Douglas W. Portmores Online Papers (Last Updated: 12/5/08)
Working Drafts: (Comments and citations
are welcome, but please do not quote without permission.)
1. Imperfect
Reasons and Rational Options. Draft of 12/5/08.
Abstract: Agents often face a choice of what to do. And it seems
that, in most of these choice situations, the relevant reasons do not require
performing some particular act, but instead permit performing any of numerous
act alternatives. This is known as the basic belief. Below, I argue that the
best explanation for the basic belief is not that the relevant reasons are
incomparable (Raz) or that their justifying strength exceeds the requiring
strength of opposing reasons (Gert), but that they are imperfect reasonsreasons that do not support performing any
specific act, but instead support choosing any of the numerous alternatives
that would each produce the same valuable result. In the process, I develop and
defend a novel theory of objective rationality, arguing that it has a number of
advantages over its rivals.
Keywords: Reasons
Rationality Incomparability Imperfect Reasons Objective Rationality Subjective
Rationality The Basic Belief Justifying Strength Requiring Strength
Rational Options Future Courses of Action Joseph Raz Joshua Gert Derek
Parfit Sergio Tenenbaum Michael E. Bratman Fred Feldman Michael J.
Zimmerman.
2. Consequentializing
Commonsense Morality. Draft of 12/1/08.
Abstract: This is
Chapter Four of my Commonsense
Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this
chapter, I argue that that any plausible
nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that, for
any plausible nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a consequentialist
theory that yields the exact same set of deontic verdicts that it yields..
Keywords:
Consequentializing Maximizing rationality Agent-relative Teleology
Deontology Teleological conception of reasons Constraints Options
Supererogation Moral dilemmas Richard Brook Campbell Brown James Dreier
Frances Kamm Jennie Louise Mark Schroeder Samuel Scheffler Thomas
Scanlon Ben Sachs.
3. Teleological
Conception of Practical Reasons. Draft of 11/12/08.
Abstract: This is
Chapter Three of my Commonsense
Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this
chapter, I defend the teleological conception of
practical reasons, which holds that the reasons there are for and against
performing a given act are wholly determined by the reasons there are for and
against preferring its outcome to those of its available alternatives, such
that, if S has most reason to perform ai, all things considered, then, of all
the outcomes that S could bring about, S has most reason to desire that oi
(i.e., ais outcome)
obtains, all things considered.
Keywords: Teleology
Consequentialism Practical reasons Normativity Internalism Derek Parfit
Thomas Scanlon Elizabeth Anderson Nicholas Sturgeon Thomas Hurka
Richard Arneson.
4. Consequentialism
and Moral Rationalism. Draft of 11/12/08.
Abstract: This is
Chapter Two of my Commonsense
Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this
chapter, I make a presumptive case for moral
rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what
they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. I argue that this view
compels us to accept consequentialism, but at the same time leads us to reject
all traditional versions of the theory. I begin by explaining how moral
rationalism leads us to reject what is, perhaps, the most traditional of all
versions of consequentialism: utilitarianism.
Keywords:
Consequentialism Overridingness Practical reasons Rationality
Blameworthiness Maximizing rationality Moral rationalism Teleological
conception of practical reasons Constraints Options Supererogation
Self-other asymmetry Moral dilemmas.
5. The
Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons. Draft of 11/6/08.
Abstract: In this
paper, I defend the teleological conception of
practical reasons, which holds that since any rational action must aim at some
result, reasons that bear on whether to perform an action must appeal to the
desirability or undesirability of having that result occur, taking into account
also the intrinsic value of the act itself (Scanlon 1998, 84). On this
conception, practical reasoning involves, first, determining which ends one has
reason to desire and, second, determining which available action will best
achieve those ends.
Keywords: Teleology
Consequentialism Practical reasons Normativity Internalism Derek Parfit
Thomas Scanlon Elizabeth Anderson Nicholas Sturgeon Thomas Hurka
Richard Arneson.
