

CONNECTIONS™

European Studies Annual Review

HISTORY · CULTURE · SOCIETY · GOVERNMENT · ECONOMY

ROCKY MOUNTAIN EUROPEAN SCHOLARS CONSORTIUM · VOLUME 4, 2008



Fourth Annual Conference of the Rocky Mountain European Scholars Consortium
"Europe's Diversity" • 19-20 October 2007

Philosophy for *Connections: European Studies Annual Review*™

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Connections is designed to disseminate the research of RMESC presenters, stimulate discussion of European topics, and provide a community for those who study the society, culture, history, government, and economy of the vast and diverse region of Europe.

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RMESC Conferences

The 4th RMESC Conference was hosted and funded by the School of International Letters and Cultures (SILC) at Arizona State University on 19-20 October 2007. SILC is pleased to announce the publication of *Connections: European Studies Annual Review* Volume 4 (2008), including a selection of articles presented at the conference. Information contact: gruzinska@asu.edu and <http://www.asu.edu/clas/dll/RMESC>

The 5th Annual RMESC Conference took place in October, 2008 at the University of Arizona in Tucson. For information on Vol. 5 of *Connections* contact Sandy Dallerba at: dallerba@email.arizona.edu

The 6th Annual RMESC Conference will be hosted by Northern Arizona University (NAU) in Flagstaff on 23-24 October, 2009. Information Contact: Patricia E Frederick, Patricia.Frederick@nau.edu

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INTRODUCTION

Europe's Diversity Aleksandra Gruzinska, Arizona State University

The 4th multidisciplinary annual Rocky Mountain European Scholars' Consortium (RMESC) conference provided a challenging forum for the examination and evaluation of 'Europe's Diversity' in its broadest dimensions, encompassing many fields of interest. It brought together seasoned scholars and graduate students who interacted and shared their work with colleagues from throughout the Intermountain West, and nationally from as far as Boston, Massachusetts.

In Volume 4 of *Connections* readers interested in Europe will find peer reviewed articles selected from those presented at the 'Fourth Annual Rocky Mountain European Studies Conference on Europe's Diversity' in five major areas: 1) economic diversity, 2) linguistic changes, and 3) a cultural voyage in countries that border the Rhine River, 4) political developments in communist Eastern Europe.

We introduce in this issue of *Connections* a Book Review section on recent scholarship of interest to European Studies, and we include a complete program of the 4th Annual RMESC conference which reveals the rich and varied topics presented by some forty scholars.

Danko Sipka addresses recent lexical processes in the three ethnic variants of Serbo-Croatian, i.e., Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak. These processes, being a part of the external linguistic history are related to recent political events in the former Yugoslavia. They, in turn, stem from ethnic identities of these three ethnic groups. The case study of the 1990s lexical changes in the three variants of Serbo-Croatian points to an important role that conflicting ethnic identities play in shaping the lexicon. While ethnic identity cannot be disregarded as a factor of external language history, its omnipresence in the political realm does not translate into an equipotent role in the sphere of language functioning. Multiple other layers of identity and various other historical currents have been shaping the lexicon.

In 'Yugoslavia's third way to paradise,' Robert Niebuhr discusses how ejection from the Cominform in 1948, forced Yugoslav elites to search for an ideological justification for an independent Communist system, which

became marked by a Yugoslav supra-nationalism alongside the decentralization of state power and a policy that became known as socialist self-management. These policies represented a pragmatism imbued with a unique Yugoslav ideology and by the 1960s, the country stood firmly wedged between the two competing systems—the democratic-capitalist West and the communist East—and could not fully identify with either.

The year 2007 marked the 100th anniversary of the publication of Octave Mirbeau's La 628-E8, representing the first "novel" ever written on the automobile. In 1907 the industry was in its beginning stages of production. The expertly assembled machine by a French engineer, Fernand Charron, was registered as 628-E8. It allowed Mirbeau to travel more freely than was true before the advent of the car and he covered a much wider territory in less time. His car whisked him through the countries stretching along the Rhine River, the waterway artery that once fed and still feeds life-giving oxygen to adjoining nations and their governments. These countries have played a key role in shaping socially and politically, geographically and culturally modern Europe.

Sylvain Gallais points to Europe's greatest gifts: its freedom to choose, its rich history and the dynamic future in the new configuration of the European Union. This freedom of choice is made possible by Europe's differences and similarities among its 730 million people in 35 countries, who speak many different languages. Europeans enjoy the freedom to choose from among many varieties of cheese; they enjoy the freedom of religion, and are exposed to many customs and cultures, all enriched by a variety of landscapes and climates, and the freedom to travel.

The contributors included in this volume show Europe's diversity, its modern economy, changing linguistic patterns, and evolving political ideologies on both, its western and eastern fronts.

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable

contributions to the Conference by Sander E. van der Leeuw, archaeologist, historian, and the chair of the School of Human Evolution and Social Change at Arizona State University, Tempe. We express our gratitude to Robert Joe Cutter, Director of the School of International Letters and Cultures for his continued support, and to our co-sponsors, including the College of Arts and Sciences (CLAS), for their remarkable generosity. The 4th Annual RMESC Conference was hosted by SILC which also assumes responsibility for its publication of *Connections* Vol. 4.



London Along the Thames (England). Photo Courtesy Sylvain Gallais

I. SLAVDOM'S LANGUAGE, LITERATURE & IDENTITY

New Words and Old Identities: Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak¹ Lexical Changes of the 1990s

Danko Sipka, Arizona State University

Introduction

The present paper will address recent lexical processes in the three ethnic variants of Serbo-Croatian, i.e., Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak. These processes, being a part of external linguistic history, are related to recent political events in the former Yugoslavia. These events, in turn, stem from ethnic identities of these three ethnic groups. The presentation in this paper will take the following course. After a brief outline of the socio-political background of the addressed lexical processes in Part 1, the methodological background and research questions will be stated in Part 2. This will be followed by the presentation of the research results in Part 3, and the discussion of their general significance in Part 4.

1. Socio-political Background

The final decade of the twentieth century in the former Yugoslavia was marked by abrupt, fundamental, and far-reaching technological, economic, political, and lifestyle changes.

On one hand, global technological changes, such as rapid growth of information technologies for instance, or gene manipulation techniques, have permeated all regions of the former Yugoslavia. The same is true of the global emergence of new ideologies (such as postmodernism) and artistic movements. On the other hand, the democratic revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the resulting termination of a bipolar world order have triggered a series of profound changes specific to the region. The following post-1989 sociopolitical changes need to be mentioned here.

1. Wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 1991-1999;
2. Disintegration of the former Yugoslavia into the Republic of Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (with the split of the latter into Serbia and Montenegro at a later point in time);

3. Transition to a multi-party and eventually democratic political system;
4. Transition to market economy;
5. Increased nationalism in all spheres of public life;
6. Revival of religious practices;
7. Lifestyle changes.

These processes need to be depicted in a more detailed manner. In particular, the 1990s wars between the three Serbo-Croatian speaking ethnic (and at the same time religious) groups—the Serbs are Orthodox Christians, the Croats are Catholics, and the Bosniaks are followers of Islam—have to be elaborated upon as a region-specific historical process.

The wars of the 1990s have a centuries-long prelude (Singleton, 1989), which in synergy with the politics of nationalism (discussed in its broader context by Rupnik, 1996), shaped popular attitudes in such a manner as to make any inter-ethnic compromise leading to the peaceful

Table 1

Nationality	1971	%	1981	%
Serbs	8,143,246	39.7%	8,136,578	36.3%
Croats	4,526,782	22.1%	4,428,135	19.7%
Bosniaks	1,729,932	8.4%	2,000,034	8.9%
Slovenes	1,678,032	8.2%	1,753,605	7.8%
Albanians	1,309,523	6.4%	1,731,252	7.7%
Macedonians	1,194,784	5.8%	1,341,420	6.0%
Yugoslavs	273,077	1.3%	1,216,463	5.4%
Montenegrins	508,843	2.5%	577,298	2.6%
Magyars	477,374	2.3%	426,865	1.9%
Roma	78,485	0.4%	148,604	0.7%
Turks	127,920	0.6%	101,328	0.5%
Slovaks	83,656	0.4%	80,300	0.4%
Romanians	58,570	0.3%	54,721	0.2%
Bulgarians	58,627	0.3%	36,642	0.2%
Italians	21,791	0.1%	15,116	0.1%
other/not determined	252,330	1.2%	389,970	1.7%
total	20,522,972	100.0%	22,438,331	100.00%

Table 2	Serbs number	Serbs %	Croats number	Croats %	Bosniaks number	Bosniaks %	Total number	Total %
SFR Yugoslavia	8 479 775	55,28	4 578 666	29,85	2 280 722	14,87	15 339 163	100,00
SR of Croatia	580 762	13,39	3 708 308	85,51	47 603	1,10	4 336 673	100,00
SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 369 258	33,97	755 894	18,75	1 905 829	47,28	4 030 981	100,00


disintegration or preservation of the former Yugoslavia impossible.

