REIMAGINED COMMUNITIES --

DEMOCRATIC, ETHNIC, AND VIOLENT:

THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF NIGERIAN IDENTITIES

AND COMMUNAL RELATIONS

DRAFT

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 1
A WORD ON IDENTITY POLITICS ........................................ 4
ETHNIC RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA ................. 4
HYPOTHESIS ................................................................ 7
METHODOLOGIES ........................................................... 8
CASE SELECTION ...................................................... 8
SURVEYS ............................................................. 9
INTERVIEWS .......................................................... 9
NEWS ANALYSIS ............................................................ 9
INITIAL FINDINGS .......................................................... 10
FINDINGS I – SURVEY RESULTS ........................................ 10
    ARRANGED BY IDENTITY CATEGORY ............................. 11
    ARRANGED BY RANK ............................................. 15
    SUMMARY AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE ..................... 17
    SUBETHNICITY CONSIDERED .................................... 18
FINDINGS II – INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS .................... 20
    GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ....................................... 20
    EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION ............. 20
    SENSE OF EXPECTATIONS ....................................... 21
FINDINGS II – NEWS ANALYSIS ........................................ 22
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ............................................... 23
CURRENT LIMITS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ............................ 23
WORKS CITED ................................................................... 24
APPENDIX A — SURVEY ..................................................... 27
APPENDIX B — INTERVIEW ................................................. 28
APPENDIX C — ITINERARY .................................................. 29
APPENDIX E — MAP OF NIGERIA ......................................... 30
**Reimagined Communities -- Democratic, Ethnic, and Violent: The Social Reconstruction of Nigerian Identities and Communal Relations**

**Introduction**

At the very least, this is a paper about the problematic nature of democracy in Nigeria’s deeply divided society. But I hope this paper is much more. Many scholars consider various manifestations of this problematic relationship. Still others prescribe domestic institutional remedies. None, however, explore the sociological processes that bind the manifestations of ethnic and democratic identity to each other in their domestic and international environments. Nor do they offer a sufficiently social explanation of the national and international dynamics behind the communal conflict that sometimes accompanies democratization. In this paper I begin that exploration.

Scholars of both international and domestic politics have long recognized the social nature of international and domestic relations. In the international arena, the British school led by Hedley Bull developed a rich understanding of social relations among states; in the American school, Kenneth Waltz granted socialization a central, though undefined, role in his structural theory. Regarding the domestic arena, scholars have long stressed the necessity of a civic society, i.e. the population being socialized to adopt a national identity and shared political norms. Rarely, however, are these two processes of socialization studied in a theoretically unified and coherent approach to their joint interaction and sometimes contradictory effects.

Perhaps the newest and most theoretically innovative attempt to integrate social theories of identity into political science is the burgeoning literature on social constructivism. Introduced generally by Alexander Wendt, his approach was readily accepted into and applied to theories of ethnicity, where the socially constructed nature of ethnic identity is so apparent.¹ It also has promise in disclosing the social nature of relations between democratic states.² This young approach is not, however, without several serious drawbacks. As Jeffery Checkel in the recent (March 1999) *ISQ* astutely points out, theories on social constructivism tend to neglect agency and even more importantly, they neglect the processes that tie the agents to the structures of meaning. A focus on the processes of socialization may better cope with these problems.

In this paper I begin to explore the processes of socialization which effect both Nigeria’s national identity and the Nigerian peoples’ communal identities. First, in the international arena, a society consisting of national, transnational, and supranational organizations socializes Nigeria to adopt a liberal economic and democratic identity, to which Nigeria answers the call by adopting a democratic identity and adapting its behavior to better act the part. Second, within the domestic arena, communal

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² The very prolific and productive IR literature on Democratic Peace Theory considers in its dyadic, normative school the social relationship among democracies, but never with an explicitly sociological approach. More directly Mark Peceny in the recent *International Studies Review* (Spring 1999) suggests that although many scholars of democratization hint at social constructivist processes, they do little to capitalize on the social nature of that process.
Figure 1. Model locating three structural tensions (T1 - T3) resulting from the social interactions in both the international and national social arenas.

(ethnic, religious, regional) groups astutely eavesdrop on this conservation, interpreting for themselves the meaning attached to the promises (mostly material) of the international socializing agents and the behavioral feedback of the Nigerian state. Thus they are led to anticipate and expect certain rewards for their nation’s willing compliance to its socialization efforts. In this domestic realm, however, the Nigerian state and its apparatuses have not in any socially meaningful way, fostered the democratic norms and national identities compatible with the new national identity it has adopted. Nor has it the sufficient strength to regulate violent forms of competition and expressions of frustration that may emerge when the promised heard through eavesdropping are not fulfilled.

The international socialization, therefore, not only affects state identity, but it also introduces a set of inherently competitive structures and primarily material expectations into the domestic society where it affects communal identities in ways incompatible with the promises it boasts. Tragically, the resulting frustration and competition is thus marked more often by blood than by progress and prosperity. In short, this paper suggests that the two socialization processes appear to be operating in contradictory and dangerous ways. I hope that Figure 1 clarifies this hypothesized dynamic and its resulting tensions.
A WORD ABOUT IDENTITY POLITICS

At the core of this study lies the notion of identity politics. Intricately bound to the understanding of social systems and socialization, identity politics is an increasingly accepted focus of political scholars who can no longer ignore the emotive origins of much political participation, especially in its most violent expressions. At the roots of the war, religious, ideological, patriotic, and ethnic identities make possible the mass mobilization and tireless execution of bloodshed and sacrifice. Thus identity represents the foundation upon which profound political power may be exercised.

Yet, on the other side of this coin, these identities represent the effects of the even more profound power of socialization. How these identities came to be, is a process bound in the historical process of structural and personal practice. Molded by organizations, manipulated by opportunistic elites, forged in local and global political-economic social structures, and adopted by individuals, these identities comprise the fire for all subsequent decision and action. Never set in stone, these identities are constantly in flux, to be acted upon from within and without. Nevertheless, when accessed and activated, they have power to compel the individual or the nation to both sacrifice and shed blood.