6. Welfare
and Posthumous Harm. Draft of 9/6/2005.
Abstract: I argue that
even if death marks the unequivocal and permanent end to ones existence,
people have good reason to be prudentially concerned with whats going to
happen after their deaths, for, as I argue, a persons welfare can be affected
by posthumous events. I begin the paper by addressing two widely discussed
problems concerning posthumous harm: the problem of the subject and the
problem of retroactivity, arguing that they can both be solved. However, I
show that even if these two problems can be solved, a significant problem
remains: the standard account of posthumous harm, which holds that posthumous
events can harm us by thwarting our desires, is untenable, since it presupposes
an implausible version of the desire-fulfillment theory of welfare. We need,
then, a new account of how posthumous events can affect ones welfare. On the
account that I argue for, the extent to which the pain, hardship, and sacrifice
endured during ones life diminishes ones welfare depends, in part, on the
extent to which they were instrumental in producing some desired end, which in
turn depends on the course of posthumous events. In other words, I argue that
it is, prudentially speaking, better to suffer for the sake of bringing some
desired end to fruition than it is to suffer in vain, and since posthumous
events can determine which of these is the case, they can be responsible for a
persons being better or worse off.
Keywords: Welfare
Wellbeing Posthumous harm Desire fulfillment Self-sacrifice Past
desires Meaningfulness Thomas Scanlon Simon Keller Steven Luper Derek
Parfit Mark Overvold George Pitcher Joel Feinberg.
Note: This paper is now pretty much
defunct. Its most interesting bits have been more fully developed in two other
papers. These two descendants are Desire
Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm and Welfare, Achievement,
and Self-Sacrifice (see below for abstracts). Nevertheless, Ill keep the
link to this paper alive (for awhileat least), partly because it is cited in a
couple places and partly because it contains some material not discussed in
either of its two descendants.
Published Papers: (If you dont
have access to the various databases, e-mail me and Ill send you copies of whatever
interests you.)
1. Consequentializing,
forthcoming in Philosophy Compass
(Draft of 11/6/08).
Abstract: A growing trend of thought has it that any plausible
nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that it
can be given a consequentialist representation. In this essay, I explore
whether this claim is true and what does and doesnt follow from it. I also
explain the procedure for consequentializing, give an account of the motivation
for consequentializing, and rebut one common objection to the consequentializing
project. [This draft includes an extra section, section 7, which will not
appear in Blackwells Philosophy Compass.]
Keywords:
Consequentialism Consequentializing Maximizing rationality Agent-relative
Teleology Deontology Teleological conception of reasons Constraints
Options Supererogation Moral dilemmas Campbell Brown
2. Rule-Consequentialism
and Irrelevant Others, forthcoming in Utilitas. (Draft of 9/10/08.)
Abstract: In this
paper, I argue that Brad Hookers rule-consequentialism implausibly implies
that what earthlings are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping
their less fortunate brethren depends on whether or not other people exist on
some distant planet even when these others would be too far away for earthlings
to affect.
Keywords: Famine
Brad Hooker Obligations toward the needy Richard Arneson
Rule-consequentialism Tim Mulgan.
3.
Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2008): 369-388.
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish
to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that
the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and
that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice
those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others
from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny
that moral reasons morally override nonmoral reasons, such that even the
weakest moral reason trumps the strongest nonmoral reason in the determination
of an acts moral status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). If I am
right, if these moral theorists are committed to the view that nonmoral reasons
are relevant to determining whether or not an act is morally permissible, then
it would seem that they have their work cut out for them. Not only will they
need to determine what moral reasons there are, but also what nonmoral reasons
there are and which of these are relevant to determining an acts moral status.
Furthermore, they will need to account for how these two very different sorts
of reasonsmoral and nonmoral reasonscome together to determine an acts
moral status. I will not attempt to do this work here, but only to argue that
the work needs to be done.
