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Is the Holocaust Unique?



PERSPECTIVES ON
COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE

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The Uniqueness of the Holocaust: The Historical Dimension

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I

Introduction

Given the focus of this book on the issue of the uniqueness of the Holocaust, I wish to state clearly at the outset my position on this matter: The Holocaust, that is, the intentional murder of European Jewry during World War II, is historically and phenomenologically unique. No other case discussed in this book parallels it. My burden in the remainder of this chapter is to document and defend this statement.

In arguing for the uniqueness of the Holocaust, I am *not* making a *moral* claim, in other words, that the Holocaust was more evil than the other events discussed in this collection, for example, the murder of Armenians in World War I, the devastation of the Native American communities over the centuries, the decimation of Ukraine by Stalin, the treatment of the Gypsies during World War II, and the enslavement and mass death of black Africans during the enterprise of New World slavery. I know of no method or technique that would allow one to weigh up, to quantify and compare, such massive evil and suffering, and I therefore avoid altogether this sort of counterproductive argument about what one might describe as comparative suffering.

In addition, I am not suggesting that the Holocaust involved the greatest number of victims of any mass crime. It did not. Numbers of victims will not establish the uniqueness of the Holocaust—quite the contrary.

When I argue for the uniqueness of the Holocaust I intend only to claim that the Holocaust is phenomenologically unique by virtue of the fact that never before has a state set out, as a matter of intentional principle and actualized policy, to annihilate physically every man, woman, and child belonging to a specific people. A close study of the relevant comparative historical data will show that only

in the case of Jewry under the Third Reich was such all-inclusive, noncompromising, unmitigated murder intended.

Given the limits of this short chapter, my presentation must be selective and schematic. I will, therefore, consider only three of the cases discussed by others in this volume in order to show how they differ from the Holocaust. If space allowed, a similar decipherment in support of *difference* could be made in every case said to be comparable to the Holocaust in this collection.¹

II

The Case of the Native Americans:

Colonial America and the United States

The Native American people(s) have been the subject of exploitation, depoliation, rape, violence, and murder since the arrival of Columbus. This centuries-long record of subjugation and abuse is incontrovertible and tragic. However, I would argue that the structure, the character, of the assault against the Native American peoples differs radically from that represented by the Holocaust for several fundamental reasons, the most basic of which is the role that disease has played in this history. That is to say: All serious contemporary students of the demographic collapse of the Indian peoples of America (that is, populations north of Mexico) are now agreed that its primary cause, whatever other factors contributed to this phenomenon, was newly imported pathogens against which the native community, estimated at anywhere between 1 million (plus or minus 10 percent) and 18 million, had no immunity. Henry Dobyns lists ninety-three pandemics and epidemics, most of which occurred in the territory that now comprises the United States, caused by European pathogens that struck the Native American peoples between 1500 and 1900. And for the sixteenth century alone—the period of the greatest decimation—Alfred W. Crosby Jr. cites fourteen major epidemics between 1524 and 1600.

As occurred also in the unparalleled demographic collapse of the South American Indian population in the sixteenth century, not only did the American aborigines lack the biological ability, the immunological prerequisites, to resist the unfamiliar and unfriendly microbes that now assaulted them, the European invaders and settlers who were directly responsible for their (often unknowing) importation lacked the scientific knowledge required to halt their deadly work once it had begun. Thus, infectious killers were unintentionally let loose within the Americas, and literally nothing was able to intervene to limit the massive damage they would do.

This phenomenon defined the history of the Native American peoples right through the nineteenth century. In the most complete analysis of nineteenth-century Indian demography undertaken to date, Henry Dobyns enumerates no less than twenty-seven epidemic outbreaks during that century, the most deadly of

which were thirteen smallpox epidemics, the two worst occurring in 1801–1802 and 1836–1840. During the first of these, James Mooney estimates that, for example, “the prairie tribes . . . lost more than half of their population at this time, while the Wichita, Caddo, and others in the South suffered almost as severely.”² Nearly everywhere in the United States, Indians continued to die, and disease was the primary cause of their death.

For example, Sherburne Cook attributes only 8.64 percent of the decline in California’s Indian population to military casualties, most of the remainder, that is, the rate of loss, being due to disease. This ratio of loss due to disease versus other factors evidenced in California also obtained more generally, with modification from location to location, throughout the country in Indian-white relations. Thus, Cook concluded that only approximately 6,750 Indians had been killed by white settlers in New England between 1634 and 1676, even though this half-century included the Pequot War of 1637 (and saw the native population of New England decline by many times that number). Even Russell Thornton, who has vigorously attempted to highlight the roles of warfare and genocide in the decline of the Indian population, is forced by the unassailable demographic evidence to conclude that, at most, “45,000 American Indians [were] killed in wars with Europeans and Americans between 1775–1890. To this might be added . . . 8,500 American Indians killed in individual conflicts during the period, to arrive at a total of 53,000 killed.”³

That is to say, in a period of 115 years, during which the indigenous population declined by over 1.5 million, only 53,000 casualties, or 3.7 percent of the total lost, can be counted as having been intentionally murdered. For the pre-1775 period, the percentage of loss due to warfare (and individual murder) is even lower. Thornton, for example, in attempting to configure losses in the prerevolutionary era, suggests doubling the post-1775 figure of 53,000 to arrive at the pre-1775 aggregate. Accordingly, if we follow this suggestion, if only for purposes of argument, we have a projection, however crudely arrived at, of 106,000 casualties due to war and conflict situations in this earlier epoch. However, given the much higher total native population in this initial contact period—anywhere up to 10 or more times as great as what it was after 1775—the percentage of loss represented by this hypothesized 106,000 casualties shrinks to some fraction of 1 percent.

When mass death occurred among the Indians of America, and it did occur, it was almost without exception caused by microbes, not militia—although militias were much in evidence and did their damage—that is, this depopulation happened unwittingly rather than by design, even transpiring in direct opposition to the expressed and self-interested will of the white empire-builder or settler. This is true for the colonial era as well as for the period of American domination. It should be specifically remarked, contra the genocidal reading of these historical events, that after the discovery of the smallpox vaccination in 1797, all Indians were encouraged to be vaccinated, and following the epidemic of 1831–1832, U.S. government policy required the vaccination of Indians. The resistance of the

western tribes to this statute contributed directly to their decimation by epidemics in the late 1830s and early 1840s.