I adopt Nigeria as a case and examine the processes and consequences of socialization. I will look at how Nigeria has come to identify itself in the international society and how Nigerians have come to identify themselves within the domestic realm. Specifically, I will consider the successful process of international socialization of the Nigerian state whereby international pressures of political-economic liberalization resulted in domestic capitalist and democratic systems. I plan then to contrast Nigeria’s successful entrance to the global society with Nigeria’s failure to socialize its population of people and regional-religious-ethnic groups into the liberal-democratic role it claims now to fill. This very failure is, I hypothesize, in part a consequence of international society’s socialization of the Nigerian state and Nigeria’s successful effort to adopt this identity.

To begin testing this hypothesis, I present the data and preliminary conclusions drawn from my pilot study in Nigeria which consisted of three weeks of observation, the analysis of about 350 surveys, and numerous interviews with Nigerian scholars and citizens. Later, I briefly present an analysis of recent historical trends of ethnic conflict that correspond with Nigeria’s democratic process. Before that, however, I will begin with a review of some relevant literature on democratization and ethnic identity followed by a more detailed statement of my preliminary hypothesis that the imposition of democracy on Nigeria, with all its promise, is exacerbating ethnic tensions. In all of this I hope to provide a critical assessment of the current situation in Nigeria, an expectation of how things may proceed, and throughout an attempt to build a better theory of how the international and domestic socialization of identities affect one another.

ETHNIC RELATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN NIGERIA

Africa’s historical experience with democracy is marked with both success and failure. The euphoria of the independence movement soon gave way to the grim reality of the political hardships the new African ‘nations’ faced. Where democracy took hold it often immediately degenerated into single-
The single-party system is still the dominant and often preferred system in African politics as evidenced by the longevity of Danial arap Moi’s, Biya’s, and Jerry Rawling’s ruling parties. As time advanced, however, a much more mixed picture of African democracy emerged. While Guelkhe (1992) and Joseph (1991) wrote of the “Rebirth of Freedom,” others painted pictures of a “sort of” democracy (Christian Science Monitor) or “Democracy without Consolidation” (Sandbrook - Third World Quarterly). While Chege wrote of “What’s Right with Africa,” others like Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy” could only stress what was wrong, and of democracy’s abandoned hopes.

Two authors acknowledging these extremes, paint the most complete and accurate picture of Africa’s condition. Crawford Young in “Africa: Interim Balance” (1996) writes about both successes and failures. Although he could name only a few clear successes (ie Namibia, perhaps a now dated example), there were also only a handful of utter failures (Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, etc.). Forty-two of Africa’s fifty-two countries, he claimed, have adopted elements of a democratic governance even if incomplete. Chege (1995) in “Between Africa’s Extremes” contrasts the extremes of 1994: the unbelievable dream of successful elections and peaceful transition in the Republic of South Africa versus the horrors of the Rwandan massacres. In the words of a Nigerian poet greeting President Clinton in 1998 “South Africa is our dream, Rwanda was is our nightmare.” Both of these extreme cases revolved around ethnic peace or ethnic war. But what can account for these differences? Why was democracy able to succeed on one hand, yet fail so miserably on the other? A careful look at the effects of ethnicity may provide answers to these questions.

Many authors have now considered ethnicity’s effect on prospects of democracy. Huntington in “The Third Wave: 20 Years After” mentions that ethnically splintered societies risk awakening or escalating ethnic violence once the political trophy of the state is thrown open to competition. Like Kaplan in “Was Democracy Just a Moment,” Huntington sees that political parties could easily form along ethnic lines and therefore magnify the already competitive relationships. Especially in a winner-take-all system, ethnic relations could sour upon democratizing. Stepan and Linz (Democratization and Consolidation) likewise question the prudence of introducing a democratic government before the “stateness” of the country can be established—a nation must be built before a state can handle democracy. A rich literature has dealt more exclusively with this ethnic question.

At the heart of it all is Arend Lijphart whose work on consociational democracy now spans several decades. Described by Lustick (1996), consociationalism represents one of the most productive Lakatosian research programmes in the field. It is founded on the premise that specially adapted political institutions are necessary for democracy to survive in ethnically divided societies. Based on his Dutch experience, Lijphart distilled four features of a consociational democracy. These are 1) electoral system of proportional representation producing a grand ethnic coalition, 2) a federal division of powers, 3) a minority veto, and 4) a system of power sharing. In an attempt to apply this remedy to South Africa’s woes, Lijphart in Power-Sharing in South Africa (1985) prescribes such a
system, which he declares in a later publication (1994) as exactly what South Africa adopted. As promising as this approach sounds, it is not without its critics.

Connors (1996) addresses Lijphart’s approach to RSA in particular. Consociationalism, he claims, runs the risk of permanently marking ethnic divisions in the political arena. It denies the fluid nature of ethnicity that might otherwise allow peaceful adaptation, and freezes ethnic relations in ways that could later lead to conflict. Guelke (1992) likewise criticizes Lijphart’s prescriptions suggesting that he does not understand the hostility South African’s have toward ethnic labels that consociational remedies might require. Finally, Lustick (1996) criticizes Lijphart’s whole programme. It has, Lustick argues abandoned the early Lakatosian rigor and instead relies principally on its aesthetic appeal. It simply does not fit well with reality.

The greatest among these critics is Donald Horowitz. Having already written extensively about ethnicity in democratic systems (1985), Horowitz likewise took on the South African issue in A Democratic South Africa? (1991). In a more generalizeable forum, Horowitz addresses the issue more broadly in the “Democracy in Divided Societies” (1993). There he explains that the remedy of consociationalism begs the question—it requires consensus and an accommodation to enable the consociational institutions that are allegedly needed to foster that very cooperation. Actual events in Nigeria support many of these concerns.

A grand coalition wherein many ethnic groups are forced to cooperate to run the country sounds like a practical and ideal fruit of consociationalism, but events in Zambia may prove otherwise. The broad coalition that led the independence movement degenerated over time along ethnic lines. Smaller partners in the coalition are easily abandoned once power is consolidated (Zambia’s experience with the MMD providing a perfect example).