The distribution of the relevant ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia, according to the last two complete pre-war census data (1971, 1981), is shown in Table 1 (table from Wikipedia, 2008, see more demographic information there and in Velat, 1987)


One can see that the three Serbo-Croatian speaking ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) were the most numerous. Their ratios in Yugoslavia as a whole and the two Serbo-Croatian-speaking republics in which the war broke out in the early 1990s, according to the 1991 census (data based on *Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1993*), were as follows (Table 2):

As we can clearly see, Serbs constituted a majority in relation to Croats and Bosniaks in Yugoslavia as a whole. Croats were a relative majority in Croatia and Bosniaks in Bosnia. It is then quite natural that the political attitudes of these three ethnic groups were by-and-large shaped as presented in the following spatial game-theoretic models:

Croatia:



Bosnia:



SQ - status quo in early 1991
x – ideal points

One's line of indifference is a line which delimits the space within which solutions are acceptable for that given player (in this case an ethnic group). More information about spatial game-theoretic models can be found in Ordeshook, 1992. These particular representations are based on the political discourse of the early 1990s and concrete political action taken in these years. A summary of these attitudes and events are available in O'Shea (2006), and Moller (1995).

That is to say, although the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia would ideally have a unitary Yugoslavia instead of a division into Bosnia and Croatia, they were ready to accept any solution which would preserve Yugoslavia, which is shown by their line of indifference. However, the Croatian and Bosniak line of indifference did not include the preservation of Yugoslavia. These attitudes were amplified by the historical burden of the three ethnic groups in question.

Although being the most prominent historical process behind the lexical changes addressed in this paper, the wars of the 1990s were not the only relevant socio-political changes that occurred. Other previously mentioned changes were more characteristic of the former Eastern Europe in general. Since the early 1990s, religion in those countries began to play a very prominent role in the public

domain, often combined with nationalism; it was eventually introduced as a school subject. Finally, a wide range of lifestyle changes, from the introduction of global fast-food chains to the emancipation of women can be observed.

The Serbo-Croatian language and its ethnic variants were not only a result of the previously mentioned socio-political processes but also their ferment. The issue of promoting variants of Serbo-Croatian to three distinct standard languages intertwined with other issues of the nationalist political agenda, which often resulted in grotesque situations, such as publishing a textbook of the “Bosnian” language which was a plagiarism of an old Serbo-Croatian textbook with only the title and some names altered (this incident is described in Klajn, 1998).

2. Model of Lexical Dynamics

A model which views lexical dynamics as an interplay between multiple layers of identity (social, regional, cultural, historic, etc.) and universal cognitive abilities was deployed in this research. On one hand, there are common generators of lexical change, such as the need to name a newly-invented entity. On the other hand there are identity-based generators, such as the need to make oneself distinct from different social, professional, ethnic and other groups. The starting point of the model is thus a well-known socio-linguistic distinction between the communication and identification functions of language. As Fasold (1984), page 1 notes: “Not only do people use language to share their thoughts and feelings with other people, they exploit the subtle and not so subtle aspects of language to reveal and define their social relationships with the people they are talking to, with people who can overhear them, and even with people who are nowhere around.” At the same time this division differentiates between changes motivated by largely universal cognitive needs and changes induced by group-specific demands. This particular distinction was oftentimes deployed in the analyses of Serbo-Croatian (e.g., Thomas, 1998). At a more operational level, quantitative sociolinguistics (Fasold, 1984, 1990), Fishman’s theory of language and ethnic identity (see Fishman, 1999), and corpus linguistics (see McEnery and Wilson, 2001) served as methodological background in this investigation. The concrete data sets and procedures are described in section 3 of this paper.

Recent sociolinguistic turbulence in Serbo-Croatian has commanded considerable interest in scholarly

circles. Greenberg (2004), and Okuka (1989) provide general reviews of the situation geared toward American and German students respectively. Neweklowsky (2003), Lučić (2002), as well as Bugarski and Hawkesworth (2004) provide collections of papers on the subject. There are collections of relevant documents, such as Šipka, M. (2001), and papers devoted to just one variant of Serbo-Croatian, such as Brozović (2001) and Katičić (2001) on Croatian, Bugarski (2001) and Klajn (2001) on Serbian. However, one should note that all these papers focus on broader issues of how various variants of Serbo-Croatian have been evolving into separate standard languages or the issue of the socio-cultural context in which these variants operate. A good example of the nature of this discussion is provided by Kordić (2008), where the author engages in numerous debates over a question if Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian are variants of Serbo-Croatian (her view) or separate standard languages (the view of her opponents).

In this paper a different perspective was assumed and the research, complementary to the existing body of works, concerns very specific issues of linguistic identity and lexical changes. In particular, the following research questions were addressed.

1. What is the extent of ethnically motivated lexical changes in the entire body of new words introduced in the 1990s?
2. Is there a relationship between ethnically-marked lexical items and the media outlets in which they appear?
3. What are the lexical changes that do not stem from ethnic identities?

In order to answer questions one and three a corpus-based database of new words in Serbo-Croatian (Šipka, D 2001) was compiled and analyzed. The particulars about the database are provided in section 4.1. Answers to question two were sought in two investigations of Bosnian textual corpora. The description of the corpora and the procedures deployed in analyzing them is provided in section 4.2.

3. Methodology

Data from Šipka, D (2001), a database of Bosniak, Croatian, and Serbian words introduced in the 1990s was analyzed to determine the extent of ethnically motivated lexical changes. This database was used as a knowledge

base for Šipka, D (2002). The database was created using textual corpora and existing new words dictionaries. Principal textual corpora encompassed major media outlets, i.e., Serbian daily *Politika* (www.politika.org.yu, 3.8 million tokens from the second half of 1999), Croatian daily *Vjesnik* (www.vjesnik.hr, 1.8 million tokens from 1999), Bosniak weekly *BH Dani* (www.bhdani.com, 1.6 million entries from 1998 and 1999), Croatian *Narodne novine* (www.nn.hr, 600,000 tokens from 1992-1999). Several other specialized corpora, such as Croatian Soldier “Hrvatski vojnik” (www.hrvatski-vojniki.hr) were also used. The database also included the words from two existing new words dictionaries (Klajn 1992, Brozović-Rončević 1996), lists extracted from various movies, TV programs, linguistic discussions, etc. Last not least, Otašević (2001), a list of new words made available by the author, was also included.

All lexemes gathered from the aforementioned sources were filtered against two of the most reliable Serbo-Croatian – English dictionaries, Benson (1992) and Drvodelić (1989) and if words or their meanings were not attested in these two dictionaries, they were included into the database (Šipka D, 2001). This procedure yielded 44,879 entries

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 The extent of ethnically motivated lexical changes

Ethnically marked items have the following frequency in the database (Table 3).

One should add that the lexemes are marked according to their systemic features. Radical Bosniak, Radical Croatian, and Radical Serbian are the lexemes which cannot be found in major media but rather marginal sources, such as extremist media. For example, Croatian *munjkovni* ‘electrical’ is used in extremist media such as *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* (www.hop.hr) but not in the Croatian national TV or major newspapers.

The data presented in the Table 3 does not support a popular perception of broad ethnically motivated lexical changes, oftentimes expressed in internet fora such as newsgroups *soc.culture.croatia* and *soc.culture.yugoslavia* throughout the 1990s. The actual number of these ethnically marked words is, in fact, limited (7%). It seems that the popular perception is based on confusing prominence with frequency.