Certainly the fatigue, the unaccustomed and punishing hunger, and a host of related psychological dilemmas that attended white conquest, in conjunction with direct military conflicts and acts of violence, reduced the inherent ability of the native population to withstand the heretofore unencountered pathogens. Yet these important factors do not alter the *unintentional* character of the spread of these infectious visitations—the primary killer—nor our appreciation of the notorious inability to control these pandemics once they began. Moreover, in contrast to those who would overemphasize the nonpathogenic causes of Indian decline, it needs to be understood that the most widespread and demographically significant epidemics—claiming an estimated one-third or more of the still very large native population—were the very earliest ones, in other words, those connected with the initial contact, that occurred *prior* to any full-scale program of enforced labor or removals north of Mexico.

Disease unaided, disease *per se*, along with the internal social and communal dislocations it created, was the primary, unavoidable, and ubiquitous agency of death among North American Indians between 1492 and 1900.

In addition, further mediating factors are to be considered in drawing the distinction between the Native American case and the Holocaust. Foremost among these is the vast enterprise of mission that was first established and supported by all the colonial powers and then continued under American auspices.

After American independence, between 1787 and 1820, eleven denominational and interchurch groups created missionary agencies, the most active being the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, an interdenominational group with a predominance of Presbyterian and Congregational missionaries founded in 1810. By 1824, twenty-one missionary schools were being supported by federal and private funds—six by the American Board of Commissioners, five by the Baptists, four by the United Foreign Missionary Society, four by the Methodists, and one each by the Moravians, Presbyterians, Cumberland Missionary Society, and the Catholics. The Indian Department reported in 1824–1825 that in 1824 a total of \$192,064.48 had been spent on Indian education from all sources (government, Indian annuities, and private donations) and that this amount had increased to \$202,070.85 by 1825. By 1826, the total of Indian missionary schools had grown to thirty-eight, and a number of new missionary societies had come into being. These thirty-eight schools had 281 teachers and 1,159 students and received \$13,550 from the federal government. The most notable conversionary successes were in the South among those nations later known as the Five Civilized Tribes, the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole, with the Cherokee providing the single most remarkable case in point.

By the 1830s, despite significant setbacks connected with the Jacksonian removals, which had seriously divided the diverse missionary groups (and differing denominations), both Protestant and Catholic missionaries were working inten-

sively among the Native Americans from Florida to California and from New York to the Great Northwest. In the 1840s, Jesuits were active in Idaho, Washington, and the Dakota Territory, and Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists were to be found in the Dakota Territory and in the Northwest. The 1850s witnessed the spread of missions to the Santee and the Ojibway in Minnesota. Now, too, the Mormons established missions to the Shoshoni and Delaware in Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, and Idaho. All this at the cost of many millions of dollars. For example, between 1818 and 1830 the Choctaw Mission in Mississippi, which converted a total of 360 individuals and established four small churches, spent \$140,000 on its relatively limited activities, and the Baptists spent on its missionary work in the West \$131,888 (\$72,184 provided by the federal government) between 1826 and 1842 and an additional \$139,750 (\$69,475 from the federal government) between 1843 and 1864. By 1865, the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions had spent no less than \$1.25 million on its Indian missionary activity.

After the Civil War, President Ulysses Grant's "peace policy," begun in 1869, encouraged still more intensive missionary activity under the leadership of the Quakers. At Grant's request, the Board of Indian Commissioners, composed of wealthy and influential Protestant laymen (no Catholics were nominated), was established by an act of Congress on April 10, 1869. Along with the creation of this new board, the selection of Indian agents, with obvious disregard for the First Amendment, was, at least in part, given over to church groups in the hope that they would be able to reform and improve the Indian service. In all, thirteen denominations came to control seventy-three agencies dealing with approximately 235,000 Indians. However, their inexperience and lack of a coherent design in such matters proved fatal, and, in the end, this reformist system, for all its considerable ambition and undoubted goodwill, did not work. By 1882, this Christian reform program was abandoned—even the Quakers having lost faith in it in its place the country moved to adopt a radically alternative strategy for solving the "Indian problem"—the allotment of Indian lands.

What is of particular and compelling interest *vis-à-vis* the post-1880 reformist effort to resolve the fate of the Indian peoples is the naive, quasi-Utopian, exceedingly insensitive, ultimately destructive, though kindly meant, ideology that governed this short-lived experiment. At the core of this initiative, undertaken by well-intended, thoroughly ethnocentric men, was the orthodox white opinion that Indian culture was inferior and that in order to "advance," the Indians had to shed their traditions as they "progressed" up the ladder of "civilization." The Indian modes of existence (personal and corporate), in all their distinctive particulars, were, by definition, doomed. Like the liberals of Europe who a priori demanded the complete eradication of Jewish identity as the fair, obligatory price for Jewish emancipation and civic equality before and after the French Revolution, the "friends" of the Indian, with clear consciences, demanded a comparable extinguishing of Native American identity. The liberals in both Europe and America—and this is what made them liberals—were for the rapid accultur-

ation and (eventual) equality of the Jew and the Indian respectively, but only after all vestiges of their traditional *tribal* consciousness and classical forms of life had been eliminated. As such, the most revolutionary constructions of ethnicity were seen not only as thoroughly compatible with authentic friendship for the Native American (and the European Jew) but, actually, as an entailment of that friendship. "Poor Indian, Poor Jew, savages and primitive obscurantists respectively, we know better." Native Americanism (like Judaism) would be, had to be, exterminated—but through an ethnocidally generous process that preserved the fundamental Native American stock now to be refashioned and recycled in a more acceptable majoritarian image.

Put simply, the reality of mission, the implication of all the conversionary activity here described, is contragenocidal in its intent.