The ideal solution to this, says Lijphart, is to find coalitions that roughly split the country in half. This might work especially well in Nigeria where a natural geographic and religious fault line divides northern and southern Nigeria almost in half. There are, however, two problems with this ‘ideal’. The first is noted by Diamond and Platter in Democracy and Ethnicity. Unlike ruling coalitions in societies not fragmented by ethnicity, ethnic parties are very resistant to changing membership. Cleavages are not cross-cutting, and the dominant cleavage, ethnicity, is resistant to negotiation or bargaining. Ethnic identity cannot be divided, bartered, or traded off like political power or economic wealth or opportunity. Second, resulting from the first problem, a near 50-50 split may not lead to a regular exchange of power (as with the democrats and republicans in the U.S.) but instead enable the permanent marginalization of the near minority. This, claims Horowitz, is what happened to Nigeria leading to the Biafran wars and some of the worst bloodshed, starvation, and suffering in modern Africa. A more recent cost to Nigeria, as suggested by Bach (1992) who depicts the increasing

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5 Something of a “grand ethnic coalition” brought Nigeria’s new president, Obasanjo, to power. The Hausa of the north allied with the Ibo and the Plateau groups, but there is little now to keep the much more numerous Hausa from abandoning the minority groups.

6 Run-off elections also prescribed to create a near majority situation also runs this risk. In Benin, a run-off election prevented a small minority taking power on a plurality vote, but the run-off too was divided along ethnic lines. The winning president won 90% of the North’s vote, but lost 94% of the south’s.
How these identities rank and their propensity to counter one another is the main focus of my questionnaire.

Horowitz’s remedy for deeply divided societies differs from Lijphart’s in its accent on the divisive nature of ethnicity and a different application federalism. Prudently applied federal structures can ease the ethnic cleavages’ impact in several ways. To the extent that provincial districts are not cut along ethnic lines, they establish another, cross-cutting cleavage of power. Ethnic groups lumped together in one region will have new incentives to cooperate as they compete against other regions for influence at the national level. On the other hand, ethnic groups that are divided among regions may be institutionally compelled to competition politically among themselves where regional interests trump unified ethnic interests. This appears on the surface to resemble Lijphart’s reliance on institutional remedies, but it reaches deeper into the minds of those effected. By acknowledging the power of identities, Horowitz seeks not to institutionalize them but to acknowledge their ranked and nested nature and create an environment in which political, provincial identities temper ethnic identities.

Given this background, Nigeria makes for a very fascinating case. It has a long post-colonial history (independent in 1960) during which time it has attempted three democratic transitions each democratic government surviving only a few days to a few years. It also has a fascinating mix of ethnic groups and a rich history of their relations. Forced into one country by British policy (Nigerians refer to it as “the mistake of 1914”) the three major groups: the very large northern Muslim Hausa, the smaller southwestern Christian Yoruba, and the still smaller southeastern Christian Ibo, have had at best an uneasy relationship and at worst fought the nightmarish Biafra civil war. Numerous institutional arrangements (some mentioned above) were attempted, but all apparently failed. The current effort, codified in a lengthy constitution does very little to address ethnic and regional differences as either Lipjhart or Horowitz would prescribe. The only constitutional remedies are first, to prohibit discrimination, second, to require the government to promote intermarriage (however that might be done politically!), and third a scanty attempt to keep political parties more national than ethnic in character.

The constitution allows for multiple parties, but with a first-past-the-post president, the parties quickly organized into two blocks. The militarily appointed election commission required that to qualify as an official party, the party must have received at least 10 percent of the local election votes in at least 2/3 of the states, but the constitution only requires that the party have one member in each of 2/3 of the states. Nothing, it seems, is being done to cut through the ethnic and regional cleavages that already characterize the state boundaries and party membership.

**HYPOTHESIS**

To the extent that the international socialization has created a Nigerian democratic identity, and to the extent that this process has created increased expectations among the citizenship, and to the extent that the population has not been properly socialized to adopt democratic norms, beliefs, and associations, or a national identity, *competition and conflict will increase with the advent of democracy rather than decrease*. Without successful democratic socialization, institutional and

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7 How these identities rank and their propensity to counter one another is the main focus of my questionnaire.
electoral approaches that do not take identity into account will not be able to contain the violent expression of the competitions they encourage.

**Methodologies**

I spent three weeks in Nigeria visiting many of Nigeria’s major cities and universities interviewing political science faculty, the leaders of non-governmental organizations, university students, and others of more average status and lifestyle, as well as conducting a brief survey of university students.

**Case Selection**

I visited eight universities in six cities spending three to four days in each. Selection criteria of the cities included the following features: first, ensuring adequate representation of the three major ethnic groups of Nigerian politics (the Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo) as well as considering several minor ethnic groups; second, the presence of a substantial university; and third, and the presence of trustworthy and reliable native contacts. According the itinerary in Appendix C, I visited the following cities and universities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin City</td>
<td>Bini and others</td>
<td>University of Benin</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Harcourt</td>
<td>Delta groups</td>
<td>University of PH, Abia State Univ., PH Branch</td>
<td>14,440, small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>Enugu State University, Univ. of Nigeria</td>
<td>9,400, large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jos</td>
<td>Plateau groups</td>
<td>University of Jos, Bayero Univ., Kano</td>
<td>14,200, large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>University of Ibadan</td>
<td>13,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the selection of ethnic groups, I focused first on the three most populous ethnic groups who have historically dominated Nigeria’s political scene (often not peacefully): the Hausa, the Ibo, and the Yoruba. Devastated by the Biafra wars, the Ibo of eastern Nigeria have since been all but excluded from national politics, but were quite central historically having been favored and groomed for leadership by the British. The Hausa are the militarily powerful Muslim bloc of northern Nigeria. By far the largest of all groups, the Hausa have ruled Nigeria longer than any other, often through its military strength. The Yoruba of southwest Nigeria occupied the area of the former capital and the most established financial center of the country. Obasanjo, the recently elected president of Nigeria is Yoruba, but as a former general, has thick ties to his northern supporters.

The Port Harcourt Delta is the nation’s source of oil, which provides most of the national revenue. It is inhabited by numerous small but vocal groups (like the Ogoni, known for their battle with Shell Oil and their martyr, Ken Saro-Wiwa) who have been an active and influential force in Nigerian politics recently. The people of Benin were traditionally a great kingdom of pre-colonial Nigeria and their current political status will be worth exploring. The plateau peoples of Jos, consider themselves as occupying an important “Middle Belt” position between the major groups of the Muslim north and those of the Christian south.
Surveys

I visited the campuses of several of Nigeria's major universities, interviewing political science faculty there and administering simple surveys to a their classes. The core of the survey replicates in spirit that conducted by William S. Miles and David A Rachefort (1991) conducted in Nigeria over a decade ago and published in APSR. Therein I measure the relative strength of the seven identities:

- Religion
- Continental Identity (African)
- International Regional Identity (West African)
- Subethnic Group
- Ethnic Group
- Nationality (Nigeria)
- and State or Province.

