research on corruption
My research on corruption began when I was struck by the persistence of corruption in the face of forces which normally, so we think, reduce or eliminate it. I've also been struck by the sometimes amusing, often disturbing details of the cases. I've been focusing on corruption in the European Union's Western states, where corruption is more widespread and occurs at higher levels of government than those states' status as wealthy democracies in a common market would lead one to expect. Privatization, economic competition, free trade regimes, exports in infrastructure projects and arms, the oil industry, decentralization and multi-level elected governance bring with them new opportunities for corruption, and often fail to disrupt old patterns. Rather, the new economic and institutional changes are absorbed into pre-existing systems and create incentives and opportunities for politicians and firms to engage in corrupt transactions. The relationship between campaign and party finance regulation and corruption is not what reformers may want: more regulation brings about more corruption.
This work is forthcoming in a book with Cornell University Press, and will be the basis for a number of articles and future projects. A short piece on the problem of fraud in the EU, and by extrapolation, in international organizations, was published by The Independent Review. A longer analysis appeared in a volume on informal networks in the EU, edited by Simona Piattoni and Thomas Christensen, and published by Elgar Press (see CV for details).
The research has been generously supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0074977), the Jean Monnet Fellows program at the European University Institute, the National Fellows program at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law of Stanford University.