Keywords: Moral
reasons Nonmoral reasons Overridingness Agent-centered options Rational
options Supererogation The basic belief Imperfect reasons
Note: An earlier
version of this paper was presented, with Noell Birondo commenting, at the
2006 APA Pacific Division Meeting in
4. Dual-Ranking
Act-Consequentialism, Philosophical Studies
138 (2008): 409-427.
Abstract: Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather
peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of
act-consequentialism, DRAC doesnt take the deontic status of an action to be a
function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic
status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in
turn a function of two auxiliary, evaluative rankings. I argue that DRAC is
promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality
that no single-ranking version of act-consequentialism can: supererogation,
agent-centered options, and the self-other asymmetry. I also defend DRAC
against two objections: (1) that its dual-ranking structure is ad hoc
and (2) that it denies (putatively implausibly) that it is always permissible
to make self-sacrifices that dont make things worse for others.
Keywords:
Utilitarianism Consequentialism Self-other
asymmetry Agent-centered options Supererogation Ted
Sider Clay Splawn.
5. Welfare, Achievement,
and Self-Sacrifice, Journal of
Ethics & Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org,
(2007), vol. 2, no. 2.
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that the achievement of ones goals
can contribute to ones welfare apart from whatever independent contributions that
the objects of those goals, or the processes by which they are achieved, make.
Call this the Achievement View, and call those who accept it achievementists.
In this paper, I argue that achievementists should accept both (a) that one
factor that affects how much the achievement of a goal contributes to ones
welfare is the amount that one has invested in that goal and (b) that the
amount that one has invested in a goal is a function of how much one has
personally sacrificed for its sake, not a function of how much effort one has
put into achieving it. So I will, contrary to at least one achievementist
(viz., Keller 2004, 36), be arguing against the view that the greater the
amount of productive effort that goes into achieving a goal, the more its achievement
contributes to ones welfare. Furthermore, I argue that the reason that the
achievement of those goals for which one has personally sacrificed matters more
to ones welfare is that, in general, the redemption of ones self-sacrifices
in itself contributes to ones welfare. Lastly, I argue that the view that the
redemption of ones self-sacrifices in itself contributes to ones welfare is
plausible independent of whether or not we find the Achievement View plausible.
We should accept this view so as to account both for the Shape-of-a-Life Phenomenon and for the rationality of honoring
sunk costs.
Keywords: Welfare
Wellbeing Achievement Self-sacrifice Sunk costs Redeeming misfortunes
the Shape of a Life Phenomenon Thomas Scanlon Simon Keller Fred Feldman
J. David Velleman Thomas Hurka Thomas Kelly.
6. Desire
Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm, American Philosophical Quarterly
44 (2007): 27-38. (This is a preprint. For citation purposes, please refer to
the published version, which is available upon request as a scanned PDF file.)
Abstract: This paper
argues that the standard account of posthumous harm is untenable. The standard account presupposes the desire-fulfillment
theory of welfare, but I argue that no plausible version of this theory can
allow for the possibility of posthumous harm. I argue that there are, at least,
two problems with the standard account from the perspective of a
desire-fulfillment theorist. First, as most desire-fulfillment theorists
acknowledge, the theory must be restricted in such a way that only those
desires that pertain to ones own life count in determining ones welfare. The
problem is that no one has yet provided a plausible account of which desires
these are such that desires for posthumous prestige and the like are included.
Second and more importantly, if the desire-fulfillment theory is going to be at
all plausible, it must, I argue, restrict itself not only to those desires that
pertain to ones own life but also to those desires that are future
independent, and this would rule out the possibility of posthumous harm. If Im
right, then even the desire-fulfillment theorist should reject the standard
account of posthumous harm. We cannot plausibly account for posthumous harm in
terms of desire fulfillment (or the lack thereof).
Keywords: Welfare
Wellbeing Posthumous harm Desire fulfillment Past desires Steven Luper
Derek Parfit MarK Overvold George Pitcher Joel Feinberg.
