

# Trust, Testimony, and Prejudice in the Credibility Economy

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*Miranda Fricker (2007) has recently explored some of the ways in which stereotypes can lead to quasi-perceptual, prejudicially diminished assessments of credibility she calls testimonial injustices. This paper proceeds in two stages. First, I examine some cases deserving of the title 'testimonial injustice' that do not fit Fricker's central cases. Second, I argue that testimonial injustice is a special case of a broader type of injustice. The proper prophylaxis against such injustices, I argue, is the cultivation of a virtue I call apt trusting.*

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Sam Waterson oozes credibility. His role as District Attorney Jack McCoy in the popular television show *Law and Order* has made him appear trustworthy to such an extent that investment firms and insurance companies have chosen him as their spokesperson.

Waterson's credibility derives from his character's strict moral compass. William H. Macy does not appear so credible. His role in the film *Fargo* as the bumbling Jerry Lundegaard coupled with his often troubled countenance makes him appear less than trustworthy.

Assessments of credibility are enormously complicated. Whether to trust someone is a difficult choice. The cost of error is often high, and we frequently make mistakes. We often need to make assessments of credibility very quickly and on impoverished evidence. It comes as no surprise, then, that stereotypes are crucial to our making reliable credibility assessments. Consider the cases from above. People who hold positions of esteem (e.g. district attorneys) and who speak confidently are taken to

be credible, while those who hold positions of disesteem (e.g. car salesmen) and who speak haltingly are often taken not to be credible.

Miranda Fricker has recently explored some of the ways in which stereotypes can lead to prejudicially diminished assessments of credibility she calls *testimonial injustices* (2007). Fricker suggests that the antidote to testimonial injustice is the cultivation of a virtue she calls testimonial justice. In this paper I shall examine several cases that deserve the title ‘testimonial injustice’ but that differ from the central cases of testimonial injustice Fricker considers. I shall also argue that testimonial injustice is a special case of a broader class of injustices. This does not mean, however, that the specifically epistemic nature of that injustice that Fricker observes is unimportant. Rather, the upshot of this taxonomy of testimonial injustice lies in the proper counteractive virtue. I conclude that there is a single virtue cultivation of which serves to counteract instances of this broader type of injustice. I call this virtue *apt trusting*.

## TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE AND NEGATIVE IDENTITY PREJUDICE

Testimonial exchange is an important means of disseminating knowledge. Hearing testimony from someone who knows that  $p$  is a basic case of coming to know that  $p$ . So central is testimony to our epistemic practice that some epistemologists have taken testimonial exchange to be the source of our concept of knowledge.<1> One must, however, guard against misinformation in a world where resources are limited, persons self interested or incompetent, and dissimulation is always a live possibility.

We often rely on the word of others in making practical choices. One's decision to act on a piece of testimony necessarily involves an investment, an investment of one's time, effort, and often one's material resources. The necessity of such an investment makes manifest the need for sorting witnesses according to their credibility. We need to know who we can count on to give us accurate and useful information before we sink resources into plans and actions guided by testimony.

Investigation into the credibility of our fellows itself takes time and valuable cognitive resources, however. We often cannot spare either. Action is often demanded with little or no time for investigation. Information that bears on credibility is often scarce. On a daily basis, then, we must resort to stereotypes in order to make reliable credibility assessments. According to Fricker, stereotypes are "*widely held associations between a given social group and one or more attributes*" (2007, 30). On Fricker's view, these associations operate at the level of shared imagery. To take an example, consider the case from above of the untrustworthy car salesman. To say that this stereotype of car salesmen is a shared *image* is to say that, when one makes a credibility judgment based on that stereotype, one does not articulate, consciously or unconsciously, a bit of *reasoning* like the following: "Well, Lundegaard's a car salesman. Car salesmen are not trustworthy. Lundegaard just told me that *p*, so I will not believe *p* without independent verification." We do not reason in such a way. Rather, on Fricker's view, we just *see* Lundegaard *as* untrustworthy. Our credibility judgment is *quasi-perceptual*. We access a shared image of the car salesman as untrustworthy, and this image informs our credibility judgment. Since we do not have to articulate a piece of reasoning, valuable

cognitive resources are conserved and no informational input in the form of premises is required.