4.2 The Relationship between New Lexemes and Media Outlets

A particularly interesting interplay of language and identity (see Riley 2007 for a general discussion, and Fishman 1999 with regards to language and ethnic identity) can be observed in the language of the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), where an attempt has been made to transform the situation in which the Bosniak form was lexically closer to the Serbian than to the Croatian variant and in which Bosniak identity was not emphasized strongly enough. The intended transformation relied on introducing words in the Croatian form (e.g., *jučer* ‘yesterday’ instead of *juče*, *definirati* ‘define’ instead of *definirati*, etc.) as well as elevating previously nonstandard Bosniak lexical items to the level of standard (e.g., *babo* ‘father’ instead of *otac*, *lahko* ‘easy’ instead of *lako*, etc.). The intended result of the changes was creating equidistance from Serbs and Croats as well as emphasizing Bosniak identity (more in Maglajlić, 2002)

In reality, as it will be demonstrated, these ideological maneuvers had a considerably limited reach. In order to get insight into the proportion of Bosniak words recently introduced from the non-standard forms into the standard language, two newspaper corpora were analyzed. The magazine titled *Start BiH* (<http://www.startbih.info>) represents a general, secular, European-oriented newspaper source, while *Novi horizonti* (<http://www.novihorizonti.com>) represents an Islamic media outlet. The results below show that the percentage of formerly non-standard Bosniak words is practically infinitesimal in both newspapers. This is true for both those lexical items which represent formerly non-standard phonetic features, e.g., *lahak* ‘light,

	Start BiH	Novi horizonti
Total	280721	340070
Bosniak (B)	176	5527
	0.063%	1.625%
Bosniak, e.g.: *lah(a)k*	6	67
non-Bosniak, e.g.: *lak*	63	1
Bosniak, e.g.: *amidž/da{jli}dž*	10	44
non-Bosniak, e.g.: *uj/tet/stri*	10	4

Table 3

Group	Examples	Number	Percent
Serbian Ekavian	<i>međususedski</i> 'neighboring', <i>mega-uspeh</i> 'mega success', <i>proterivač</i> 'one who expels'	1880	4.19%
Croatian	<i>bojišnica</i> 'battlefield', <i>božićnica</i> 'Xmas bonus', <i>uradak</i> 'paper, article'	632	1.41%
Radical Croatian	<i>datkovni obradnik</i> 'data processor', <i>munjkovni</i> 'electronic', <i>rednik</i> 'compter',	203	0.45%
Bosniak	<i>lahko</i> 'easily', <i>mehko</i> 'softly', <i>poselamiti</i> 'greet', <i>šehid</i> 'fallen hero',	243	0.54%
Radical Bosniak	<i>dekika</i> 'minute', <i>greb</i> 'grave', <i>hudovica</i> 'widow', <i>krhat</i> 'frail', <i>zijehati</i> 'yawn',	68	0.15%
Serbian	<i>instalirati</i> 'install', <i>naduvan</i> 'bloated, inflated', <i>pasuljast</i> 'bean- like'	61	0.14%
Radical Serbian	<i>đeneral</i> 'general', <i>sohran</i> 'cashe', <i>toržestven</i> 'festive', <i>vaznosii</i> 'ascend',	20	0.04%
Marked, Total		3107	6.92%
Unmarked		41772	93,08%
Total		44879	100,00%

easy', formerly substandard vs. *lak* 'light, easy', and those which were formerly non-standard as lexemes, e.g. *amidža* 'maternal uncle', formerly non-standard vs. *ujak*, *tetak* 'maternal uncle', or *daidža* 'paternal uncle' vs. *stric* 'paternal uncle'.

While these new formerly non-standard Bosniak lexemes are characterized by very low frequency and play a very limited role in differentiating Bosniaks from Serbs and Croats, they have some role as differentiating factor between Islamic media outlets (which have been embracing them fully and unreservedly) and the secular ones (which are by-and-large hesitant to accept them). This then represents an interesting case where the original political intervention in the language substance yields a result quite different from the envisaged one. Obviously, two newspaper texts do not constitute a representative sample of Bosniak media outlets which is why these results were not tested statistically. This investigation, rather, generated the following two hypotheses:

1. The corpus distribution of new Bosniak words is very limited and they are hence not a significant marker of Bosniak identity,

2. New Bosniak words are more likely to be found in conservative texts, which makes them an indicator of conservatism within the Bosniak ethnic group.

In order to test these hypotheses the following two corpora were used containing the following major Bosniak media sources based on their self-expressed Islamic orientation (Islamic media, number 2 below) or the lack of such proclamation (general media, number 1 below)

1. General media corpus (less conservative)

BHDani <http://www.bhdani.com>, Bosna ekspres <http://www.bosniaexpress.com>, Bošnjaci <http://www.bosnjaci.net>, Bošnjački topiraci <http://www.bosnjacki-topiraci.net>, Kitabhana <http://www.kitabhana.net>, Walter <http://www.walter.ba>, Nova Grapska <http://www.novagrapska.com>, OHR <http://www.ohr.int>, ONASA <http://www.onasa.com.ba>, Oslobodjenje <http://www.oslobodjenje.com.ba>, Sabah <http://www.sabah-ba.com/>, SlobodnaBosna <http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba>, Superbosna <http://www.superbosna.com>, StartBih <http://www.startbih.info>

2. Islamic media corpus (more conservative)

Bošnjakinja <http://www.bosnjakinja.net>, Džemat <http://www.dzemat.org>, ElKalem <http://www.elkalem.com>, Islam <http://www.islam.co.ba>, Muslimanski glas <http://www.muslimanskiglas.com>, Nahla <http://www.nahla.com>, Novi horizonti <http://www.novihorizonti.com>, Preporod <http://www.preporod.com>, Rijaset IZ <http://www.rijaset.net>, Saff <http://www.saffbih.com>

The following procedure was deployed:

1. An undergraduate research assistant² was given two lists of Bosniak electronic newspapers and magazines (general and Islamic) and instructed to form two corpora of approximately same size including the sources evenly. She remained uninformed about the purpose of this research, which separated data collection from its analysis and hence made the procedure more objective.
2. The author consequently used PERL scripts and SPSS 14 to analyze the two corpora, tabulating percentual distribution, and Pearson’s correlaton coefficient.

This research confirmed the two hypotheses and the results were very similar to those in the previous investigation of two Bosniak magazines.

Tokens	General corpus	Islamic Corpus
Total	997149	997861
Bosniak	754	17555
Percent	0.076%	1.759%

The data was re-coded to test statistical significance of the results using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The first variable was the level of conservatism (Islamic texts were coded as 1, non-Islamic texts as 0), the second variable was the presence of Bosniak leksemes (1 - specific Bosniak lexeme, 0 – general lexeme). The analysis shows a statistically significant, yet low-intensity correlation between the type of text (general vs. Islamic) and the use of new Bosniak lexemes

Presence of Bosniak lexemes

Level of conservatism

0.0883

p=0.00

Finally the percentage of recorded new words which are actually used in real life texts was tested. When fully inflected, new Bosniak words comprise 2824 word-forms. As one can see from the following table, only a small portion of them is actually used and that percentage is twice as high in Islamic media outlets.

Category	Number	Percent
Bosniak word-forms total	2824	100%
Bosniak word-forms in Islamic outlets	373	13.21%
Bosniak word forms in general outlets	177	6.27%

It is clear from the above data that, despite all efforts to introduce new Bosniak words, their appearance in media outlets remains limited (i.e., most of these lexemes are not used at all) and their distribution is twice as high in conservative media outlets.

4.3 Lexical Changes Without Regard to Ethnic Identities

Having answered the first two questions about ethnically marked new words, let us turn to a bigger picture and see which factors in fact determine lexical changes of the 1990s. The aforementioned database of the author’s New Words dictionary (Šipka, D 2002) shows that the new lexical items fall into the following domains:

Domain	Examples	number	percent
Computer science	<i>bežnik ‘Basic’, C ‘C’, izvršni program ‘executive program’, kobol ‘Cobol’, server ‘server’</i>	7218	16.08%

Politics	<i>abdićevac</i> 'supporter of the Bosniak politician Fikret Abić', <i>deposovac</i> 'member of the DEPOS coalition', <i>hadezeovština</i> 'HDZ political party'	3367	7.50%
Lifestyle	<i>ajlajner</i> 'eyeliner', <i>alko-vikend</i> 'alcoholic weekend', <i>porno-zvezda</i> 'pornstar', <i>rejev</i> 'rave', <i>trendaš</i> 'trendy person'	1889	4.21%
Military	<i>ARBiH</i> 'Bosnian Armed Forces', <i>miročuvár</i> 'peace keeper', <i>motorola</i> 'Motorola communication device'	1467	3.27%
Media	<i>blic-pitanje</i> 'quick question', <i>briefing</i> 'briefing', <i>niskotiražan</i> 'low-circulation'	1243	2.77%
Economics	<i>diler</i> 'dealer', <i>gospodarstvenik</i> 'entrepreneur', <i>telebanking</i> 'telebanking'	1140	2.54%
Medicine	<i>anoreksija</i> 'anorexia', <i>bulimija</i> 'bulimia', <i>posttraumatski</i> 'post-traumatic'	984	2.19%
Other technologies	<i>akrilik</i> 'acrylic', <i>autoblokator</i> 'self-blocker', <i>videotelefon</i> 'video phone'	926	2.06%