7. Consequentializing
Moral Theories, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007):
39-73.
Abstract: To consequentialize a given non-consequentialist theory, take
whatever considerations that the non-consequentialist theory holds to be
relevant to determining the deontic status of an action and insist that those
considerations are relevant to determining the proper ranking of outcomes. In
this way, the consequentialist can produce an ordering of outcomes that when
combined with her criterion of rightness yields the same set of moral verdicts
that the non-consequentialist theory yields. In this paper, I argue that any
plausible non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized. I explain the
motivation for the consequentializing project and defend it against recent
criticisms by Mark Schroeder. Against further challenges, I argue that the fact
that any non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized doesnt entail
that were all consequentialists nor does it entail that consequentialism is
empty. Lastly, I argue that although the consequentializer will need to appeal
to our considered moral convictions in determining how to rank outcomes, this
in no way renders the resulting consequentialist position circular or
uninformative.
Keywords: Consequentialism
Consequentializing Maximizing rationality Agent-relative Teleology
Deontology Agent-centered constraints Agent-centered options
Supererogation Campbell Brown James Dreier Jennie Louise Mark Schroeder
Samuel Scheffler.
Note: This paper contains (among
other things) a reply to Mark Schroeders Not
So Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
87 (2006): 348-356. Those interested in this debate should also see Mark
Schroeders Teleology,
Agent-Relative Value, and Good, Ethics 117 (2007): 265-295.
8. Combining
Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result, Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 95-113.
Abstract:
Consequentialism is an agent-neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an
agent-relative non-teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of
the twonamely, non-egoistic agent-relative teleological ethics (NATE)is quite
promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and
deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like
consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the compelling
idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of
affairs. Yet unlike consequentialism and like deontology, NATE accords well
with our commonsense moral intuitions.
Keywords:
Consequentialism Teleology Paradox of deontology Evaluator-relative
Agent-relative Teleology Deontology Agent-centered constraints Agent-centered
options Fitting pro-attitudes Amartya Sen Jorge L. A. Garcia A. C.
Ewing Franz Brentano.
Note: For a critique, see Mark
Schroeders Not
So Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
87 (2006): 348-356 as well as his Teleology,
Agent-Relative Value, and Good, Ethics 117 (2007): 265-295. For
my reply, see my Consequentializing
Moral Theories, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007): 39-73.
9. Position-Relative
Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation, Ethics
113 (2003): 303-332.
Abstract: I argue that
a version of maximizing act-consequentialism can accommodate both
agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. Specifically, I argue that
position-relative consequentialismthe theory that holds that agents ought
always to act so as to bring about what is, from their own individual
positions, the best available state of affairscan account for the fact that
agents have a moral option whenever the state of affairs in which the agent
safeguards her own interests is, from her position, all-things-considered
better but morally worse than the state of affairs in which she sacrifices
these interests for the sake of others.
Keywords:
Consequentialism Teleology Paradox of deontology Evaluator-relative
Agent-relative Teleology Deontology Agent-centered constraints
Agent-centered options Duties to self Supererogation Amartya Sen Samuel
Scheffler.
Note: Notes 31 and 32 should be
transposed. Their places in the text were reversed accidentally by the
printers. In note 32, I mention and feebly attempt to address an interesting
objection by Stephen Darwall. My latest view, as espoused in my Dual-Ranking
Act-Consequentialism, avoids this objection. Betsy Postow criticizes the
account of supererogation that I give here in her Supererogation
Again, Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (2005): 245-253. My latest view, as espoused in my Dual-Ranking
Act-Consequentialism, avoids this objection as well.
10. Can an Act-Consequentialist
Theory Be Agent-Relative? American Philosophical Quarterly 38
(2001): 363-77. (This is a preprint. For citation purposes, please refer
to the published version, which is available upon request as a scanned PDF
file.)