The creation of Indian reservations also bears directly on this issue of putative Indian genocide. In fact, after 1850, the policy of reservations became the primary national response to the "Indian question," because, unless the indigenous peoples could be protected against the tidal flow of white settlement that was in the process of creating a vast settler nation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, all hope of preventing the extinction of the Indian would prove a cruel illusion. That is, *as an alternative to extinction*, and as a new, if in many ways equivocal, manifestation of America's historic paternalistic and imperialistic colonial attitudes toward the nation's aboriginal peoples, a second round of Indian removals, now to newly established reservations, began. This policy, first articulated in a programmatic way by William Medill, commissioner of Indian affairs in the James Polk administration, allowed the majority of western Indian territory to be opened up to white settlement while establishing a "controlled" and protected environment—all too often actually uncontrolled and unprotected—wherein intercourse, laws, white-directed educational reform (there were forty-two Indian schools by 1842 with some 2,000 pupils of both sexes), and missionary activity could, working together, begin to transform the indigene into a peasant-style Christian farmer. Indian culture would give way to "civilization," but the Indians themselves, that is, as a biological entity, would survive, if in a starkly different sociocultural guise.

Beginning in the early 1850s, under the administration of President Millard Fillmore, the implementation of this policy on a broad scale was accelerated. For example, the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation was created in 1851 for the Hedatza, Mandan, and Arikara; the Otoe were moved to the Blue River Reservation in Nebraska and Kansas in 1854; and the Cheyenne and Arapaho were "settled" temporarily as it turned out—for they had another decade of overt resistance left in their system—in areas south of the Arkansas. Various California Indian nations were enclosed on the Fresno Farm Reservation in 1852, the El Tejon Reservation in 1853, and the Nome Ladkee Reservation in 1854, with six additional loci created between 1856 and 1870 (though only three of these reservations remained open by 1871). The Chippewa of Michigan and Wisconsin

began their entry onto reservations in 1854. In fact, in 1854 alone, the various Indian nations ceded, in twelve treaties, 18 million acres in return for reservations of 1.5 million acres. In 1865, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache were established in northern Texas and western Oklahoma. In 1866, the Sante Reservation was created in Nebraska, and, in 1867, the White Earth Reservation was created for the Chippewa. In 1868, the Navajo were moved to a reservation in northern New Mexico and Arizona; the Utes were relocated to western Colorado and parts of Utah; and a number of other Utah tribes were installed in the Uintah Valley. The Sioux, under the Treaty of Fort Laramie, settled in Montana and the Dakotas after 1868, and the Oglala Sioux settled at the Red Cloud Reservation in 1870. In 1873, the Mescaleros were lodged on a reservation in their traditional lands in south-central New Mexico; in 1869, a final settlement with the Southern Cheyenne and Southern Arapaho was reached that created a nearly 4.3-million-acre reservation in western Oklahoma; in 1874, the Kickapoo, who had previously been moved west of the Mississippi, were moved once more to a newly created reservation; the Pawnee were installed on a reservation in Indian Territory in 1875; and then in 1876-1877, following further wars and General George Custer's massacre, the Northern Cheyenne were likewise moved to this territory. In the Northwest beginning in 1855, the Nez Percé were given a 3-million-acre territory in the Grande Ronde, Clearwater, and Snake and Salmon Valleys of Idaho; the Cayuse, Umatilla, and Wallawalla were provided with a grant of 800 square miles in the Blue Mountains beginning in 1855; and the Kiklatia, Yakima, and Paloo (Palouse) were settled on the Yakima River in the Washington Territory. The Flathead, Upper Pend d'Oreille, and Kutenai were ceded a 1.25-million-acre reserve in northern Montana. In Oregon, the indigenous peoples were contained in the Warm Springs Reservation, and the Numa (Northern Paiute) who spread across parts of Oregon, California, Idaho, and Nevada were removed to the Walker Lake and Pyramid Lake (and other) reservations after the Pyramid Lake War of 1860. By 1876, even some Apache had accepted their fate and joined reservations. Indeed, by the mid-1870s Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano estimated that Indian reservations outside of the Indian Territory occupied 96,155,785 acres (containing 172,000 people). Accordingly, as late as 1887, Indian lands totaled 156 million acres.

This enterprise of protected resettlement was, ultimately but not surprisingly, unable to transcend the broader crosscurrents and deeply partisan politics of the period. Pressure to reduce Indian landholdings continued, justified by various reformist ideologies as well as outright avarice, often offering only a "fig leaf." However, even a cursory study of the inventory of the reservations already listed indicates that the U.S. government, despite the inhumanity and injustice incarnate in this grossly unfair resolution of the territorial question, never came, relative to the American Indian, to the Hitlerian conclusion: "You cannot live at all." During this era physical abuse and moral indifference were present in abundance in Indian affairs, but the substantial criminality and severe neglect that reigned

supreme were not the consequence of, and were not accompanied by, a consciously enacted program of extermination.

In the years following the Civil War, especially during President Grant's terms in office, the U.S. government carried through its decision that the Indian people qua a people could not live *among* the white population but could continue their separate communal life in their degraded and reduced circumstances, with official America's consent in the special Indian territories created for this purpose. It did so because, as the commissioner of Indian affairs wrote in 1867, the policy of "preservation by gradual concentration on territorial reserves [was the only alternative to] swift extermination by the sword and famine."⁴ This was not a noble choice. White society, even as it "saved" the aboriginal inhabitants of the land, was guilty of colossal wrongdoing. Yet, despite the monumentality and endurance of the crime, this was not a crime without limits and self-imposed constraints. The maintenance of 141 reservations (by 1880), controlling well over 100 million acres (including the Indian territory), inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Indians—housing 11,328 students in school, 177 church buildings, and 27,215 Indian church members—is indisputable evidence of this. The reservation, for all the ethical and existential transgressions that it represents, is a concession to survival, a commitment to continued individual and tribal existence. (As proof of its success in at least providing for native survival, I note that in the mid-1980s, the Native American population of the United States was put at 1.532 million by the U.S. Census Bureau, with 631,574 persons still living on 278 reservations; the 1990 census put the native Indian population at over 1.8 million.)