In a simple list, I asked students to fill in the particular values of each category (ie what religion are they) and then rank those identities according to the degree that each defines who they are (See Appendix A).

Knowing what I know now, I never would have expected to get as many surveys as I did. School shootings (unfortunately very common in Nigeria now) prevented me from getting many responses at the University of Nigeria. A three month long school strike in Ibadan prevented my polling of the Yoruba population. An unexpected school break prevented me from surveying any students in Jos. I was, nevertheless able to sample good-sized populations in Benin City, Port Harcourt, Enugu, and Kano. These samples are sufficient to allow some interesting analysis, although it will be limited to a consideration of the broadest regional/religious cleavage in Nigeria, and not yet allow a finer-tuned consideration of other considerations.

Interviews

I spent all of my remaining time interviewing my contacts, their acquaintances, common folk, and numerous university professors both individually and in small focus group discussions. I took several legal pads full of notes as respondents answered my open-ended questions regarding democracy, their ethnic identity, and their view of Nigeria’s national identity (See Appendix B for questions).

News Analysis

While in Nigeria I bought, read, and collected a large sample of national newspapers. After the initial few days it took to determine which newspapers had were consistently available and had representative coverage, I settled on four major newspapers, and collected them at regular intervals. These four papers: The Guardian, Vanguard, Concord, and Punch were collected over the three week period and all references to ethnicity, democracy, political violence, and international pressures were noted.

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8 Issues of This Day, The Champion, Tempo, Hallmark, and The Nigerian Tribune were considered and rejected from any systematic analysis for various reasons (most due to nation-wide accessability and reliability) but were read on occasion and will be drawn on to illustrate a few points.
For more immediate, though less accurate and detailed results, I found a Nigerian newspaper, the *Post Express*, online which contains a two and a half year archive. By combing through that archive and recording every mention of deaths caused by ethnic and religious conflicts, I was able to piece together a preliminary picture of how ethnic relations are faring and how they are changing with the advent of democracy.

**Initial Findings**

The results of these surveys, interviews and observations, and news analysis will be presented each in turn. I have to admit that I entered Nigeria with an optimistic bias. Excited at the prospect of Nigerian democracy and impressed that it had progressed as far as it had, I wanted to be present at the dawn of a new era. Instead, countless observations and numerous interviews have largely dispelled me of that optimism.

The following findings, in their simplest form, depict Nigeria as a deeply divided society in danger of becoming even more divided as people with little national identity, belief in democratic principles, or civic society are thrust into political competition on uneven footing yet with euphoric expectations. The surveys suggest that not only is Nigeria deeply divided, but that the nature of the divisions (to be discussed in the interview and observation section) are especially troubling. The traditionally ruling north, possessing a bulk of the electorate and a relatively united ethnic and religious front, is able to maintain power in a democratic government perhaps even better than they were under a military regime. Only now expectations are high all around, and already the violence has begun.

**Findings I – Survey Results**

The results of the almost 350 survey responses are worth analyzing in several forms and interesting at several levels. At the first level, the aggregate responses of Nigerians as a whole provides substantial insight into how they identify themselves and where they place their primary social-psychological allegiance. Do they most closely associate themselves with national or supranational groupings that have the effect of binding them together as a Nigerian people, or conversely, do their loyalties lie in more divisive religious, state, and ethnic categories?

At the second level, the responses disaggregated by region provide additional insights. How successful have state-building attempts, the efforts to consolidate a national identity, been in each region? To what extent do Northerners and Southerners identify themselves with similar patterns, and how do they differ? Because the aggregate level can easily be read between the lines of the disaggregated charts, only this disaggregated level is portrayed in the following figures, although the implications of both levels will follow.

I will present the data in three forms. First, I will present the responses arranged according to category. In other words, for each of the identity categories addressed (religion, ethnicity, etc.), a chart will display the percentage of respondents who indicated that that particular identity was their most central, second most central, etc., down to their least central identity.

Second, that same data will be rearranged and categorized according to rank. In other words, one chart will group all of the first ranked identities distributed across the range of identity categories, followed by another chart of all of the second ranked identities, and so forth. This briefer analysis (to
avoid redundancies) will highlight a few more patterns regarding the distribution of identities within each rank.

Third, I will compare the mean rankings of each identity for each region to both accent the whole populations’ rather than the individuals’ ranking of identities and to test for statistical significance. Throughout all of this I temporarily depart from the seven identity categories included on the survey; a bulk of this analysis will focus on only six and exclude the category of subethnic identity. By way of explanation and to avoid further distraction, this adjustment will be explained and analyzed at the conclusion of this section.

**RESULTS ARRANGED BY IDENTITY CATEGORY**

We begin where Nigerians’ identify themselves most strongly. As represented in Figure 2, respondents in both the north and the south claimed religious identity as their most central. This is not surprising given previously published research on religion in Africa. Nor is it atypical of religious identification generally. This finding is, however, noteworthy on two grounds. First, religion has historically been one of the principle cleavages in Nigeria dividing northern Muslims and southern Christians. Although it was not the primary mobilizing identity in the Biafra war (the Yoruba sided with the Hausa—a fact that still draws deep resentment among some of the Ibo I interviewed), the salience of religion did arise unsolicited in most of my interviews in both regions. It is important, therefore, that this especially divisive identity is also the strongest in both regions.

Those I interviewed in the north played down the importance of religious differences claiming that there were many Christians living in the north, and believing that their presence represented a meaningful cross-cutting cleavage. As table 1 shows, there were many Christians in the north, but that alone is not evidence of cross-cutting cleavages.

![Figure 2. Respondents’ ranking of their Religious identity. N = 340 (North, N=182; South N=158).](image)

**Table 1.** Distribution of religion by region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Residence</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>153 (96.8%)</td>
<td>4 (2.5%)</td>
<td>1 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>26 (14.4%)</td>
<td>158 (85.1%)</td>
<td>1 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The essence of cross-cutting cleavages lies in identity. What lacks in making these cleavages truly cross-cutting is that their region of residence is that alone; it is not reflected in how they identify...
themselves. In fact, most of the northern Christians identify even more strongly with their southern ethnic origins and religion.