According to Fricker, in testimonial exchange, hearers are

Confronted with the immediate task of gauging how likely it is that what a speaker has said is true. Barring a wealth of personal knowledge of the speaker as an individual, such a judgment of credibility must reflect some kind of social generalization about the epistemic trustworthiness—the competence and sincerity—of people of the speaker’s social type, so that it is inevitable (and desirable) that the hearer should spontaneously avail himself of the relevant generalizations in the shorthand form of (reliable) stereotypes. Without such a heuristic aid he will not be able to achieve the normal spontaneity of credibility judgment that is characteristic of everyday testimonial exchange (2007, 32).

The imagistic quality of credibility stereotypes is crucial to maintaining the spontaneity of testimonial exchange. If stereotypes operated at the level of inferences, testimonial exchange would be stilted and could not attain the free-flowing nature characteristic of such exchange.

Unfortunately, not all stereotypes we avail ourselves of represent reliable empirical generalizations. Some are based on prejudice. Prejudices are, roughly, negative attitudes that display a resistance to counterevidence.<2> While many prejudices take the form of beliefs, the negative stereotypes Fricker is concerned with do not. Since the social stereotype is “an image that expresses an association between a social group and one or more attributes,” and not a *belief*, “it becomes clearer how its

impact on judgment can be harder to detect than that of a belief with the same content” (2007, 37).

Beliefs are readily amenable to evidence, reasons, and rational scrutiny in a way that images are not. Reconstructing one’s social stereotypical images is more than a matter of acquiring new evidence, or of thinking things through more carefully. Abandoning or reconstructing a stereotype involves changing the way one *sees* things. This is somewhat more difficult than merely changing one’s beliefs. Further, “[i]mages are capable of a visceral impact on judgment, which allows them to condition our judgments without our awareness, whereas it would take an unconscious belief to do so with comparable stealth” (2007, 37). The feature of stereotypes that facilitates testimonial exchange, unfortunately, renders those stereotypes resistant to change through belief modification.

When a credibility judgment is mediated by a stereotype that is *identity prejudicial*, and thereby results in a hearer’s according a speaker lower credibility, Fricker maintains that a testimonial injustice has been done to the speaker. An identity prejudicial credibility stereotype is one that associates a feature of the identity of some social group with one or more attributes inversely related to credibility. To take an example, the identity *being-a-woman* is historically associated with the attributes “illogicality, inferior intelligence, evolutionary inferiority..” and so on (2007, 32). To have a negative identity prejudice is just to have a commitment to an association between negative features and a particular social identity (e.g., being a woman, being working class, being black, etc.).

According to Fricker, the sort of prejudice that often results in testimonial injustice is a “negative identity-prejudicial stereotype” and is defined as follows:

*A widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attributes, where this association embodies a generalization that displays some (typically epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment (2007, 35).*

The ethically bad affective investments Fricker has in mind here are affective investments like racial hatred, misogyny, or heterosexism. The central case of testimonial injustice, then, is one in which a hearer assigns a speaker a lower than usual credibility judgment on the basis of a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype.

#### OTHER FORMS OF TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE

According to Fricker, the wrong done by testimonial injustice is twofold. There is a purely epistemic harm done in that “knowledge that would be passed on to a hearer is not received” (2007, 35). This harm is one prejudiced hearers bring upon themselves. When testimonial injustice is endemic, however, this harm is visited upon entire epistemic communities. The second harm is a harm done specifically to the speaker. This dimension of the wrong done in cases of prejudicially diminished credibility assessments accounts for the *injustices* that result from such assessments. In cases where a speaker is unjustly subject to a prejudicially diminished credibility assessment, their capacity as a conduit for knowledge is undermined; “[t]o be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is

to be wronged in a capacity essential to human value” (2007, 44). This aspect of the harm done by testimonial injustice reveals how deeply such injustices cut. To have one’s credibility undermined in such a way is to be undermined in a category essential for human value; one treated in such a way is treated as subhuman.

In the following sections, I shall consider some cases that do not fit Fricker’s characterization of the central case of testimonial injustice, but that nevertheless seem to deserve the title.