Abstract: A theory is
agent neutral if it gives every agent the same set of aims and agent relative
otherwise. Most philosophers take act-consequentialism to be agent-neutral, but
I argue that at the heart of consequentialism is the idea that all acts are
morally permissible in virtue of their propensity to promote value and that,
given this, it is possible to have a theory that is both agent-relative and
act-consequentialist. Furthermore, I demonstrate that agent-relative
act-consequentialism can avoid the counterintuitive implications associated
with utilitarianism while maintaining the compelling idea that it is never
wrong to bring about the best outcome.
Keywords:
Consequentialism Deontology Teleology Agent-relative Paradox of
deontology Samuel Scheffler Frances Howard-Snyder.
11. McNaughton
and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction, Utilitas
13 (2001): 350-6. [From EBSCO Host ASU access only.]
Abstract: In this
paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the
agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is
unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of
conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization
so as to fix the problem.
Keywords: Agent-relative
Agent-neutral Conditional obligations David McNaughton Piers Rawling.
Note: For a reply from McNaughton
and Rawling, see their Conditional
and Conditioned Reasons, Utilitas 14:2 (2002): 240-248.
12. Commonsense
Morality and Not Being Required to Maximize the Overall Good, Philosophical
Studies 100 (2000): 193-213.
Abstract: On commonsense
morality, there are two types of situations where an agent is not required to
maximize the impersonal good. First, there are those situations where the agent
is prohibited from doing so--constraints. Second, there are those situations
where the agent is permitted to do so but also has the option of doing
something else--options. I argue that there are three possible explanations for
the absence of a moral requirement to maximize the impersonal good and that the
commonsense moralist must appeal to all three in order to account for the vast
array of constraints and options we take there be.
Keywords: Commonsense
morality Maximizing rationality Overall good Agent-centered constraints
Agent-centered options Imperfect reasons Rational options Shelly Kagan.
13. Does
the Total Principle Have Any Repugnant Implications? Ratio
12 (1999): 80-98.
Abstract: Recently a
number of philosophers have suggested that the 'total principle' does not imply
the 'repugnant conclusion' provided that a certain axiological view (namely, the
'discontinuity view') is correct. Nevertheless, as I point out, there are three
different versions of the 'repugnant conclusion', and it appears that the
'total principle' will imply two of the three even if the 'discontinuity view'
is correct. I then go on to argue that one of the two remaining versions turns
out not to be repugnant after all. Second, I argue that the last remaining
version is not, as it turns out, implied by the 'total principle'. Thus, my
arguments show that the 'total principle' has no repugnant implications.
Keywords: Total
principle Repugnant conclusion Mere addition paradox Incommensurable
values Discontinuity View Derek Parfit.
14. Can
Consequentialism Be Reconciled with Our Common-Sense Moral Intuitions?
Philosophical Studies 91 (1998): 1-19.
Abstract:
Consequentialism is usually thought to be unable to accommodate many of our
commonsense moral intuitions. In particular, it has seemed incompatible with
the intuition that agents should not violate someone's rights even in order to
prevent numerous others from committing comparable rights violations.
Nevertheless, I argue that a certain form of consequentialism can accommodate
this intuition: agent-relative consequentialism--the view according to which agents
ought always to bring about what is, from their own individual perspective, the
best available outcome. Moreover, I argue that the consequentialist's
agent-focused account of the impermissibility of such preventive violations is
more plausible than the deontologist's victim-focused account. Contrary to
Frances Kamm, I argue that agent-relative consequentialism can adequately deal
with single-agent cases, cases where an agent would have to commit one rights
violation now in order to minimize her commissions of such rights violations
over time.
Keywords:
Consequentialism Agent-relative Commonsense Morality Agent-centered
constraints Minimizing violations Paradox of deontology Single-agent
cases Patient-focused Victim-focused Agent-focused Frances Kamm
Richard Brook.