Reflecting back to Figure 2, there is a notable difference between how many Northerners rank their religious identity first, compared to the significantly fewer Southerners who share that conviction. Although it is a strong and potentially divisive force in both regions, it appears to be less so in the south where four times as many respondents held other primary identities.

The two other supranational identities, shown in Figures 3 and 4 lie at the other end of the spectrum in terms of how closely respondents identified with each. Both figures depict that very few Nigerians in both the north and the south identify strongly with either the African continent or the West African region. This portrays a noteworthy contrast to religious identity, given that these supranational identities, unlike religion, have the potential to bind together Nigeria’s northern and southern regions. Instead, they represent the weakest identity categories unlikely to provide much social-psychological cohesion between the regions. Despite Nigeria’s deep involvement in West African politics and Peacekeeping (ECOMOG) and despite the potential pan-African identity, there is little in either of these categories to unify Nigeria’s north and south regions within a common supranational setting. One interesting observation in these results, however, is how similarly both the North and South express this shared lack of supranational identity.
That shared pattern of ranking stands in stark contrast to how respondents of each region consider their national Nigerian identity (Figure 5). Whereas almost none in the north ranked their Nigerian identity above all others, about one fifth of the southerners were inclined to do so. This is due in part to the fact that most Northerners had already assigned the first slot to their religious identity, and the zero-sum nature of ranking dictates that there simply are not as many northerners left to rank their Nigerian identity first. Nevertheless, the northerners were also markedly less inclined to rank their Nigerian identity second. Almost half of the southerners ranked their Nigerian identity first or second, nearly triple the rate of their northern compatriots.

Overall, however, it is also noteworthy that median rankings of the Northerners and Southerners are only in the fourth and third positions respectively. This national identity, above all others might otherwise have suggested some degree of successful nation building, but it appears that even after several decades of independence, Nigerians in general still don’t feel especially Nigerian relative to other identities, and even less so in the North.

Instead the northerners seem to identify themselves at a substantially higher rate with their more local state identity (Figure 6), compared to southerners, many of whom rank their state identity dead last. Coupled with the pattern of Figures 1 and 4, Figure 5 indicates again that the Northerners tend to feel more local loyalty than do Southerners.

Finally, the category of ethnic identity further portrays a sharp divide between north and south.
Although southerners were more likely to rank ethnicity first, northerners were much more likely to rank it within the first two spots. Once again this suggests a more divisive nature of northern identity contrasted with that of the south. Perhaps more importantly, however, because ethnicity is the second highest ranked identity country-wide (after religion), its divisive nature between the north south and with the southern region should not be neglected. Because the north is ethnically homogenous and the south heterogeneous in the extreme, any strong identity associated with ethnicity is liable to have not only a divisive impact between the north and south regions, but among the southern regions themselves to the advantage of the north—a pattern to which that history and current events bare witness.
RESULTS ARRANGED BY RANK

This same data, now arranged by rank rather than category, reaffirms some of the earlier observations and highlights yet others. Focusing in Figure 8 on only those first ranked responses, the difference between the northern and southern regions is again clear. Compared with the Northerners who (as stated earlier) almost unanimously ranked religion as their first identity, Southerners were much more divided, many ranking nationalism or ethnicity first.

Throughout the remaining positions of rank, this pattern continues. In Figure 9, for example, the north overwhelmingly considers ethnicity their second most important identity, whereas the Southerners remain divided among the categories.

This pattern continues in Figures 10 and 11 wherein the third and fourth ranked categories are displayed. The north holds a greater degree of consensus claiming the state identity as their third strongest and their Nigerian identity as their fourth. It is not until the unpopularity of the continental and regional identities cluster in the fifth and sixth ranked Figures 12 and 13 and again bring consensus. From the pattern of these six figures, one can again see, and perhaps this time more clearly, that not only do Northerners tend to identify more with nationally divisive identities, but that they also do so with much more harmony of opinion among themselves contrasted with the broad variety of rankings of those in the south.

Figure 8. Respondents’ first ranked identities, contrasted by region. N = 340 (North, N=182; South N=158).

Figure 9. Respondents’ second ranked identities, contrasted by region. N = 335 (North, N=178; South N=157).
Figure 10. Respondents’ third ranked identities, contrasted by region. N = 333 (North, N=175; South N=158).

Figure 11. Respondents’ fourth ranked identities, contrasted by region. N = 331 (North, N=173; South N=158).

Figure 12. Respondents’ sixth ranked identities, contrasted by region. N = 291 (North, N=140; South N=151).

Figure 13. Respondents’ fifth ranked identities, contrasted by region. N = 328 (North, N=171; South N=157).
STATISTICAL SUMMARY – MEANS AND MEASURES OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

With a much broader stroke, the previous twelve figures are summarized in Figure 14 where all of the respondents’ rankings in each category are averaged together to produce a single mean score for each identity. This approach enables us to more comprehensively determine how the northern and southern aggregated populations (rather than the spectrum of their individual respondents) rate their identities.

It is once again clear that religion occupies the top ranked identity in both regions, although the difference between north (with a mean rank of 1.3) and the south (of 2.2) is still remarkable. It also remains the story that the lowest ranked African and West African identities are relatively weak in both regions, and about equally so. The aggregate ranking of three middle categories, however, is now brought into sharper focus. Portrayed yet more simply in Table 1, Northerners and Southerners order their identities as follows.

Table 1. Ordinal ranking of the mean identity rank for each category in each region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Category</th>
<th>Order of Mean Rank</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigerian Nation</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African Region</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Continent</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the north the mean identities portray a clear progression from the most divisive being considered the most important to the more unifying categories being considered relatively less important. The southern respondents, in contrast, tend follow a similar pattern with one sharp exception—in the south, Nigerian nationalism (a unifying feature) trumps the two potentially more divisive identities of ethnic and state allegiance.

Finally, one might ask whether these differences are statistically sound? An ANOVA comparison of means suggests that they are. In Table 2, the mean scores are presented more precisely than in Figure 14, followed by the difference in means relative to the total degrees of freedom for each
set. Comparing these means squared suggests that the differing relative strengths of religious, state, and Nigerian identity are all highly statistically significant. Finally, a Chi-Square test of statistical significance replicates this test with similar results.