Religion	<i>akšam namaz</i> 'evening prayer', <i>bogoodstupništvo</i> 'departure from God', <i>satanistički</i> 'Satanist'	792	1.76%
Music	<i>afro-udaralje</i> 'Afro percussion', <i>bluz-pevač</i> 'blues singer', <i>rokerica</i> 'female rocker'	705	1.57%
Sports	<i>aikidoka</i> 'Aikido fighter', <i>ATP turnir</i> 'ATP tour', <i>super G</i> 'super giant slalom'	691	1.54%
Law	<i>abolucija</i> 'abolition', <i>bezakonost</i> 'lawlessness', <i>bevizni</i> 'without visa'	499	1.11%
Ecology	<i>bio-razgradiv</i> 'bio degradable', <i>eko-država</i> 'ecological country', <i>grinpisovac</i> 'Greenpeacer'	215	0.48%
Psychology	<i>apercepcioni</i> 'aperceptive', <i>isfrustrirati</i> 'frustrate', <i>psihocid</i> 'psychocide'	167	0.37%
Art	<i>apstraktivac</i> 'abstract artist', <i>neoavangarda</i> 'neo-avant-garde', <i>videoart</i> 'video art'	160	0.36%
Air and space	<i>avio-let</i> 'airplane flight', <i>čarter-flota</i> 'charter fleet', <i>flajt-direktor</i> 'flight director'	140	0.31%

Drug abuse	<i>acid</i> 'acid', <i>krek-kokain</i> 'crack cocaine', <i>narkomafijaš</i> 'narco-mafioso'	124	0.28%
Philosophy	<i>autoempirijski</i> 'self-empirical', <i>bitoslovlje</i> 'ontology', <i>ničeanski</i> 'Nitschean'	108	0.24%
Construction	<i>gradogradnja</i> 'city building', <i>korbizjeovac</i> 'Corbusier follower', <i>medijapanac</i> 'media artist'	81	0.18%
Linguistics	<i>bošnjakizam</i> 'Bosniak word', <i>europanto</i> 'European esperanto'	81	0.18%
Ideology	<i>ideološki</i> <i>background</i> 'ideological background', <i>kreacionizam</i> 'creationism'	80	0.18%
Biology	<i>avokado</i> 'avocado', <i>briselski kupus</i> 'Brussels sprouts', <i>jojoba</i> 'yoyoba'	21	0.05%
Marked, total		22098	49.24%
Unmarked		22781	51%
Total		44879	100.24%

The previously listed changes are mostly driven by the following social changes:

<i>Changes</i>	<i>Domains most affected</i>
Scientific and technological	Computer science, Medicine, Other technologies, Air and Space, Construction, Biology

Socio-economic	Politics, Military, Economics, Law, Sports, Media
War and nationalism	Politics, Military
Lifestyle changes	Lifestyle, Ecology, Psychology, Drug abuse
Revival of religion	Religion
New ideologies, artistic and media movements	Ideology, Music, Art, Philosophy, Psychology, Linguistics
Cognitive and ludic impulses	Philosophy, Art

Qualitative analysis of the processes and statistics in Šipka, D (2001) reveals the following lexical processes of relevance, exemplified further in the text:

1. Emergence of the new lexemes and affixes and revival of previously obsolete **items**;
2. Emergence of new **meanings, coupled** with widening and narrowing of the existing **ones, changes** in the connotation, frequency and usage **features**;
3. Weakening of the lexical **norms**.

Emergence of new lexemes and affixes is mostly a result of the previously mentioned socio-political changes in fields noted in the previous table. In addition, one should mention cognitive impulses, i.e. the need to name new concepts and ideas, as well as ludic impulses, i.e. the drive to play in language. For instance, the 2878 new abstract nouns coined with the suffix -ost (e.g., *apolitičnost* 'condition of being apolitical', i.e., 6.4% of all new words, considerably higher than 2.3% which is the percentage of these nouns in Benson 1992) found in Šipka, D (2001) demonstrate the influence of the cognitive impulses. Nouns like *mojstven* 'pertaining to the I-ness', *napetoleđen* 'tensely cold' *nigdenedostajući* 'never missing' show the need to play in language.

Political changes generate words pertinent to current events. A host of 55 new words derived from the root *Srb(in)* 'Serb' in Šipka, D (2001) should be mentioned in this respect. It is however interesting to note that political changes also create new words used to refer to the past. While in Communist times only three words referring to the former Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito were common,

in the New Words *Dictionary* database (Šipka D, 2001) 33 new items derived from his name are attested.

Semantic changes follow the patterns observed with the emergence of new words. These changes happen in the same domains, for example, politics: *golub* formerly ‘pigeon, the bird’, recently also ‘pigeon, moderate politician’, computer science, e.g., *mesto*, which along with a number of the existing senses (place, location, town...) develops a new one ‘URL, i.e., an internet site’, military, e.g., *pancir*, formerly ‘armor’ recently also ‘bulletproof vest’, medicine, e.g., *plastičar* formerly ‘sculptor’ recently also ‘plastic surgeon’ etc. It is interesting that the changes driven by ethnic nationalism tend to erase subtle semantic differences. Thus the existing distinction *šljem* ‘military helmet or hardhat’ versus *kaciga* ‘automotive or astronautic helmet’ have been eliminated in the Croatian variant by the practice of using *kaciga* in both senses in an effort to make themselves distinct from the other two Serbo-Croatian variants.

Changes of usage features were most dynamic in the Bosnian Muslim variant. On one hand, numerous formerly substandard words, such as *amidža* ‘uncle’ (standard word was *stric*), *poselamiti* ‘greet, say hello’ (standard word was *pozdraviti*), have been accepted into the Bosniak standard. On the other hand, many formerly Croatian words, such as month names (*siječanj* ‘January’, *veljača* ‘February’,) have now been used in the Bosnian Muslim standard.

Weakening of lexical norms pertains to the dissolution of the distinction between the standard and substandard. Several factors militate in this respect. Ethnic nationalism, as such, tends to homogenize its ethnic group and makes it as distinct as possible from other groups. Likewise, the discourse of war reporting was full of colloquial ethnic slurs. Furthermore, there is a global process of allowing more substandard terms for instance in movies, and popular music. Finally some major media figures commenced their life as either youth or underground newscasters and gradually joined general media sources while retaining an informal style of reporting. Permeation of the standard with substandard lexical items has a systemic character. We thus note substandard suffixes, for example: *-uša* ‘derogatory suffix for female doers’ (15 *lexemes*) or univerbizing suffix *-ak* (53 *appearances*) with several meanings ‘doer’, ‘follower’, ‘garment’, etc...

5. Conclusion

This case study of 1990s lexical changes in the three variants of Serbo-Croatian points to the role that conflicting ethnic identities play in shaping the lexicon. While ethnic identity cannot be disregarded as a factor of external language history, its omnipresence in the political realm does not translate into an equipotent role in the sphere of language functioning. Multiple other layers of identity and various other historical currents (such as technological, socio-cultural, lifestyle changes, etc.) also shape the lexicon. In the overall picture of the 1990s, lexical changes and ethnic identities are just one of many contributing factors. Moreover, as demonstrated in section 4.2, the intention of using new words to create distinct ethnic identities is not implemented in the practice of real life texts. The new words, contrary to the original political intention, turn into markers of conservatism within one ethnic group rather than a distinctive feature of that particular ethnic group toward the others. At a more general level, the results presented in this paper offer additional evidence for a high complexity of the interplay of societal and linguistic factors, thoroughly elaborated in Fasold (1984).

There are several limitations of the present research. First, both the nature of the media outlets and the use of specific Bosniak lexemes in those outlets are only an indirect measure of conservatism and the attitude toward Bosniak words. Ensuing psycholinguistic research where randomly selected subjects would be administered lexical decision tasks and a test of conservatism would get a more direct insight into the relationship under discussion. Second, only one ethnic variant of Serbo-Croatian was analyzed and further research should explore if this trend is present in the other two ethnic variants. Finally, the data was coded in such a manner as to allow descriptive statistical analysis and the analysis of correlation. Further research should employ more elaborate coding as to allow other inferential statistical procedures.