In this often misrepresented historical context, it is important to recognize explicitly that the Indian Wars, begun in the 1850s and 1860s against the great western tribes (Navajo, Comanche, Sioux, and Apache), were fought not to exterminate the Indians outright but rather to break their serious and continued resistance to removal to reservations. The federal government and the U.S. Army sought to crush Indian autonomy, eradicate Indian territorial attachments, put an end to the extremely expensive Indian Wars, and reduce the Indians to a subservient and acquiescent mode of behavior that would allow the national authorities to dictate the sociopolitical, economic, and existential conditions of Indian life. This description applies even to such humanly costly encounters as occurred, for example, in the Washington Territory in the mid-1850s during the Rogue River War and the Yakima War. For these military conflicts, too, were fought so that the federal authorities could successfully relocate Indian tribes drawn from Oregon and Washington onto eight reservations established for them. This nonexterminatory reading of the great Indian Wars is reinforced, moreover, by the treatment of (to take just one example) the Nez Percé, who chose not to join their Northwest Indian neighbors in the military conflicts of the 1850s and were, at least for a time, spared their depredations as a consequence. That is to say, reflective of a larger conscious American design, there was no national homicidal scheme directed at the Washington and Oregon Indians.

Likewise, the great climactic Indian Wars on the plains in the 1870s and 1880s against the Kiowa, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche, and Sioux, among others, were, for all their lethal ferocity, a continuation of the dominant-submissive pattern that the federal authorities now sought to impose on white-Indian relations. Contra the misconceived genocidal school of historical interpreters, it is here relevant to recognize the salient fact—not forgetting particular massacres perpetrated by American military forces, indeed, precisely in light of them—that once the U.S. Army had subdued the great western tribes on the field of battle, it could have slaughtered all the remaining tribal members had genocide been its determine purpose. It was not and it did not.

III

The Famine in Ukraine

The widespread and consequential famine in Ukraine between 1930 and 1933 also has to be accounted for in light of the current argument contra genocide. There are two main lines of scholarly interpretation as to what happened in Ukraine and why. The first of these emphasizes the nationalist dimensions of the event. Under this interpretation, both the indigenous Ukrainian population and the alien Soviet ruling class knew that Ukraine, as recently as 1918, had been independent—with its own separate historical and cultural traditions—and that it wished to be politically independent again. Accordingly, the confrontation of the late 1910s and of the 1920s and 1930s in this region is seen as having been defined by the collision of two competing claims to sovereignty: one nationalist and the other putatively internationalist, though, increasingly, the latter was merely a cover for an ever more visible Russian national chauvinism. For Stalin, the ultimate objective is seen to have been the full integration without national remainder of Ukraine into the larger, ideally homogenized, Soviet state. Anything less was dangerous, both practically—because it would interfere with Bolshevik control of the agricultural market and the essential issue of grain collection and distribution, a circumstance that often divided the local leadership—and potentially—because of the geopolitically divisive character of nationalist aspirations. In consequence, Stalin, under this nationalist reading, consciously decided on a deadly campaign—most accurately described through the political category of internal colonialism—to eradicate this recurring threat to Soviet hegemony. Beginning with the purge of Ukrainian academics and political and cultural leaders that began in April 1929 and continued into 1930, Stalin is believed to have set in motion a movement that would eventually consume literally millions of Ukrainians.

The object of the entire terror campaign was, under this exegesis, the complete annihilation of Ukrainian nationalism (a goal that was also consistent with the larger Stalinist policy of the socialization of agriculture). Much like Hitler's later

strategy in, for example, Poland (and elsewhere in eastern Europe), Stalin sought to expunge local autonomy and all manifestations of cultural and political independence in order to facilitate continued domination from Moscow. Here, as in many other cases that easily come to mind (Cambodia, Nigeria, Sudan, and, most recently, Rwanda), the purpose of state-organized violence is the maintenance of political control.

Given the importance of the independent, economically autonomous peasantry in Ukraine's socioeconomic structures, Stalin's plan for the extermination of national identity required—in addition to the removal of the national intelligentsia—a crusade against this "protocapitalist" strata. As Semen O. Pidhainy has described it, Stalin had to move against Ukrainian nationalism's "social base"—the individual landholdings.⁵ "Only a mass terror throughout the body of the nation—that is, the peasantry—could reduce the nation to submission."⁶ As long as the *selianym* (a euphemism now for all free Ukrainian peasants) existed, nationalist (and capitalist) sentiment would remain: Both needed to be crushed.

The dominant method used to achieve this collective submission to socialism, this elimination of the base of Ukrainian national sentiment, was the forced collectivization of the agricultural sector. At the same time, and not unimportant, such a centralized agrarian policy gave the Communist Party—in the form of the All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture—control over the region's grain supply. It was the task and responsibility of this commissariat, in conjunction with the Soviet planners, to calculate, coordinate, and organize the yearly grain harvest, in other words, to set and oversee the state exactions to be levied and collected. In the event, when this direct control was expressed in an overly demanding target for grain exports from the region—ostensibly justified by the increased program of industrialization that was to be financed by the agricultural surplus—it effectively translated into a man-made famine in Ukraine in 1931 that grew worse in 1932 and 1933. For example, in 1931, the procurement quota for the region was set at 7 million tons out of a total of 18.3 million tons (much of which had been lost to inefficient collective harvesting). Such a level of national procurement almost certainly spelled trouble for the local community. Matters of food supply only got worse in 1932 when the procurement total was again set at 7 million tons while that year's harvest, due to drought, inefficiency, and a decline in the number of acres sown—the last partly in protest to Stalinist policy—came in at the very reduced level of 14.7 million tons. Although the local leadership, in the face of the total decline in tonnage, managed to persuade Moscow, at great cost to itself in the suspicions of disloyalty (and suspect nationalism) that such appeals raised, to reduce the quota to 6.6 million tons—itsself a target never fulfilled—even this reduced sum was still far too high to make it possible to avoid massive starvation. Stalin, despite the mounting death toll, did not believe, or did not want to believe, the claim that the harvest was too small both to feed the Ukrainian people and to provide sufficient grain for export. Instead, already intently suspicious of Ukrainian separatism and fearful of local disloyalty, he chose

to interpret the failure to meet the inordinate quotas sent down from the center as deliberate acts of "sabotage," the peasants as no better than "wreckers" of the socialist dream. Therefore, in a deliberate act intended to punish the population of Ukraine—though justified as an act of socialist self-defense—he continued to export grain from the region, if at a lower rate: 1.73 million tons in 1932 and 1.68 million tons in 1933, compared to 5.2 million tons in 1931. This export of grain, given the greatly reduced supplies, turned an already grave situation into an occasion of mass death.