### UNDER-TESTIFYING: TWO CASES

Testimonial injustice can occur, I suggest, in cases where the person done an injustice is not the speaker but the recipient of testimony. When we testify to others, we often make assessments of their trustworthiness and their competence. What we tell others is conditioned by how reliable we think they are and by how competent we take them to be. Consider the case of a classroom instructor offering a lecture on some abstruse concept in, say, political philosophy. The way in which she frames her testimony will depend, in part, on her assessment of her audience’s competence. Suppose a negative identity prejudicial stereotype of minority or working class students as incompetent is operating in her assessment. She delivers a ‘dumbed down’ version of her lecture to a class that consists largely of minority and working class students. She does the members of her class a testimonial injustice.

The harm that she does them is twofold. First, they miss out on some knowledge they might otherwise have gained. Second, they are treated like inferior human beings

insofar as they are treated as unfit subjects of knowledge. This type of injustice is especially pernicious. For repeated instances of such injustice serve to reinforce the negative stereotype. Persons subjected to systematic injustice of this sort *actually are* less knowledgeable than others, for they have been deprived of epistemic opportunity. Also, an environment in which such injustices often occur is one that is hostile to the development of epistemic virtue. Students who repeatedly receive the message that they are inferior may fail to develop the requisite inquisitiveness and intellectual confidence required for being full-fledged participants in the cognitive economy.

The second case also involves a failure to testify to a hearer.<3> A woman shopping with her husband asks a hardware store clerk a question about a lawnmower. The clerk addresses his response, not to the woman who asked him, but rather to her husband. What is going on in such a case? The clerk made an identity prejudicial judgment about the woman. Either she wouldn't understand the information about the lawnmower or would be incapable of implementing the information in decision making, so the proper audience for the reply is clearly her husband who is (judged to be) both competent in matters related to lawn care and possessed of the decision making authority.<4>

In this case, the woman is not done the twofold wrong. She *does* come by the knowledge she sought in virtue of hearing the answer directed towards her husband. However, she is undermined in her capacity as a knower, for she is deemed an unfit respondent. Again, if this sort of injustice is frequently done to her, she may suffer from impoverished intellectual virtue. She may just stop asking questions like this of people

like the hardware store clerk. She will thereby miss out on knowledge she might otherwise have gained.

These cases differ from Fricker's central case of testimonial injustice in that the roles of recipient of injustice (hearer) and perpetrator of injustice (speaker) are reversed. However, since a negative identity prejudicial stereotype is at work in creating a diminished assessment of credibility in a testimonial exchange, there is good reason to think testimonial injustice occurs.<5>

### OVER-TESTIFYING: TWO CASES

Testimonial injustice can be done by speakers who *withhold* testimony due to negative identity prejudicial stereotyping. I maintain that testimonial injustice can also be done when speakers are *too* forthcoming with testimony due to such stereotyping. Consider a case of class disparity. A wealthy couple openly gossip in front of their housekeeping staff because they feel that the staff, due to their working class status, are not competent to understand the complex social intrigues of their betters. In such a case, clearly an injustice is done, but it is one that results in the hearers gaining *more* knowledge than they would otherwise have. What, then, is the wrong done to the housekeeping staff?

I claim that the wrong done is one of *displacement*. The gulf between classes is made manifest the extent to which the housekeepers are made to feel *invisible*. In this testimonial exchange, they are treated just like pieces of furniture or animals. Just as it is acceptable to discuss gossip in front of a chair, a table, or a dog, the homeowners deem it acceptable to discuss gossip in front of their working class subordinates. It's okay to talk

in front of the staff because they believe the staff to lack the wherewithal, first to understand the complexities of what is being said, and second to do anything with the information even if they do manage to understand it.

Consider a second case. Medical professionals (and most adults) often speak in the third person about children, mentally handicapped adults, and the elderly in the presence of those persons. Information that is of great importance to the hearers is being discussed, but it is being talked about in such a way as to imply that the hearers are not sufficiently competent to understand it. Again, the victims of the testimonial injustice are in a position to come by *more* knowledge than they might otherwise have, but at a cost. They are made to feel displaced, at the periphery of conversation, unable to contribute to discussion. They are treated like mere objects, as no more capable of contributing to or understanding what is being said than a chair or a table.