Summary

The present paper addresses recent lexical processes in the three ethnic variants of Serbo-Croatian, i.e., Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak. These processes, being a part of the external linguistic history are related to recent political events in the former Yugoslavia. They, in turn, stem from ethnic identities of these three ethnic groups. The case study of the 1990s lexical changes in the three variants of Serbo-

Croatian points to an important role that conflicting ethnic identities play in shaping the lexicon. While ethnic identity cannot be disregarded as a factor of external language history, its omnipresence in the political realm does not translate into an equipotent role in the sphere of language functioning. Multiple other layers of identity and various other historical currents have been shaping the lexicon.

Notes

1. Bosniak stands for the standard language as used by Bosniaks, ethnic group formerly known as Bosnian Muslims. This term is more precise than Bosnian, which would lead to an erroneous assumption that there is a common standard language in the entire country while, in fact, each of the three ethnic groups uses their own standard, Serbs Serbian, Croats Croatian, and Bosniaks Bosniak.
2. The author would like to express his gratitude to the Arizona State University Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict (<http://www.csrc.asu.edu/>) for their support of this undergraduate research project, and Sara Schwalm for her work on the project.

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
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Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Photo Courtesy Danko Sipka

II. POWER AND JUSTICE

A Struggle for the Hearts and Minds: Ideology and Yugoslavia's Third Way to Paradise

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And, of course, it was a tremendous moral blow for us.¹
—*Josip Broz Tito to Nikita Khrushchev regarding the events of 1948.*

The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought with it profound changes throughout the world. Some scholars anticipated the defeat of communism and proclaimed the triumph of democracy and market capitalism as an “end of history.”² Not only did communism wither away in Europe, but also the political integrity of several states was shaken by brutal civil war. Yugoslavia's tragic demise during this time forced a reevaluation of many contentious questions surrounding the broader fundamentals of the modern nation-state as well as the more noteworthy multiethnic Yugoslav experiment. In part because of the overwhelming speed of communism's general collapse in the early 1990s, and partly from the brutal nature of ethnic cleansing, the particular events in Yugoslavia have been largely misunderstood.³ This article will analyze the manner in which the unique identity of Yugoslavia—as neither communist nor democratic—came about and how it cannot be grouped together with the broader collapse stemming from the Kremlin. Communism's death was an integral force securing Yugoslavia's fate, but Yugoslavia possessed a distinctive ideological worldview that also failed against the West.

Following Yugoslavia's ejection from the Cominform—the Communist Information Bureau—in 1948, Yugoslav elites searched for an ideological justification for the independence of their Communist system from Moscow's guiding hand. This change stemmed from the realization that the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY, League of Communists of Yugoslavia) could not continue to emulate the Soviets once criticisms by Moscow reached epic proportions, terms that included labeling dictator Josef Broz Tito a “fascist stooge” and the LCY a “Trotskyite organization.”⁴ Intellectual bankruptcy in the face of Soviet accusations led Tito to embark on a course of national communism, declaring that “no one has the right

to love his country less than [he loves] the Soviet Union.”⁵ A few years later, the chief ideologues in the LCY called for a socio-political system that combined decentralization of state power and socialist self-management, which in principle meant that workers instead of the state owned the means of production. As a result, by the 1960s, Yugoslavia stood firmly wedged between the two competing systems—the democratic-capitalist West and the communist East—and could not fully identify with either.

This article will first explore how a particular Yugoslav socialism came into being, and then analyze the path that Yugoslav leaders navigated in order to define themselves in light of the Cold War standoff between sharply divergent ideologies. Tito's solution, as it evolved by the end of the 1950s, placed an emphasis on reform that would make his Marxist system a viable and legitimate alternative to the Soviet model, but his system nonetheless remained marginalized and left to fail by the dawn of the 1990s.

Tito's Banishment from the Cominform

When evaluating the Soviet threat to the United States and mapping out an adequate response, the American diplomat George Kennan saw “a subtle connection between traditional Russian habits of thought and the ideology which has now become official for the Soviet regime.”⁶ Because of this hybrid notion of ideology's constitution, his regard for ideology as a force of and for itself was small. Despite that, Kennan observed that communist ideology served key roles for the party elites. Primarily, communism served to legitimize an illegitimate government by supplying a historical imperative for ruling. Second, communism provided an outlet for both extreme sacrifice by the people and simultaneous repression by the state, especially enhanced if surrounded by hostile elements. In the wake of devastation after 1945, Kennan recognized communism as an ideology that could speak to disgruntled efforts throughout the world, especially as decolonization efforts seemed overwhelmingly led by leftists and Soviet

credibility reached its climax following the Nazi defeat. As a capstone to his thinking, Kennan defined ideology as the “product and not a determinant of social and political reality,” which caused him to see an inherent flexibility within the international communist movement.⁷

While much of what Kennan diagnosed turned out differently, the notion that communism could act with flexibility proved him both right and wrong. The events in 1948 between Stalin and Tito validated Kennan’s hope for separate deals with postwar communist countries, while in the long term, Tito’s example influenced little in Europe, and actually served as a mechanism to enforce a tightening of Soviet control over the rest of Eastern Europe as Soviet thinking crystallized.

The Tito–Stalin split unveiled a wave of hope and an uneasy tension across Europe and set a new tone for the Cold War. While Western observers—along with most in Yugoslavia—were at first genuinely taken by surprise by the Soviet condemnation in light of the feverish pace of Yugoslavia’s construction of communism, the results affected U.S. policy in an unsurprising way. Yugoslav leaders, while not abandoning communism, embarked upon a policy that led to a series of deals with the United States whereby Yugoslavia could remain outside of the Soviet orbit thanks to billions of dollars worth of American aid.

The sources of the split have long been analyzed thanks to the opening of archives by the Yugoslavs, as well as the publication of biographies and testimonies from high-ranking officials such as Milovan Djilas and Ambassador Veljko Mičunović.⁸ Most of the materials underwent publication in Western collections and seemed to portray Yugoslavia as a neutral and benign socialist alternative to the Soviet system. This set the stage for the later popular reception of a foreign policy centered on non-alignment, at which point, at least rhetorically, the Soviet Union became a target for criticism as a country ruled by antidemocratic imperialists; a title no longer held solely by the United States.⁹ Some of this benevolence worked its way into scholarship, as Western sources have concluded that the split resulted from a combination of power politics and a careful awareness of geostrategic realities.¹⁰ The text of the Soviet charges against the Yugoslavs told a different story, still; one filled with ideological rifts and deviations that set Yugoslav leaders in opposition to the true path to Communism. Recent work on this subject has benefited from an opening of some Soviet archives, but still concludes

that while the Yugoslavs emphasized the ideological charges from Moscow, the reality for the Soviets was the need for a firm control over Eastern Europe without competition or troublemakers. Top-secret Yugoslav materials confirm this, including dialogues between the Yugoslav and Soviet leadership mention Soviet intentions to squash Yugoslav reparation requests along with their territorial claims on both Austria and Italy.¹¹ This revised viewpoint recognizes that the Yugoslav territorial designs on Albania and Tito’s continued meddling in the Greek Civil War gave Stalin an example from which to establish firm authority with little risk of retaliation. While not without flaws, this argument nonetheless reopens the question of why Soviet leaders decided to proceed as they did in the summer of 1948 and what they hoped to gain from their actions.¹²

Titoism, Yugoslavism, or Simply Particularism?

In painting Yugoslavia as a state of ideological traitors, the Soviets forced the Yugoslav leadership to respond in the only manner possible—with ideology. Tito could not open up the question of Yugoslav territorial aggrandizement since it would fit only too well into Moscow’s charges of heresy as disingenuous Marxists. Nor could Tito follow through with any plans of actually bringing Albania under his control, because that could lead to an external war in which he could find comfort in neither East nor West. Tito knew that he had to do something to withstand Soviet pressure, and he first trumped up the so-called national card, while still adhering to Marxism by pressing forward with collectivization and rapid industrialization. Tito successfully tapped into and used the people’s collective memory from the recent past in his portrayal of foreign powers trying to dominate Yugoslavia. Harping on the issue of national pride was easy for Tito, not least of which because whether Yugoslavs agreed with him or not, they knew Tito as a man who fought against the Nazis and for national liberation. Tito’s use of nationalistic rhetoric also fit within a larger anti-Soviet design, which had clear roots in the interwar period.