Increased pressure was now also applied against the *selianym*-class enemy, local party officials (37.3 percent of the new Ukrainian Communist Party members and candidate members were purged and 75 percent of local Soviets and members of local committees were replaced, with many of those who were replaced being arrested for failing to produce the required quota), those involved in local agricultural middle management (many of these officials were arrested in the second half of 1932 for sabotaging Bolshevik policy), and all channels of Ukrainian economic, cultural, and nutritional self-sufficiency. On December 14, 1932, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party accused the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party "of tolerating a Ukrainian nationalist deviation in its ranks" and then proceeded, on January 24, 1933, to replace it with a new ruling clique headed by Pavel Postyshev. At the same time, all available food aid to the stricken population, it is argued, was consciously denied, existing grain reserves in the region and elsewhere were not made available, and the importation of food was stopped at the border of Ukraine—all while Stalin, in an act of depravity, continued, as already noted, to export more than 3 million tons of grain in 1932 and 1933. As a result, there was massive—under this decoding, *intentional*—starvation throughout Ukraine climaxing in 1933 and 1934. Of a peasant population of upwards of 25 million, I estimate that up to 5 million persons, or 20 percent of the rural population, plus from 500,000 to 750,000 persons in the urban areas of Ukraine, died from lack of food and related medical problems in this period. In some areas, the death rate was as low as 10 percent, in others nearly 100 percent, depending largely upon local agricultural and ecological conditions, for example, and most importantly, the ability to find other sources of nutrition, such as fish or wildlife—in many places this also led to cannibalism and infanticide—to replace the lost grain harvests.

So goes the nationalist account of the Ukrainian famine interpreted as an intentional, man-made "genocide." Stalin purposely killed 5 million or more Ukrainians, plus hundreds of thousands of additional individuals belonging to other ethnic groups, such as the Volga Germans and Kuban Cossacks, in order both to decapitate opposition to agricultural collectivization and to eradicate Ukrainian, and other, nationalist aspirations.

Now, accepting this nationalist interpretation of Ukrainian history, at least for the sake of argument, what are we to conclude about these events constituting an instance of genocide? This is neither an irrelevant nor a trivial question given the

size of the human losses involved and the evil will that is asserted to have directly caused, to have been knowingly responsible for, these losses. Moreover, I do not want to support any diminution or denial of this vast collective tragedy; the existence of which is not in doubt. However—and here I recognize that given the loss of millions of persons this conclusion will seem at first counterintuitive—even if the nationalist intentionalist thesis is correct, the results—at least 5 million deaths—do *not* constitute the technical crime of genocide, and the event, in its phenomenological specificity and totality, is not, for all of its murderous ferocity and demographic enormity, comparable to the Shoah. I would argue—assuming the correctness of this account—that the ruthless campaign against Ukrainian nationalism that destroyed a majority of the indigenous Ukrainian cultural and political elite, in addition to a significant segment of the peasant population of the region, is most correctly categorized as an instance of nationalist conflict and internal colonialism rather than as an example of genocide. Stalin did not intend to exterminate the entire population of Ukraine.

This conclusion finds immediate support from the apposite statistical indicators: Though the human carnage was enormous—approaching the number of Jewish victims during the Second World War—the portion of the Ukrainian peasant population lost was somewhere near 20 percent (plus or minus 5 percent), and the losses for the Ukrainian population as a whole were in the area of 15 percent. These demographic results resemble (if being slightly higher than) the figures for population decline in those eastern European countries overrun by the Nazis, and in both cases the numbers do not indicate that a policy of total population eradication was pursued. Had Stalin in Ukraine—and Hitler in eastern Europe—sought to pursue a genocidal war, given the destructive possibilities that lay open to him, more than 15 percent of the population would have been done away with. More people were not killed because, amid the murder that did occur, there was, odd as this may seem, restraint. There was restraint because Stalin did not want to eradicate the people of Ukraine; he wanted to exploit them. Eliminating the whole of a vanquished helot population makes no more sense than slaughtering one's slaves. However, in contrast, eliminating a conquered people's controlling elite, leaving it leaderless, anxious, and vertiginous, is a rational and functional strategy, long pursued by conquerors and adopted by Stalin, in order to achieve both enduring subordination of the subjugated and political stability in one's empire. This is not a humane imperial strategy—a regular course of action to be recommended as a form of empire maintenance—but neither is it genocide.

Ironically, this judgment is confirmed by the heartrending condition of the children, especially infants and the newborn. Throughout Ukraine, youthful caravans lay strewn across the landscape; the entire territory had become a crude necropolis for children under the age of twelve who were unable to obtain enough nourishment to stay alive. Yet even here, in the midst of the most intense human suffering, the relevant population statistics require careful decipherment. The latest demographic data indicate that fewer than 760,000 children died,⁸ largely

from starvation, between 1932 and 1934. This represents, depending on one's estimation of other relevant demographic variables, between 6 percent and 33.5 percent of the age cohort and a significant percentage of the total population decline. However, recognizing the great tragedy that occurred here, even the maximum loss rate of 33.5 percent does not support a genocidal reading of this event. For, on these numbers, that is, a loss rate of between 6 and 33.5 percent, 66.5 percent of Ukrainian children, at a minimum, survived. Once the famine was past its peak in May 1933, the surviving two out of three children were not singled out for further harassment or worse. Most of those who survived the crisis of 1932–1933 survived.