Although she does not consider cases of over-testifying specifically, Fricker's treatment of her central cases of testimonial injustice can be extended to cover them. In describing the wrong done in cases of testimonial injustice, Fricker distinguishes between treating someone as an *informant* and treating them as a mere *source of information* (2007, 132). Informants pass along information by means of their active participation in the pooling of knowledge. Sources of information, on the other hand, "are states of affairs from which the inquirer may be in a position to glean information" (132).

According to Fricker,

...testimonial injustice—especially when it is systematic—also wrongfully deprives the subject of a certain fundamental sort of respect, and the distinction

between a source of information and an informant helps reveal this deprivation as also a form of *objectification* (132).

Just as a speaker is treated as a mere source of information rather than an informant in virtue of her being objectified in Fricker's sense, so too a hearer is treated as a mere object rather than a discursive partner in virtue of her being displaced in my sense. In both cases, I suggest, testimonial injustice occurs.

### CREDIBILITY WIDELY CONSTRUED

So far I have been talking about assessments of credibility generally. I have alluded to credibility judgments' having as a component an assessment of *competence*. In this section, I shall sketch a view of credibility that extends the notion to cover *trustworthiness*. If what I have to say in this section is correct, then it appears as though developing a virtue of apt trusting will suffice to alleviate testimonial injustice.

Fricker observes that assessments of credibility are made along two separate dimensions: *competence* and *sincerity*. When confronted with a potential informant, in order to determine their credibility, one must assess their character along both of these axes. In this section, I shall argue that competence and sincerity both involve a cluster of concepts that are ambiguous between epistemic and practical or moral renderings. If this is right, then there is room for a concept of practical or moral credibility. This concept, I maintain, is operative in the proper account of trusting.

### COMPETENCE

What is it to judge that one's interlocutor is competent? There is a cluster of properties that comprise competency. Competent individuals are *rational*. We tend not to take the word of informants who display marked irrationality. Indeed, many negative identity prejudicial stereotypes operative in cases of testimonial injustice involve attributions of irrationality. But, rationality is ambiguous between *practical* rationality and *epistemic* rationality. One is epistemically rational just in case one *believes* rationally. The epistemically rational agent, *inter alia*, gives the proper weight to evidence in determining what to believe, refrains from believing inconsistencies, and draws inferences from her beliefs in accordance with principles of sound reasoning. The practically rational agent, on the other hand, *acts* rationally. She weighs evidence appropriately in deciding what to do, refrains from committing herself to inconsistent courses of action, and draws conclusions about what to do in accordance with principles of sound reasoning.<6>

Competent speakers are also taken to be *reliable*. When we take a speaker to be reliable, we judge that, more often than not, what they tell us will be true. Again, reliability bifurcates into epistemic and practical reliability. The epistemically reliable person has mostly true beliefs. They *track the truth* reliably. Their informational states (e.g., perceptions, beliefs, etc.) are good indicators of the truth. The practically reliable person, on the other hand, can be *counted on*. They tend to be responsible, and can be trusted to act appropriately.

The competent person is also judged to be *knowledgeable*; they are thought to have information. Here, as in the other properties, there is an epistemic-practical divide.

The person who is epistemically informed knows about the world. They possess certain facts. The practically informed person knows what to do and how to do it. One way to draw the distinction is to say that epistemically informed people possess *propositional* knowledge or knowledge *that* while practically informed persons possess knowledge *how*. Assessments of informedness, of course, are relative to certain domains. I may correctly judge an auto mechanic to be well informed about how to repair a carburetor while judging her not to be so well informed about how to perform open heart surgery. This relativity produces a complication where testimonial injustices are concerned. For some social groups are prejudicially perceived as having an overabundance of information about certain areas.<7> I mention this complication, however only to set it aside.

## SINCERITY

Credible interlocutors are also taken to be sincere. When confronted with a potential informant, we judge them to be credible only if we think they are *telling the truth*. That is, if we think they are not trying to deceive us. I want to suggest that there is a distinction to be drawn between epistemic sincerity and practical or moral sincerity. The sincere individual is *honest*. One may be honest in virtue of one's testimony (i.e., one tells the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth) or one may be honest in virtue of one's behavior (e.g., one does not steal, one returns lost property to its rightful owner, etc.). One who is honest in this latter sense has a virtue relevant to assessments of

trustworthiness or practical credibility, while one who is honest in the former sense has a virtue relevant to assessments of epistemic credibility.