**Table 2.** Comparing average relative ranking of identity categories in the North and South: A Comparison of Means and tests of Statistical Significance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Category</th>
<th>Average Ranked Value</th>
<th>Difference of Mean Squares</th>
<th>Statistical Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the North</td>
<td>In the South</td>
<td>Between Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continent (Africa)</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Reg. (W. Africa)</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (Nigeria)</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>66.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>16.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>67.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A Word About Subethnic Identity – Theoretical and Statistical Considerations**

When all seven of the identity categories included on the survey are analyzed together, the results appear substantially stronger than when subethnicity is excluded. I believe, however, that they are deceptively so. Miles and Rochefort (1991) in their oral interviews were able to force a ranking and thus ensure that all identities were ranked, whereas my written survey did not have that power. Consequently, about one third of the northern respondents did not identify a subethnic identity.

By itself this is a fascinating and theoretically suggestive finding. It is noteworthy that the Northerners are much less likely to fragment their large and cohesive ethnic identity (an observation shared by many Southerners in my interviews who claim that the north is advantaged by its united ethnic front, relative to the splintered and fragmented ethnic and subethnic mosaic of the south).

Nevertheless, this large population of missing data does not make for sound statistical analysis. As depicted in Figure 15, subethnicity held an important, although not primary, position in both groups. Its neglect on so many of the Northerners’ survey responses had the unfortunate consequence of inflating the ranking of the other categories. In

**Figure 15.** Mean rank (1-7) of each identity category, contrasting North and South. Statistical Significance of 0.01 indicated with *.
essence, about one third of the Northerners had reduced their overall scale to 1 through 6, thus
substantially lowering their mean scores across the board when compared to Southerners who were
more often utilizing the entire 1 through 7 scale. To compensate for this statistical bias, I removed
subethnicity from the lineup in the previous analysis.

I am open, however, to the possibility that the absence of response is perhaps more telling than
not. I am thus including a brief ranking and test for significance here to parallel those found earlier in the
text and discussion of the six identity analysis.

Table 3. Ordinal ranking of the mean identity rank for each category in each region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Category</th>
<th>Order of Mean Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subethnicity</td>
<td>5th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>2nd</td>
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<td>State</td>
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<td>Nigerian Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>West African Region</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Continent</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Comparing average relative ranking of identity categories in the North and South:  A
Comparison of Means and ANOVA test of Statistical Significance (Subethnicity Included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Category</th>
<th>Average Ranked Value</th>
<th>Difference of Mean Squares</th>
<th>Statistical Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the North</td>
<td>In the South</td>
<td>Between Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continent (Africa)</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int’l Reg. (W. Africa)</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>14.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (Nigeria)</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>44.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>59.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>21.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subethnic Group</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>32.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>107.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the statistical limitation mentioned above, I can not claim confidently that the apparent
statistical significance of International Region and Ethnic Group is reliable. Because the Northerners on
average tended to rank them lower on the scale (higher in salience) their contrast with the south is
exaggerated by the overall lowering effect of the abbreviated (1-6) scale of many respondents. Regarding Subethnicity, however, which was ranked higher (less salient) in the north, one may with confidence conclude that the Northerners give it relatively less weight remaining more unified ethnically and subethnically than their compatriots in the south. This finding seems to collaborate well with the patterns of and conclusions drawn from the previous figures and table.

Findings II – Interviews and Observation

This section is very much a work in progress. It will take some time to process my notes and observations and to organize and present them in a revealing manner. Here I only scratch the surface with a few notable observations.

General Observations

No education can compare to the first-hand experience of the rhythm of Nigerian life. I avoided the tourist and missionary centers and placed myself in settings where I was constantly forced to interact with Nigerians. I had gone almost half of the trip before seeing my third white person. I stayed in very modest hotels, shopped at the local market, attended local churches, and road public transportation whenever I wasn’t walking.

Once I observed the all-consuming efforts required to survive in even this wealthy pocket of Africa, it was easy to understand why people viewed democracy as they did. Over and over, political scientists I interviewed described the population in Almond and Verba’s political culture terminology as “subjects.” And over and over when I talked with regular people about what democracy meant to them they resounded almost in unison, “a better standard of living.”

It was especially revealing to be present in Jos, not far from the capital, on the day of the new government’s inauguration. Knowing the positive billing the event was receiving in the international news, and aware that CNN International was broadcasting portions of the ceremony, I had expected that Nigerian’s themselves would be even more excited. The national newspapers proclaimed with gigantic headlines and bold color photos the excitement of the occasion, but on the street there was a profoundly eerie lack of celebration. In every way it was business as usual.

I spent the midday hours walking the length of the city, and of the thousands of people I saw engaged in typical commerce, I only had three encounters with the inauguration. First, I walked by an electronics shop that was broadcasting the ceremony over a loudspeaker. Nobody appeared to listen. Second, I walked by a tiny television shop, which had one of its TV’s tuned to the ceremony. I walked closer to take a look, and when the owner approached me, I eagerly asked him if he’d been watching and what he thought. He responded only by trying to sell me that television. Finally, I wandered into an “upscale” grocery story which had a television. No one was there except three young, underemployed staff who were watching. Their conversation was not one of excitement or celebration, however, but puzzlement. “What does democracy mean?” they asked each other, apparently with no good answers.

Evidence of International Socialization

The international news made it clear that international social pressures were substantial, but also that the Nigerian government was eager to live up to international expectations. When the democratic elections were nullified in 1993, the United States imposed sanctions and halted all development aid. The message was clear-on a visit to Kano. US Ambassador, Williams Twaddell, promised that if
Nigeria returned to democracy, sanctions would be relaxed. Just two weeks after the inauguration, the United States also restored military ties which had been severed in 1995.

The British Commonwealth had sanctioned Nigeria and suspended her from the Commonwealth in 1995 when General Abacha imposed the death sentence on activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. It promised Nigeria that on the very day of the civilian government’s inauguration, Nigeria would be readmitted. The day after the inauguration, the Commonwealth General-Secretary was able to announce that “Nigeria is not only back fully in the Commonwealth, Nigeria’s standing internationally at the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and all other international organizations has been fully restored.”