This historical outcome regarding the children is not trivial. What makes the Ukrainian case non-genocidal, and what makes it different from the Holocaust, is the fact that the majority of Ukrainian children survived and, still more, that they were *permitted* to survive. Even the mountain of evidence pertaining to Stalin's evil actions produced by the proponents of the nationalist-genocide thesis—for example, James Mace and Robert Conquest—does not indicate an intent to eliminate, or any motive that would plausibly justify the extermination of, the Ukrainian biological stock. Though the number of Ukrainian children who died and, under the intentionalist reading, were murdered, was almost as high as (or higher than) the number of Jewish children who were exterminated, their deaths were the consequence of, represented, and intended something wholly different from what the murder of Jewish children at Auschwitz and Treblinka represented and intended. In the Ukrainian case, the focused object of the violence and death was national enfeeblement and political dismemberment. In the Shoah, the focused object, given its racial determinants, was physical genocide. Stalin intended that after the famine there should still be Ukrainians, though not Ukrainianism; Hitler intended that after Auschwitz there would be neither Jews nor Judaism. The loss of every child in both contexts, employing the calculus of the talmudic sages, was the loss of a world. The death of each child was an act of equal immorality. Nonetheless, there is an important, nonreductive, phenomenological difference to be drawn between mass murder (including children) and complete group extinction (including children), between a war for political and territorial domination (including children) and a war of unlimited biological annihilation (including children).

The issue, the interpretive inquiry, the dialectic of evidence and meaning regarding the Ukrainian tragedy, is still more complex. For, as noted (nonpolemically) at the outset of this analysis, there are two possible explanations of the Ukrainian tragedy. The second possible, plausible, non-nationalist deconstruction of the Ukrainian tragedy argues that the famine was neither intended nor man-made—though, ultimately, it was the result of human errors connected with the program of forced collectivization. That is to say, under this alternative reading, the famine, the reality and extent of which no one denies, was not the consequence of a premeditated plan to murder large numbers of Ukrainians in sup-

port of an antinationalist political outcome in the region. Therefore, by definition, what transpired, though baleful and full of bile, was not genocide.

The case for this very different interpretation has been made by a number of scholars including, most recently, J. Arch Getty, Walter Laqueur, Mark B. Tauger, and R. W. Davies, and is supported by both Robert C. Tucker's narrative in his *Stalin in Power* and Adam Ullian's conclusion in his *Stalin: The Man and His Era*: "Stalin and his closest collaborators had not willed the famine."⁹

Now, under either interpretation of the Ukrainian tragedy, the fact is that, though something very terrible occurred in Ukraine, what happened was a very different sort of thing—structurally and as regards intention—than what transpired in the Holocaust.

IV

The Armenian Tragedy

The Armenian tragedy was an enormous historical outrage. As I understand this event, the controlling ambition, the collective civic agenda, behind Turkish inhumanity was primarily nationalist in character and, in practice, limited in scope and purpose. The Armenian massacres were an indecent, radicalized manifestation of a most primitive jingoism activated by the exigencies of war from within and the revolutionary collapse of the Ottoman empire from within. Turkish nationalism—the extreme nationalist elites in control of the Turkish state—now under the violent cover of war, envisioned and pursued the elimination of (not the murder of) all non-Turkish elements—and most especially and specifically the eradication of the Armenian community—from the national context. The anti-Armenian crusade was, therefore, for all its lethal extravagance, a delimited political crusade. Of course, mixed into the noxious brew that represented itself as national destiny were other obsessions: a loathing of Christians if not all non-Muslims, xenophobia, greed, jealousy, fear, desire, and the like. But, above all else, the "war against the Armenians" was a vulgar and desperate manifestation of raw nationalist politics.

As a direct and immediate consequence, anti-Armenianism is not expressed in the baroque language of metaphysical evil, nor does it require (paraphrasing Heinrich Himmler's assertion that "all Jews without exception must die") the complete annihilation of every Armenian man, woman, and child. It does not represent a racial collision as that term came to be understood in the ornate ontological schema of Nazism. There is no assertion of primordial reciprocity between power and being, between intrahuman aggression and metahistoric causations, between biological contingencies and nomenclological principles. Rather, the elemental rationale almost universally cited by the Turks in defense of their actions is political: The Armenians were secessionists, Russian spies, fifth-columnists, and divisive nationalists who would subvert the Turkish people's revolution and de-

stroy Turkish national and political integrity. This explanatory tack, this nationalist warrant, is already determinative in the prewar Turkish interpretation of, for example, the Armenian massacres at Adana in April 1909, and it reappears in full force in the explication of the events of 1915–1916. Repeated Turkish reference to the Armenian revolution at Van in 1915 is perhaps the outstanding example of this "legitimizing" mode of moral-political reasoning.

This is to argue that contrary to, for example, Helen Fein's contention that the Armenians were "enemies by definition,"¹⁰ that is, on a priori ideological or racial grounds—thereby allowing her erroneously to equate the action against Jews and Gypsies in World War II with that against the Armenians in World War I—the Armenians were "enemies" to the degree that they were enemies in this context, on practical and political grounds centering around long-standing policies of internal colonialism, the implications—and machinations—of national self-determination, and the provocative issue of loyalty in time of war. Accordingly, the objective of Turkish action, when it came in 1915–1916, was the destruction, once and for all, of Armenian national identity. The criminality of the Armenians did not require (as I shall show in detail in a moment) the biological extinction of every Armenian man, woman, and child—especially if such individual and collective survival took place outside Turkish national boundaries and, therefore, made no claims upon Turkish sovereignty or national territory.

This is not to ignore the magnitude of the crime perpetrated against the Armenian people, the misery and death entailed by the mass deportations, the continual abuse of Armenian women, the mix of ideology, sadism, and self-interest in the massacre of Armenian men, and the theft and murder of infants and children. It is, however, to insist that these deliberate acts of despoliation and near-unlimited cruelty be deciphered aright. To decipher them aright means recognizing their particular strategic causation that (odd as this may sound, given the vast inhuman carnage that occurred) entailed limits. Being a political-national assault against a political enemy, the Young Turks could achieve their preeminent goal—the protection of the nation as they defined it—without requiring the complete physical extirpation of every person of Armenian heritage. To this degree (and here I make only this limited and very precise claim), the intentionality behind, as well as the actualized structure of, the Turkish program for the eradication of Armenian national existence was *unlike* the biocentric war that Nazism carried on against the Jews—because the "Armenian question" differed in its quintessential character from the "Jewish question." The former had been a conflicted political issue for nearly a century, had created manifold pressures and functional compromises for the Ottoman state, and now could be, once and for all, resolved by the annihilation of the organized Armenian *community* within Turkey. In contrast, the Jewish question, which had likewise been a central, exceedingly controversial, political concern in Europe since the beginning of Jewish emancipation in the eighteenth century, was categorically transformed by Hitler into an inescapable metaphysical challenge ("blood" in the Nazi universe of dis-

course being understood as the elementary vehicle by which ontological values become incarnate in history) that could *only* be resolved by an uncompromisingly genocidal assault. The Third Reich, therefore, insisted not only on the elimination of Jewish collective identity and communal existence, but also on the murder of every Jewish person of whatever age and gender.