## EPISTEMIC CREDIBILITY, PRACTICAL CREDIBILITY, AND TRUST

Taking an interlocutor's word is a special case of trusting that person. When I rely on the testimony of an informant, I trust that person to tell me the truth. I trust them to give me reliable, accurate, and helpful information. My trust in an informant is mediated by my assessment of their credibility. Testimonial injustice, then, is a special case of prejudice getting in the way of correctly assessing a person (or entire social group) as trustworthy. If this is correct, then we should expect to see similar injustices appear not just with respect to *testimonial* exchanges, but also with respect to trust relations more generally.

In order to trust someone with a valued good, say to trust a baby sitter with my child for the weekend, I must judge that person to be *practically credible*. That is, I must think that the person in question possesses the practical analogues of the epistemically relevant properties of rationality, reliability, knowledge, and honesty.<8>

Negative identity prejudicial stereotypes can figure in assessments of practical credibility. To take an example. Negative prejudicial stereotypes often prevent gays and lesbians from being trusted with children in caretaking capacities.<9> Social images of gays and lesbians involve assessments of their practical credibility. They are not seen as being honest. That is, negative stereotypical images of gays and lesbians portray them as subversive, as wishing to corrupt children, to 'recruit' young people. This negative image bears not only on gays' and lesbians' perceived honesty, but also on their

perceived reliability; they cannot be counted on to look after children without exposing them to morally questionable influences.

These negative social images lead to gays' and lesbians' being displaced in an important respect from the social world. Similarly, social images of certain groups as suffering from epistemic credibility deficits lead to members of those groups being displaced from the epistemic community. The failure to trust gays and lesbians with the care of our children is structurally similar to the teacher's failure to deliver a suitably informational lecture to her students. In both cases responsibility for something is not given to some group. In the former case, responsibility for the care of children is withheld; in the latter case, responsibility for having some bit of knowledge is withheld. Gays and lesbians are denied childcare responsibilities because they are seen as incapable of adequately discharging those responsibilities. The students are not given responsibility for knowing some bit of information because they are seen as incapable of grasping it. If the failure to delegate responsibility to gays and lesbians for the care of our children is structurally similar to the failure to delegate responsibility for knowing abstruse concepts to minority and working class students, then there is some reason to suspect the injustices underlying these failures to have a common remedy.

#### APT TRUSTING

Fricker claims that the antidote to testimonial injustice is the virtue of testimonial justice.

. If what I've said above is correct, then the corrective virtue needed to remedy testimonial injustice should fall out of a more general virtue: apt trusting. Knowing who

is worthy of trust, when, and with what is a complicated matter. One's trusting relations can be more or less reasonable, more or less morally good. Apt trusting is that virtue possessed by those who trust reasonably, fairly, to the appropriate extent and in the right circumstances, and for the right reasons.<10>

It is an injustice, I maintain, to refrain from entering into a trust relationship on the basis of a negative identity prejudicial stereotype. One's making diminished credibility judgments based on such a stereotypes is evidence that one lacks the virtue of apt trusting.

It might here be objected that the virtue of apt trusting, qua moral virtue, is insufficient to counteract the specifically *epistemic* dimension of the wrongs done by testimonial injustice. In reply, I want to suggest that apt trusting has both epistemic and moral or practical dimensions. Since part of what it takes to trust aptly is a proper assessment of evidence, an appreciation of reasons, and an ability to reason soundly, apt trusting requires possession of a number of epistemic virtues. Apt trusting requires that one be *impartial* to a significant degree. In deciding which trust relationships to enter, the apt truster disregards information about the trusted that is irrelevant. She who possesses the virtue of apt trusting views race, class, gender, sexual orientation, etc. as irrelevant to determining who to trust. The apt truster avoids making identity prejudicial credibility judgments in determining who to trust.