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, a discreet, revolutionary group, operated throughout the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslav with little success and even less popular support. The royal dictatorship imposed by King Aleksandar Karađorđević, along with the numerous inter-ethnic and inter-party disputes, negatively affected all political parties, but these events stigmatized the communists

as illegal and subversive. Unusually chilly relations between the Russians and the Yugoslavs marked this period. Part of the problem facing the Yugoslav communists rested on a general hostility towards the Soviet Union thanks to a large and outspoken group of Tsarist émigrés residing in Belgrade. This scenario set the tone for a general anti-Russian mood, upsetting the prior friendship and realigning Yugoslavia with the Central and Western European powers. A low level of activity *within* Yugoslavia by communists was contrasted by a rather active stance outside the country. Hundreds of Yugoslav communists traveled to Spain to fight in the dramatic struggle against General Francisco Franco.¹³ But this effort at preventing fascism from triumphing in Spain proved a fruitless cause and further separated the communists from the prevailing political moods in Eastern Europe.¹⁴

Soon after Franco's victory and the banishment of leftist opposition from Spain, Hitler unleashed World War II, and, by 1941, Axis forces had invaded and occupied Yugoslavia. Tito liked to point out after 1948 that during the period of occupation, the Soviet Union provided little support for his Partisans. More aid had come from the Americans and the British than from the Soviets, but owing to a lack of Western troops in the Balkan theater of operations, it was the Soviet Red Army that helped the Partisans liberate Belgrade and it was in the Soviet Union where Tito and his entourage held strong allegiances. Because of the limited assistance that the Soviets could provide Tito, and indeed the limited contact with the Yugoslav Party more generally, the Yugoslavs understandably felt rather self-sufficient.¹⁵ In addition, the leading pro-Soviet factions within the Yugoslav Party—indeed most prewar Communist Party members—largely perished during the war.¹⁶ What emerged then was what Edvard Kardelj, chief Yugoslav ideologue and confidant of Tito, later described as a feeling of how the struggle for liberation against the enemies of Yugoslavia determined the independent nature of Tito's communist regime. Kardelj logically linked the self-sufficient revolutionary struggle with the postwar socio-political reform stemming from the events of 1948.¹⁷

A Yugoslav Way Emerges

The first few years following the scuffle between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders produced enormous tension inside Yugoslavia as a two-front struggle was fought on behalf of the regime; on one hand, there existed the effort

to consolidate the party by getting rid of the so-called Cominformists and, on the other hand, to build a military deterrent against a Soviet or Soviet-led invasion. Moscow fueled these fires by attempting to drive rifts within the Yugoslav Party and inciting numerous border incursions along Yugoslav territory.¹⁸ When the Yugoslav secret police uncovered several high-ranking military and political figures as covert Soviet agents, Tito used the opportunity to fight a high-profile campaign against all of his opponents, thus leaving him in full control of the country by the early 1950s.¹⁹ While Yugoslav sources reported “thousands” of border incidents, the fear of actual invasion decreased with each passing day, as a result of a strong Yugoslav resolve.²⁰ American aid, though slow to come, arrived in spades when the U.S. government recognized a potential ally in Tito.²¹ Some Yugoslav decision-makers even declared a preference to join forces with the West and fall under the American nuclear umbrella already in place to protect Western Europe from Soviet aggression.²² Tensions eased over time but the fundamental problem facing Tito and his loyal revolutionary band lingered on: what to do in the face of Soviet charges of heresy? If survival meant that Tito would have to adopt a new line—one based upon elaborating the particular *Yugoslav* characteristics of revolution—then so be it. The groundwork for an ideological break already existed and all Tito needed to do was emphasize the errors committed by Moscow's elite. Vast changes to the Yugoslav Constitution enacted in 1953 separated the two systems and the LCY already began flirting with a new ideological position, which, thanks to Stalin's actions, rested on a newfound unity within the Yugoslav federation.

Change Becomes Evident

When Stalin declared that under no circumstances would the Soviets intervene “what[so]ever in the internal affairs of other people,” he established a basis for Tito to demand unquestioned independence. Tito outlined his thoughts as early as during the speech in Ljubljana on 27 May 1945:

It is said that this [WWII] is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that everyone shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest.²³

The Soviet Union of course, noted the tone in the speech and took offense. Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, I.V. Sadchikov, cried out that Tito's speech was an "unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union" and that another instance of such insubordination would be met with "open criticism in the press" and disavowal.²⁴

The following three years would not drastically alter the mood of distrust between Moscow and Belgrade. Surely, Stalin wished for a larger piece of Europe, and Tito's actions and rhetoric over the problems in Trieste, Greece, and Albania put everyone on alarm. Soviet responses continued to caution the Yugoslavs, and the answer was consistent obedience but without drastic change in direction.²⁵ Finally, as a way to discredit Tito, the Cominform considered that the basis for these and other Yugoslav "mistakes" grew out of the "undoubted fact that nationalistic elements" influenced the leadership of Yugoslavia. Moreover, Moscow believed that Yugoslav elites considerably overestimated the internal, national forces and their political influence; as a result, "they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and build socialism without the support of the Communist Parties of other countries," chief among which, was the Soviet Union. The path for the Yugoslavs rested with "healthy elements" within the party who could "return to internationalism and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism."²⁶ In response to this condemnation by the Soviet Union, American President Harry Truman would write Congress a letter stating that "I have determined that Yugoslavia is a country which is of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area."²⁷

In the wake of the contest between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the repercussions mandated that ideology shift. The Soviet Union lashed out against the Yugoslavs by noting that nationalism was rampant alongside a lack of democracy in the Communist Party and the corrupted security forces.²⁸ Tito responded by charging that Stalin had perverted the Soviet Union's journey to communism and perpetuated rather than weakened the interests of the state, concluding that no resemblance to "state machinery which is withering away" yet existed in the USSR.²⁹ The Soviets continued to harangue the Yugoslavs for the next thirty years, but in general their position grew more moderate following the death of Stalin. But Stalin's first actions after 1948 sought to destroy Tito's appeal and strengthen his position in the remaining eastern European satellites.³⁰

It is important to note that Tito found justification in the form of his own ideology—Titoism—and in state relations with support from the United States. By the mid-1950s, Tito had even elicited the tacit approval of Khrushchev who justified the idea of a heterogeneous communist movement and reaffirmed the policy of non-intervention. But Khrushchev sorely misjudged the effects of an independent Tito when they jointly pronounced, "that the roads and conditions of Socialist development are different in different countries . . . that any tendency to impose one's views in determining the roads and forms of socialist development are alien."³¹ That joint pronouncement guaranteed doctrinal change in the communist world and legitimized a new multipolarity.

The freedom Tito enjoyed rested, though, on the laurels of American declarations of support and Moscow's hesitation to test American resolve. Especially after the Korean War unleashed a general denouncement of aggression coupled with a determined military response by the Western powers, an invasion of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union or its allies seemed unlikely. While in 1951, American analysts still thought such an invasion possible, and notably so did Yugoslavs who called for vocal American support—even for American nuclear arms—that assessment decreased by 1952.³²

While the main American concerns over aggression faded in 1952, the threat of instability in the Balkans remained a distinct possibility. The U.S. government reviewed the situation in 1952, and noted several key features of the Yugoslav situation: "The assassination or death of Tito would weaken the regime and would afford added opportunity for the USSR to exploit political confusion and discontent, but would be unlikely to break the regime's hold over the country or to produce fundamental changes in its foreign or domestic policies;"³³ that "from the outset, the regime has placed a heavy strain on the population, particularly the peasant majority;" but that "current and future peasant discontent will be firmly handled on a local level;" and finally, that "a coup d'état directed against Tito by high members of the CPY [LCY], the armed forces, the security forces, or by other dissatisfied elements is unlikely."³⁴ The US government asserted that Tito had solidified his position as leader and that by 1952 he commanded "the loyalty and obedience of the party and the armed and security forces, and even opponents of the regime apparently prefer it to the reestablishment of alien control from Moscow."³⁵ With

a secure power base thanks to his loyal police and officer corps, and international recognition by the United States, Tito enjoyed the flexibility to pursue his own policies with a much-needed vigor.