At this juncture of our argument, three seminal factors that strengthen the morphological *disanalogy* between the Armenian tragedy and the Holocaust need to be introduced. They are: (1) the possibility of Armenian Christian conversion to Islam as a way of avoiding deportation and worse; (2) the specific character of the forced deportations; and (3) the *nontotalistic* nature of the anti-Armenian crusade.

As regards the mediating role of conversion to Islam, the eyewitness accounts of the tragedy repeatedly mention this lifesaving, though communally destructive, possibility. Both "willingly" and unwillingly, large numbers of Armenians became Muslims. In particular, there appears to have been extensive, forced proselytization of Armenian women and children. It is difficult to ascertain just what role official Ittihadist ideology played in these coerced prophylactic rituals, though it is clear that the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), devoid as it was of a racist ideology, did not oppose such re-creative, death-deflecting actions. Indeed, to the degree that Islamization constructively reinforced the Young Turks' normative political agenda—Islam being a fundamental buttress of Turkification (whereas Christianity was the key element in Armenian self-identity)—this survivalist (flagrantly inhumane) program was consistent with CUP ambitions; and it found wide instantiation. So wide, in fact, that Johannes Lepsius again and again excoriates the Turkish government for allowing, even encouraging, this tyrannical policy, and Arnold Toynbee accusingly refers to "survival being purchased by apostatizing to Islam."¹¹ Likewise, the German, U.S., British, and other governments are on record as protesting this unwelcome practice.

In that neither Islam nor Turkism is predicated on inelastic, biologicistic concepts, both possess absorptive capacities that create existential as well as sociopolitical possibilities unavailable in Nazism. Accordingly, the "other" is not only defined differently by the Ittihad elites than in Hitler's Reich—not genetically and without reference to metaphysical canons of ontic pollution and decadence—but the required response to the "other" allows for the remaking of the "other," primarily through the mysterious rite of conversion, so as to obviate still more complete—that is, exterminatory—forms of overcoming. We have evidence that the children in Christian orphanages were converted en masse. It was not only women and children who were forcibly converted. Lepsius, for example, records that the entire male medical staff of the German Mission Hospital in Urfa were coerced into becoming Muslim, as were Armenian army physicians at Sivas.¹² In Aleppo, the entire Armenian labor battalion was converted in February 1916, and further large-scale conversions of Armenian males occurred in March and April 1916. Lepsius also reports that "all Armenian villages in the Samsun area and in

Urfa has been Islamized. No favors were granted to anyone, apart from renegades."¹³ In fact, Lepsius conservatively estimates that 200,000 men, women, and children, approximately 12 to 13.5 percent of the entire Armenian community, were forcibly converted and thereby saved,¹⁴ however objectionable the instrument of their salvation. In this respect, Turkish policy reproduces medieval procedures of cultural homogenization, not modern procedures of physical genocide. As such, it kept Armenians, if not Armenianism, alive.

Secondly, the Armenian deportations were not uniform events of total annihilation. Though these Armenian removals, carried out under the most brutal conditions, were regularly occasions of mass death that sealed the fate of hundreds of thousands, several hundred thousand Armenians did survive these horrific journeys. Lepsius, for example, (under)estimates the remnant at 200,000 individuals. Toynbee cites a total of 600,000 Armenian survivors up to 1916—the combined total of those who lived through the deportations and those who fled into Russian territory. He summarizes:

In general wastage [death during the deportations] seems to fluctuate, with a wide oscillation, on either side of 50 percent; 600 out of 2,500 (24 percent) reached Aleppo from a village in the Harput district; 60 percent arrived there out of the first convoy from the village of E. (near H.), and 46 percent out of the second; 25 percent arrived out of a convoy from the village of D. in the same neighborhood. We shall certainly be well within the mark if we estimate that at least half those condemned to massacre or deportation have actually perished.¹⁵

Supporting these large estimates of the number of those who were *not* killed during these forced evacuations are the figures for Armenians who found refuge in Arab countries and then, later, in western Europe and the United States. Richard Hovannisian, writing of their acceptance in the Arab world, indicates that "many of the deportees suffered a cruel fate at the hands of certain Bedouin tribes in the Syrian desert, but most were accorded sympathetic asylum by the Arab peoples, who had themselves endured four centuries of Ottoman domination. In all, the number of Armenian deportees who found refuge in Arab lands, by 1925, is estimated at well over 200,000."¹⁶ This figure excludes the 50,000 persons who found refuge in Iran. More specifically, Hovannisian breaks these refugee figures down as follows: Syria accepted 100,000 Armenian refugees; Lebanon, 50,000; Palestine and Jordan, 10,000; Egypt, 40,000; Iraq, 25,000; and Iran, 50,000, making a total of 275,000 survivors. These numbers are supported by later governmental statistics issued by the respective Arab countries. Census data released between 1931 and 1945 by the individual Middle East states indicate that Syria had an Armenian population of 125,550 (1945); Lebanon, 72,797 (1944); Palestine, 3,802 (1931); and Egypt, 19,596 (1937). Moreover, in addition to these aggregates, we also have evidence in various national census counts of the inter-war period of sizable new Armenian communities, in France, Greece,

Cyprus, Bulgaria, and the United States, with additional small populations in Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Greece, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Canada. (The population figures for these communities overlap with Hovannesian's figures for the Arab World—though to what exact degree is uncertain.) Therefore, if we put the number of survivors of these inhumane transfers at between 300,000 and 400,000, we shall be on secure grounds—or at least grounds that are as secure as possible given all the statistical uncertainties—remembering that Hovannesian's total of 275,000 does not include any survivors in Russia, Europe, or the United States. This translates into a survival rate somewhere between 17.7 percent (300,000 out of 1.7 million, the maximum Armenian population) and 26.6 percent (400,000 out of 1.5 million, the minimum Armenian population). Then, too, beyond the mathematics alone, these substantial statistics indicate that the Turkish oppressor did not require nor demand the death of all Armenians. The Turks had all of these individuals, this entire defenseless population, within their control and could have murdered them all, despite the practical difficulties involved in murdering an entire people in a country as large as Turkey had they so desired. Evidently, this was not necessary.