Japan likewise indicated it might lift sanctions on Nigeria stating that “Now that the completion of the transition to a civilian rule is done...[t]he Japanese government will study extending appropriate assistance to Nigeria’s effort for reform and development.” Nigeria even received a Papal blessing.

Perhaps even more important than these overt attempts at persuasion, the process of socialization is often marked by informal and unspoken pressure to conform to norms and expectations. It is, therefore, difficult to observe, but I believe I’ve captured some of its effects.

Sense of Expectations

When asked how people expected their lives to change under democracy, they inevitably referred to these international issues and their economic benefits. When asked why they expected democracy to help their pocketbooks, they most frequently blamed their poverty on their government’s corruption and on their international pariah status. Accepting democracy, they reasoned was the solution to each.

They expected that once trade and aid began flowing in to Nigeria, and once a corrupt government stopped hoarding the economic goods for itself, the Nigerian people would prosper. Much more importantly, they believed that not only would the country as a whole benefit from international assistance, but moreover their particular region or ethnic group would receive their “fair share” of the economic and political goods distributed internally. In the south, discussion always turned to the derivation formula used to allocate oil profits.

While sitting with five professors in the oil-rich region of Port Harcourt, they adamantly explained to me that the oil profits must stay in the state where the oil is. For too long, they claimed, the north had grown fat on their oil. How much should they keep? Some argued all of it, others were more modest and only wanted most of the profits. What would happen to the economy of the north? If the northern states can’t be economically self sufficient, they should cease to exist--the dozen northern states should merge into one that Kano’s commerce could support.

Such thinking had more immediate political consequences as well. While I was in Nigeria blood was spilled in the north over political representation (now that representation meant something, it was worth fighting for control of it) and in the south over control of oil-rich land (now that the local population in control might benefit from the oil revenue, it too was worth fighting for).

Thus it was not surprising that many of the expectations I heard were followed by a threat if they were not met. Speaking with a focus group of one particular ethnic minority, they all voiced deep confidence that this democratic government would have to incorporate them into the government. “What if they do not?” I would ask. “You are still a numerical minority, and in democracy, the majority rules.” “They will,” they replied. “And if they don’t?” Their final response: “There could be war.”

In a similar but even more sobering conversation with an educated youth in the oil-rich Delta region, he expressed hope that the government would meet recent demands of the region to allow the oil profits to remain in that area. The group this youth supported was already in the process of
mobilizing action in the event the government did not respond to their wishes. According to this contact an armed faction in Lagos had been offering them military training and stolen weapons. Even more shocking, he claimed he was on his way to meet with a representative of Sierra Leone’s rebels to negotiate joint exercises! Although at the time, I was inclined to doubt him, I am now more concerned. Last month’s news reported that several dozen oil workers were taken hostage in his area — another tactic he warned me about (“If you’re still here and things get worse, you’ll probably be kidnapped because you’re white, but don’t worry. We are educated people and we will take good care of you if you cooperate.”)

**FINDINGS III – NEWS ANALYSIS**

News collected during the my visit did provide ample evidence of rising expectations and their international origins. The news also documented well two small ethnic clashes which together claimed 60 lives; both concerned political representation. Other more costly clashes (250 dead in Warri) involved fighting over oil rights that were worthless under the military government but were anticipated to become profitable when the democratic government was expected to allow the local groups to keep more of the profits. Just last month fighting broke out in the north between Hausa and Yoruba, claiming between 30 and 70 lives.

To reveal the pattern of ethnic violence, I reviewed 2 ½ years of Nigerian news and quantified any reference to deaths resulting from communal violence. The fruits of this effort are depicted in Figure 16, represent both the number of different clashes reported in a given quarter and the reported death toll from each clash. The official date of transition from military to civilian rule was May 29th 1999, just as ethnic relations became the worst they had been in years.

![Death Toll of Communal Conflicts by Quarter](image)

**Figure 16.** Death toll of communal clashes as reported in *Post Express.*
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Until I am able to better track the consequences of democratization over time, I can make few definitive conclusions. I do suggest, however, that the data I have collected, and the pieces of which I’ve presented, provide preliminary support for my hypotheses that democracy is externally imposed, that civil society is weak, that the nation is deeply divided, and that democracy is likely to exacerbate these conditions. Furthermore, the new constitution does little to solve these problems and contains little of the remedies that either Horowitz or Lijphart suggest. Despite my love of the democratic system and my strong desire for Nigeria to succeed, I am pessimistic about its prospects given current conditions and efforts.

CURRENT LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Although I was able to draw some theoretically interesting and statistically significant conclusions from my survey data, much remains wanting. I had hoped to do so much more but strikes in Ibadan, shootings in Enugu, and school break in Jos prevented me from collecting sufficient sample to perform finer analysis and contrast by region. Although the north-south cleavage is a pivotal one, I would like to explore further the relations between southern groups and the relations of each to the democratic process.

Furthermore, I cannot avoid criticism that my western origins and appearance might have biased the respondents’ answers. I expected that, if anything, it would have biased them toward their African identity–Social Identity Theory would suggest that what most differs between them and myself would be most immediate in their mind at the time of the interview. The survey results indicate, however, that this was not the case; continental identity was the lowest. Nevertheless, I believe that my data would benefit in quantity and quality if I allowed the local professors to execute the next round. I made at least one reputable and reliable contact at every university I visited and will be contacting them shortly with a new survey to administer. For less than the cost of my traveling back to Nigeria, I can contract with six professors to survey 100 (200 in the Muslim north) freshmen political science students in each university and mail me the results. This will enable me to verify my initial regional comparisons, in addition to enabling me to do the following:

• Contrast the three major ethnic groups (The Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo)–I missed the Yoruba due to a strike and only thinly covered the Ibo due to school shootings.
• Contrast major and minor ethnic groups (see how economic and political liberalization may affect the three major groups mentioned above compared with minor groups of the former Benin empire, the Delta region, and the Plateau middle belt).
• Track identity change over time
• Add questions to more fully address issues related to and compatible with other surveys (World Values, and Democratic Culture), and to enable a more cross national analysis of Nigeria’s experience.
SOME WORKS CITED
(For the moment woefully incomplete)


Appendix A

Ranked Identities Survey

With the permission of my faculty contact, I administered a short survey in one large or several small classes. Where classes were out of session (typically due to violence or strikes) I got permission from the department chair and surveyed small groups of students as I could find them. The instructions and survey typically took no more than 10 minutes and consisted of two related tasks.