Apt trusting also requires the epistemic virtues that enable a critical appraisal of one's pattern of credibility judgments. A self-critical apparatus is needed in order to root out those credibility assessments modulated by prejudice. One must monitor and remove judgments that are resistant to evidence in order to trust aptly. Further, coming to have

the virtue of apt trusting involves taking steps to modify one's quasi perceptual credibility assessments. Identity prejudicial credibility assessments are *inapt* insofar as they incorrectly represent properties of persons relevant to trustworthiness. Correcting for such misperceptions may involve more than 'top down' reasoning about how identity features correlate with competence and sincerity. In order to correct for these misperceptions, one may have to undergo some kind of diversity-oriented aversion therapy. To take an example, a person attempting to overcome his sexist credibility assessments might purposefully place himself in situations where it is necessary for him to trust women.<11>

Apt trusting further requires a measure of honesty. One must refrain from cultivating self-deceptive or rationalizing patterns of thought in order to maintain apt trust relationships. The avoidance of self-deceit is a primarily epistemic virtue. As with the development of a self-critical capacity, cultivating honesty may involve more than discursive practices.

Apt trusting, then, requires one to develop intellectual virtues that are, I argue, sufficient for remedying testimonial injustice.

## CONCLUSION

There are structural similarities between the judgments we make about potential subjects of trusting relationships and the assessments of credibility we make about possible informants. Just as failure to take someone's word in a testimonial exchange displaces them from the discursive endeavor, failure to trust someone displaces them from the

social environment. When members of a social group are thrust to the margins of the epistemic or social world due to identity prejudicial credibility deficit (epistemic or practical), an injustice is done. They are unjustly accounted as not trustworthy. These similarities between epistemic and social marginalization make for a unity in the virtue associated with overcoming both kinds of wrong. There is but one virtue, apt trusting, that is the proper antidote to prejudicial assessments of practical and epistemic credibility. If this is correct, then a proper moral education will include attention, not only to the way prejudice influences our assessments of practical credibility <12>, but also to the way it influences our assessments of epistemic credibility.

The suggestion that apt trusting is sufficient to eliminate testimonial injustice does not imply that testimonial injustice is not a phenomenon distinct from other sorts of injustice. Rather, the suggestion is that its parity of structure with other forms of injustice is a reason to think there is a parity in the virtue cultivation of which will suffice to counteract testimonial injustice.

## NOTES

1. See Steven Reynolds's "Why We Should Prefer Knowledge," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* (2008).
2. Fricker calls the kind of prejudice operative in instances of testimonial injustice *negative identity prejudice*. I give her definition of this term below.
3. I take this case from Cheshire Calhoun.
4. Whether the clerk's assessment of the woman's agency in this case counts as an assessment of a feature relevant to her capacity as a knower is perhaps

contentious. A similar worry could be raised about the cases of overtestifying given below. I take it that to have knowledge is, *inter alia*, to be able to *do* certain things with that knowledge. If this is right, then one's prejudicially seeing someone as not possessed of agency will have an effect on one's assessment of that person's capacity as a knower. It might be maintained that assessments of agency are irrelevant to *credibility* judgments, for they do not seem to be assessments relevant to *sincerity* or *competence*. It might be that agency is an *enabling condition* for certain kinds of competence. So, to undermine a person as an agent is indirectly to undermine that person's competence. This is a complicated issue I do not intend to settle here, however. Thanks to Cheshire Calhoun for this point.

5. In an email exchange, Fricker revealed that she would count such cases as instances of testimonial injustice.
6. Fricker is aware that "[t]he undermining of someone as a knower is, conceptually and historically, closely related to their being undermined as a practical reasoner", however, she maintains that "[t]he two sorts of insult to their humanity are importantly distinct...relating as they do to two different functions of rationality..." (2007, 137). If what I have to say below is correct, then the two sorts of insult are importantly unified in their corrective virtue.
7. Thanks to Cheshire Calhoun for this point.
8. This list is not supposed to be exhaustive, but merely to give a flavor of the kinds of properties a trustworthy individual is taken to have.

9. For more on the extent to which such credibility assessments marginalize gays and lesbians from the sphere of family life, see Cheshire Calhoun's *Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
10. There is a lot to say about the *content* of the virtue of apt trusting. This is a project I reserve for another paper. Here I merely give the *structure* of the virtue. Thanks to Danielle Fundora for this point.
11. I owe the notion of such diversity centered aversion therapy to Pamela Stubbart.
12. If the term 'credibility' strained here, I recommend 'responsibility'. To judge that a person is (morally or practically) responsible is to judge that they possess the practical analogues of competence and sincerity.

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