Thirdly, the enacted policy of deporting Armenians was not universally applied even within the borders of Turkey. The Armenians of Constantinople, numbering up to 200,000, and the Armenians of other large cities—for example, Smyrna, where between 6,000 and 20,000 Armenians lived, Kutahya, and, to some degree, Aleppo—were not uprooted en masse during the entire war period. Lepsius estimated (and, in his own words, perhaps "overestimated") that the number of Armenians so protected represented one-seventh to one-ninth of the total Armenian population, or some 204,700 persons (out of what he projected as an original Armenian population of 1,845,450).¹⁷ Although recent studies¹⁸ require that we temper Lepsius's figures and indicate that up to 30,000 Armenians were, in fact, deported from Constantinople, the need to modify all generalizations as to Turkish intentions, given the very real limitations placed upon evictions from Constantinople and elsewhere, stands.

To gain a full picture of all the relevant statistics bearing upon the question of Armenian survival, we must also add in the 300,000 or so Armenians who retreated with the Russian army back into Russian territory after the final defeat at Van in the summer of 1915 and the 4,200 who survived the famous battle at Musa Dagh and were rescued by the French in mid-September 1915. Accordingly, the comprehensive demographic picture regarding casualties and survival looks like this:

1914 Armenian Population	1,500,000–1,700,000
Converts to Islam	200,000–300,000
Survive Deportations (outside Turkey)	300,000–400,000
Survive in large Turkish Cities	170,000–220,000
Survive in Russia	250,000–300,000
Survivors of Musa Dagh	4,200–4,200

TOTAL SURVIVORS 924,200–1,224,200
TOTAL DEATHS (1915–1918, based on 1,700,000 total) 475,800–775,800

This is not the Holocaust.

V

Conclusion

The spatial limits imposed on this chapter prevent further comparative review and analysis. However, I believe that in all the other cases that are said to parallel the Holocaust, close study would show that they also are dissimilar insofar as they, too, would not be examples of an unlimited war that required complete annihilation—the death of every man, woman, and child—of the victim population. The Holocaust is a unique historical reality.

NOTES

1. I discuss all of these historical events at great length in volume 2 of my study entitled *The Holocaust in Historical Context* (New York: Oxford University Press), forthcoming. Volume 1, published in 1994, deals with premodern cases, for example, medieval antisemitism, the witch craze, the medieval crusades against heretics, and the French wars of religion, that bear on this subject.
2. James Mooney, "Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians," in the *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1895–1896* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Ethnology, 1898), part 1.
3. Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), p. 49.
4. Cited from Brian Dippie, *The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982), p. 151.
5. Semen O. Pikhainy et al., eds., *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book*, vol. 1 (Detroit, 1955), p. 205.
6. Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 219. Repeated in the *U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. xiii: "Crushing the Ukrainian peasantry made it possible for Stalin to curtail Ukrainian national self-assertion."
7. Cited from George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 166. On these political activities, interpreted from a radical Ukrainian perspective, see Hryhory Kostuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 18–37; and from a less ideological perspective, see Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics in the Ukraine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 195–208.
8. Robert Conquest's maximum total of child deaths of 4 million—3 million as a result of the famine and 1 million due to the program of dekulakization—appears, based on currently available evidence, too high. See *Harvest of Sorrow*, p. 297. Moreover, this total in-

- cludes non-Ukrainian children, for example, those of Kazakhstan, thus reducing the number and percentage of child losses in Ukraine (even on Conquest's numbers) significantly.
9. Adam Ulan, *Safire: The Man and His Era* (New York: Viking, 1973), p. 349.
 10. Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 30.
 11. Arnold Toynbee, "The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks" (pamphlet, New York, 1917).
 12. Johannes Lepsius, *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918* (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919), p. 283.
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. lxv.
 15. Arnold Toynbee in Viscount Bryce, *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916* (London: The Knickerbocker Press [for His Majesty's Stationery Office], 1916), p. 650.
 16. Richard Hovannisian, "Ebb and Flow of the Armenian Minority in the Arab Middle East," *Middle East Journal* 1(28) (Winter 1974):20.
 17. I will provide a fuller accounting of these statistics in my analysis of the Armenian Tragedy in Vol. 2 of my *Holocaust in Historical Context*.
 18. See Yahakn N. Dadrian's important qualification regarding the Armenians of Constantinople, "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications," *Yale Journal of International Law* 14(2) (Summer 1989):262, n. 131; and again, "The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23(4) (November 1991):570, n. 26. According to Dadrian's reconstruction, based on the testimony of German Ambassador Wolff-Metternich on December 7, 1915, who gave as his source the Turkish chief of policy, 30,000 Armenians were deported from Constantinople and more deportations were feared.



Responses to the Porrajmos: The Romani Holocaust¹

IAN HANCOCK

Ignorance and arrogance are in full flower ... [including] the notion that not only Jews ... but Gypsies were chosen by the Nazis for annihilation.

Edward Alexander, "Review of Lopate," 1990²

"Holocaust" has been used to encompass more than the murder of the Jews. From the casualties in our Civil War to the wholesale murder of gypsies in World War II.

William Safire, "On Language: Long Time No See," 1983³

Just four years after the fall of the Third Reich, Dora Yates, the Jewish secretary of the Gypsy Lore Society, noted in the pages of *Commentary* that:

It is more than time that civilized men and women were aware of the Nazi crime against the Gypsies as well as the Jews. Both bear witness to the fantastic dynamic of the 20th century racial fanaticism, for these two people shared the horror of martyrdom at the hands of the Nazis for no other reason than that they were—they existed. The Gypsies, like the Jews, stand alone.⁴

And, the following year, the *Wiener Library Bulletin*, organ of what is now the Jewish Institute of Contemporary History in London, published the statement that "Germany had in 1938 a gipsy population of 16,275. Of these, 85 percent were thrown into concentration camps, and no more than 12 percent survived."⁵