The U.S. policy of supporting Tito in the early years after the split paid off. Intelligence officials credited the efforts of the United States, which by 1952 were seen as key in convincing the USSR “that an attack by the adjacent Satellites would involve not only serious risk of war between the US or UN and these Satellites, but also the danger that such a conflict would develop into a general war.”³⁶ The estimates of the Kremlin’s assessment of Tito and his successful resistance against its overtures led to the prevention of further heresy from undermining Soviet control in other East European countries.³⁷ No doubt disappointing to American policymakers, this realization stood in stark contrast with what seemed hopeful on 30 June 1948—at the outset of the Tito–Stalin split—when policymakers such as Kennan and institutions such as the Central Intelligence Agency—indicated that if Tito won “substantial concessions from the Kremlin or is successful in breaking away from Kremlin control,” then the Satellite countries would find it difficult to control their “nationalist” elements, who were reportedly “already rebelling against blind obedience to the Kremlin.”³⁸

Not surprisingly, these initial assumptions by some U.S. policymakers, proved incorrect and Stalin took the opportunity to purge the leadership of the various East European communist parties and solidify a position of subservience to the whims of Moscow. But Stalin lost Yugoslavia and also indirectly created an ideological competitor potentially more dangerous than capitalism.

The Yugoslav Perspective of Titoism

The seriousness with which this new Yugoslav approach was taken inside the country cannot be taken for granted. Yugoslavia *needed* to be different from the Soviet Union and if it became apparent that Soviet tendencies entered the new political life of the Yugoslav Communist Party, then attempts were made to rectify matters. Yugoslav politicians branded the great Soviet evil as representative of bureaucratic chauvinism. The Yugoslavs presented a salient definition of this phenomenon as “an expression of non-democratic and bureaucratic relations” that emerged in a “period when it became clear that it was impossible to continue developing socialist democracy and self-

government relations in society” while at the same time retaining a hierarchy with power concentrated in the center.³⁹ The Yugoslav system, according to General Ivan Gošnjak, head of the Yugoslav People Army’s (JNA) security service, relied on “progressive thought” formed as a result of “the party and its forums,” but also out of “self-government organizations” instead of hierarchical and archaic bureaucratic processes.⁴⁰

Ceda Kapor, a member of the Central Committee of LCY from Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH), argued that “everything should be done” so that communists and working people realize that the “implementation of the decisions” means “struggle for the further development of socialism and socialist social relations, *not only* one for clearing up the national problems and relations.”⁴¹ The conflict that the Yugoslavs struggled with was maintaining a high-level of awareness among their members and therefore reaching deep into society. The way to do this for the Yugoslav political elite rested on the policy of socialist self-management. Self-management became more than a rhetorical device for LCY leaders. Party official Nijaz Dizdarević “stress[ed]” that it was necessary to put forth the question of the ideological awareness of the LCY members, because it was “of essential importance,” for the LCY’s role in society to “help the working man in his struggle for self-management.”⁴² This emphasis on the individual was markedly different from the Soviet case, where the working man was subject to the decrees of the elite vanguard.

One of the primary institutions that touched all families in Yugoslavia, the army, also served a vital role in the construction of a Yugoslav ideology. The Yugoslav People’s Army pledged that its members would be “uncompromised fighters for the unity of the Yugoslav Socialist society, brotherhood and unity,” and the “development of social self-government” in a democratic society.⁴³ Owing to the nature of the revolutionary armed struggle during World War II, the army’s role in the state—vis-à-vis the LCY—was paramount. During the 1960s, a critical time in the history of the Cold War, a sharpening of laws and policies in the Communist Party emerged, but also alongside the adoption of a series of educational courses to indoctrinate members of the armed forces. A course entitled “The History of the LCY” was introduced with a special emphasis on understanding the conditions of social development. The syllabus for the course outlined the “dialectic approach and solution of complicated problems” in the period of preparations and

carrying out the Revolution, as well as in the period of the construction of socialism”—including a direct emphasis on the position of the individual in socialism; namely, Yugoslav socialism.⁴⁴

The roots of a particular Yugoslav identity are still clouded by the events of the 1948. How reliable are the sources that paint Tito as a Communist maverick unwilling to bow to Stalin and what did Stalin think he was going to achieve by expelling Tito from the Cominform? While Yugoslavs typically painted Tito as independent-minded from the beginning, no sources prior to 1948 describe a unique Titoist ideology—as a sort of Yugoslav Communism in contrast to the communism of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ The latter emerged as a result of the split; this is undeniable. What happens though in Yugoslavia after 1948 is not just a blind groping for survival; rather, a deliberate system emerged that not only built legitimacy for itself, but also maintained a logic and consistency.

An integral part of the domestic policy and the reform towards further decentralization and self-management was a parallel foreign policy. In 1955, when a group of newly independent Asian states met at Bandung, Indonesia, Tito latched onto and helped develop the principles that these leaders formulated. The resulting Non-Aligned Movement spoke of lofty goals, mainly creating news during the 1960s, including spearheading a fight against colonialism, hegemonialism, racism, and any interference into a country's domestic affairs by another state.⁴⁶ The last point is obvious from Tito's own experience with Stalin and the resulting Yugoslav fear of Soviet or Soviet-bloc invasion. Kremlin leaders kept this fear real by the suppression of protestors in 1956 in Poznań, Poland, and the invasions of Hungary, which were meant to protect socialism; in addition to the actions much later in 1968, when events in Czechoslovakia also required the presence of the Red Army. These events reminded the Yugoslavs of their precarious position and, according to one German journalist at the time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was an attempt by “the Moscow Polemics” to directly check against the successful “Yugoslav path to socialism.”⁴⁷

This “Yugoslav path” necessarily opted out of either course laid out by Moscow and Washington. As a working alternative to choosing sides, Yugoslavia naturally had the most gain in the Third World, those countries “liberating themselves from colonial slavery,” that only desired “to formulate their own policies, to be equal in international

affairs, and to preserve freedom of action.”⁴⁸ But, as history has shown, Yugoslav socialism failed to export itself as a political model for emulation. Its limited success in drawing in members of the newly liberated countries of Africa and Asia towards a friendly relationship succeeded only as long as Tito could supply economic aid alongside moral and political advice, such as the delivery of arms to Indonesia or Egypt. As Odd Arne Westad has argued, during the Cold War there existed two blocs along with a host of revolutionaries whom no one could control.⁴⁹ The revolutionaries took sides according to the level of economic, military, and political aid dispersed. Tito unfortunately had little money to finance a successful Non-Aligned Movement and use that as a vehicle to export his system. Traveling to Africa and Asia as part of goodwill missions, Tito tried also to promote trade, but his economy was never large enough to finance revolution. In the important Yugoslav daily, *Komunist*, Gavro Altman said that “the lasting political interests of our own country and the well conceived interest of our economy” calls for a further involvement with fellow Non-Aligned countries.⁵⁰ Indeed, it was Tito's only choice without harming his credentials; he wanted a place for Yugoslavia and he needed international recognition in order to proceed as a respectable and legitimate member of the socialist world. Moreover, the place for Yugoslavia would be in influencing the further expansion of socialism and future revolutionary developments of “all progressive people.”⁵¹

Recognition of Different Paths

During the Soviet–Yugoslav summit in the summer of 1955, Edvard Kardelj stated that the Yugoslavs supported international socialist parties in addition to communist parties, whereas the USSR supports only those under its control. This policy, according to Kardelj, was foolish.⁵² The Yugoslavs defended their position because, as they saw it, support for social-democratic parties would help draw them away from the capitalist parties, whereas the opposite would occur if left isolated.⁵³ This position was clearly in line with the Yugoslav sense of sovereignty and self-identity, but it also fit within the larger dilemma of European security, especially in light of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with West Germany's inclusion in 1949. Khrushchev and Tito alike recognized the German problem as the plague of European stability and social development.⁵⁴ The difference in the positions of the two leaders, however, revealed themselves

with the proposed solution. Obviously, Tito had less to lose by recognizing one Germany whereas the Soviets *needed* to have East Germany legitimized by other parties. But the Soviets could gain little ground in the West, according to the Yugoslavs, because with secrecy and exclusion, Western Europe—in particular countries such as Britain and France—had more to fear from the Soviets than from a resurgent Germany.

From the Yugoslav point of view, the Soviet brutalization of other parties stood as a testament as to why they had to follow an independent revolutionary position regarding ideology. Yugoslavs could not tolerate such a hierarchical system, but while admittedly different, Tito was supposedly told by the founding members of NATO that Yugoslavia was not eligible for membership because of its one-party system.⁵⁵ For the West, the Yugoslavs were conveniently anti-Soviet but still too socialist for real inclusion into multinational systems such as NATO and, later, the European Economic Community (EEC).