First, I offered the students a short pre-printed list (see the next page) of seven identity categories identified. I then instructed them verbally to identify their religion, ethnic group, etc in the space immediately following the identity categories. Next, I instructed them to rank the categories according to the degree that each defines who they are—1 representing the strongest identifying factor and seven the weakest. Several versions of the list (each with items organized according to a random number generator) are distributed randomly to each student to control for ordering effects.

My script was as follows:

“Good morning. (Wait for response). My name is Kevin Ellsworth. I am a Ph.D. student visiting your university to conduct some research—research related to how you identify yourselves. (I begin handing out the survey forms).

“If someone were to ask you, ‘Who are you?’ you might answer many different ways. I would answer--

By name -- ‘I am Kevin.’
By occupation -- ‘I am a student.’
By gender -- ‘I am a man.’
By position in the family -- ‘I am a son, a father, etc.’

“These answers represent how I define myself. They represent who I think I am.

“I would like to know who you think you are, not by name, occupation, or gender, but in seven other categories listed here. “Ask yourself, ‘Who am I?’ for each category and answer ‘I am a ________.’ (I draw a random form)

“I will go over some of them with you but probably not in the order you have them listed on your form. For instance, what continent do you identify with?” (Someone always responded, “Africa”) +

“Good, now answer ‘I am an. . .’ (someone would always answered “African”)

“Good, now think of which state—I mistakenly call it province—do you most identify with, whether it be where you live now or where you are from. For example (I would list a few local states).

“The category region may be a little confusing. First don’t confuse it with religion on the form. What I mean by region is what international region do you identify with. For example, some people feel South Asian, Eastern European, or West African. Decide which you identify with and fill it in by ‘region’.

9 When questioned by the faculty or students, I also offered a brief explanation (after they’ve completed the surveys) of how the survey will illuminate the relationship between democracy and ethnic relations in Nigeria.
“Are there any questions? (On several occasions I had to explain that by ‘Subethnic Group,’ I was referring to a smaller subset of a larger ethnic groups.) Has everyone filled in all the blanks under the heading ‘Identity’? Good, now as you look at the list you’ve just provided, you may notice that you feel more strongly about some of these identities than you do about others. Ask yourself now, which of these best describes who you are to yourself. Which is most central to your being? Now write a ‘1’ in the small blank next to this most important identity. Now ask yourself, ‘which of the remaining identities is the most important?’ and mark it with a ‘2’. And so on until you have numbered them all one through 7.

“Thank you.”

After collecting all of the surveys, I would then explain briefly how we express our identities in the democratic process and how democracy may work to influence the ordering of identities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Your Identity</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continent</td>
<td>_____________</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
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<td>Region</td>
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<td>Province</td>
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<td>Nationality</td>
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<td>Religion</td>
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<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>Subethnic Group</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Subethnic Group</td>
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APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW

I first interview my contacts and then seek referrals to interview neighbors, friends, and acquaintances. I talked to everyone else I could find as well, cab drivers, people at the market, hotel workers, etc. The interviews addressed the following points and questions:

Introduction
C Introductions, presentation of references/related contacts, and small talk. Assurances of anonymity, discussion of use of information, and permission to interview and take notes.

Democracy
C I would begin by asking them how they felt about the transition to democracy. How did they feel about the old government. How do they expect the new one will differ. What to they expect will be the impact on their lives, on their cities, on their regions and ethnic groups.

Rank and Content of Ethnic Identity
C If possible I attempted to have people verbally (or by arranging index cards labeled with each identity category) identify and order their identities. I would then talk with them about why they ordered them as they did and what that meant to them.

Political Expression of Ethnic Identity
C I have heard that some people are very satisfied with the recent local and presidential elections,. But that others are not satisfied. Can you help me understand why this is the case. (I will use this nonthreatening question to lead to their personal feelings about the elections’ outcomes which should give me a fairly reliable indication as to how they did or would have voted).

C I could not help but notice that different regions of Nigeria voted for different political parties. Can you help me understand that. (This should allow me to explore their perceived role of ethnicity in voting behavior, and can lead me to address their own expression of ethnicity in which party they favored).

Cooperative vs. Conflictual Nature of Ethnic Identity
C Tell me about the major/neighborhood ethnic groups in Nigeria.

C How do you feel about each?
C Can you tell me the first three adjectives that you feel best describe the (other ethnic groups’ names)?

C How does the (other ethnic groups) relate to past and current governments? How do you feel about that?
APPENDIX C

SCHEDULE OF MY TRAVELS IN NIGERIA

Lagos
— Arrived Wed, 5/19 in Lagos at
— Traveled by shared taxi to Benin City, Thur, 5/20 (321 km.)

Benin City
— Stayed with former arms dealer, well connected with the university and the military.
— Surveyed 88 students at University of Benin, Main Campus and Interviewed three faculty individually, and led a focus group discussion with 6 other faculty at the faculty lounge
— Traveled to Port Harcourt by shared taxi, Sat, 5/22

Port Harcourt
— Surveyed 37 Students at Abia State University, Port Harcourt Branch
— Interviewed three faculty individually, and five more in a focus group discussion and several other people.
— Surveyed 10 students at Port Harcourt University, Abuja Park
— Traveled to Enugu by Train, Tuesday 5/25

Enugu
— Surveyed four students in Enugu State University of Technology (shootings prevented more)
— Surveyed thirty students at University of Nigeria, Enugu Branch
— Interviewed several faculty and other people.
— Traveled to Jos by shared taxi (601 km.)

Jos
— University was out of session but I had an extensive interview with faculty member, Dr. Sam Egwu University of Jos, Dept. of Political Science, who also heads a NGO on democracy in Nigeria.
— Traveled to Kano by shared taxi

Kano
— Surveyed 180 students in Beyero University of Kano
— Interviewed several professors and led a small focus group
— Flew to Lagos, then caught shared cab to Ibadan

Ibadan
— Univeristy of Ibaden was on strike and utterly vacant except for regional expert on federalism and ethnicity who I interviewed extensively.
— Traveled to Lagos and flew home