The token appreciation shown to Tito by the West, while in effect allowing Tito to reform his Marxist principles in peace, did undermine a larger problem of legitimacy for the dictator. The lack of real inclusion helped reinforce the fear in Belgrade over how far the West would go to save Yugoslavia if attacked and how much aid the Yugoslavs might receive. Tito used this ongoing instability to extract concessions from both sides but he still needed someone to recognize him as the undisputed leader of *his* Yugoslavia. Initially understood by leaders in the West as a potential ally against the Soviet Union, they took note of certain geostrategic guarantees regarding the limits of Soviet penetration into Europe, so long as an independent Yugoslavia existed. Noting these benefits, the Americans wanted more and attempted to modify Yugoslav domestic politics as a result of the critical aid provided during the post-1948 Soviet economic blockade. Partly for this reason, when the Americans realized that they had failed, denial for Yugoslavia into its organizations came naturally. Entry into associations such as NATO was not possible for “communist” countries, thereby solidifying a complex identity problem for Yugoslavs.

True to his revolutionary character and the socialist principles for which he and his followers fought, Tito strengthened his credentials as a socialist and was granted something completely unforeseeable since the summer of 1948—recognition by the Soviet Union. The results of the

Soviet-Yugoslav summit in 1955 opened up new avenues for Yugoslav policy and further consolidated the legitimacy of the regime. Having admitted that “our ideological development has always stuck with Marxism-Leninism,” but that the Yugoslav system has employed different means to realize the Marxist-Leninist vision, Yugoslav leaders successfully negotiated for a series of concessions and admissions from the Soviet party, including the notion that different paths to socialism existed, thus debunking the myth of an immaculate Soviet design, as well as guarantees by the Soviet Union not to mingle in the internal affairs of another country—including economic and ideological affairs.⁵⁶ With the stroke of a pen, Tito’s system was held up as legitimate, the importance of which could pave the way for further reforms and strategies to perfect the new Yugoslav system, despite any Soviet revocations. While within less than a year, Soviet tanks would roll into Hungary to protect socialism there against “reactionary elements” of the Hungarian party, Tito could nonetheless rest easier than at any time since 1948.⁵⁷

The result of this reassurance of sovereignty meant that for Tito and the LCY a further revision of their principles and methods could proceed forward unhindered. By the early 1950s, the LCY dominated the state and Tito reigned supreme without serious domestic competition thanks to the unswerving loyalty of the armed forces and police. Tacit acknowledgement by the West of Yugoslavia’s security and recognition of independence by the Soviet Union gave Tito the freedom to experiment with ongoing reforms to help hammer this new self-management system together. Initially serving after 1948 as a way to make the Yugoslav system different from its Soviet progenitor, self-management—the idea that workers would own the means of production and had a larger voice in the administration of the state at all levels—would grow to dominate the political geography.

In crafting a Marxist state, the chief Yugoslav ideologues turned towards a policy of self-management that stressed the nature of a decentralized administration of industry, agriculture, and government. At first, self-management spoke to merely the working class, but the concept expanded to include virtually every sector of society with the exception of the armed forces.⁵⁸ Miljenko Živković, a Yugoslav military thinker, equated self-management to be the answer to questions of divisions throughout society. Because “self-management and self-

directing societal relations form the basis of the unity of the classes, political and national interests, as well as all nations and nationalities,” Yugoslav leaders confidently boasted of their success in uniting the citizenry and building Marxism.⁵⁹

Kardelj declared in 1953 that the Yugoslav Federation had become, “above all a bearer of the social functions of a unified socialist community of the Yugoslav working people.”⁶⁰ The assertion of the rights of the working people was deliberate, because they were regarded as the backbone of Yugoslavia and the ones who would now take the initiative and work towards communism. To that end, the Constitutional Law of 1953 stated in Article Two that “all power belonged to the working people, who exercised their power either directly (social self-management) or indirectly, through representative organs.”⁶¹ The decade following the enactment of the 1953 Constitutional Laws displayed to Yugoslav elites that a more thoroughgoing reform platform needed implementation. The resulting constitution in 1963 sought to clarify many of the issues raised during the prior decade and address some of the changing paradigms. Self-management laid out in 1953 meant that people would work to satisfy both the personal and common needs. The definition of the people was important since the constitution was written to acknowledge them as the cornerstone to the country’s ongoing success. The introduction to the 1963 Constitution noted that the “peoples of Yugoslavia” were “aware that the further consolidation of their brotherhood and unity” was necessary and that to accomplish that task, they “have founded a socialist federalist community of working people.”⁶²

Self-management took center stage alongside the recognition of worker’s predominance in Yugoslavia. Self-management supposedly gave each Yugoslav citizen a stake in the regime and served to boost the popularity of the regime in the wake of ideological contradictions following the split with Stalin. The workers became the *de facto* center point of Yugoslav politics and represented the ideal Yugoslav identity. Yugoslav elites left farmers to themselves and, most importantly, ignored the ethnic issue; the ambiguities of which were apparent with the leveling of *peoples* in the ethnic sense with “community of working people” in a broader sense.

In attaining self-government, the government assigned the duty of the working people in the social-political communities to “decide on the course of economic

and social development, on the distribution of the social product, and on the matters of common concern.”⁶³ Self-management would continue on as the primary means of state ideology and play a large role in giving people a stake in the system. What Yugoslav leaders at the time did not envision though, was how dangerous reforming a one-party state might ultimately prove.

Conclusion

When Hitler committed suicide in his besieged Berlin bunker in May 1945, fascism as an ideology also died as a viable worldview. The two remaining competitors—communism and market capitalism/democratic liberalism—thereafter possessed awesome power over molding the direction that the new Europe would take. For a time following the end of World War II, it looked as if the world was going to fall into two categories and another great conflict would soon engulf mankind. Not only did World War III not break out, but the notion of infallible control from the two centers of the postwar world also proved to be false. While much of the Third World entered global politics without pledging allegiance to either side, the period after 1948 gave birth to the possibility of a competing socialist system, providing that Tito remained in control of Yugoslavia. This emphasis on the significance of Yugoslavia’s successful existence outside of Moscow should not color the fact that dramatic challenges occurred in the American Satellites as well. Both France and Italy possessed influential communist parties that caused concern for policymakers in Washington—no doubt on a similar level as Tito’s actions worried the masters of the Kremlin. The fundamental difference, of course, rested on the knowledge that in neither France nor Italy could Communists claim real power and affect change in the American capital.⁶⁴

An early chief ideologue close to Tito, Milovan Djilas, summed up his country’s policy of successful independence as seeking to “defend not only our own ideas and the independence of our internal social evolution, but also the frontiers of the State.” Djilas continued by noting the fluidity of international relations: “And we have to defend these frontiers under the concrete condition of the world as it is today. Hence it is our obligation to concentrate our forces in the direction from which the main danger is threatening at the given moment.”⁶⁵ Pragmatism imbued with a *Yugoslav* ideology: that is the essence of what Yugoslav elites strove to achieve and then maintain throughout the

Cold War. A particular Yugoslav system, once emerged, sought legitimacy at home and then abroad as a third way—Titoism represented a complete *Weltanschauung*, which indulged a foreign policy tied heavily to the principles of peaceful-coexistence and sovereignty for all nations.

After 1948, the Soviets placed Tito in their sights. That he survived meant that the Cold War, still in its infancy, needed realignment. Titoism as a viable ideology emerged by 1953 with the passage of numerous constitutional amendments but Titoism as a “separate path to socialism” meant that throughout Eastern Europe and especially in the emerging Third World, the Soviets were put on the defensive. Building upon the success of those initial reforms, the LCY continued to adapt and cater to changing environments; nevertheless, the party always remained the sole interpreter of Yugoslav thought. The changes that the Yugoslavs put into practice fundamentally shifted the rhetoric of the new state from that of a tight, federalist system based upon Stalinist principles, to one of decentralized administration, self-managed communes, and worker rights. Yugoslavia truly stands out in the history of Cold War era European politics with the emphasis placed by the LCY on the world’s stage vis-à-vis Non-alignment. Tito’s system thus gained a voice among the decolonizing peoples and those newly free from colonial rule. That Tito failed to export his system remains secondary; what is important is that a multipolar world reemerged soon after 1948, because neither the Red Army nor its patrons in Moscow were seen as invincible, perfect, or unquestionable—nor was the West the only opponent; those illusions died on a warm June day.

Notes

1. “I, razume se, da je to bio za nas ogromni moralni udarac.” See “Fragmenti iz zapisnika o sastanku plenuma CK KPSS Jula 1955. godine na kome je vodjena diskusija o politici SSSR-a prema Jugoslaviji posle povratka Sovjetske Dele Legacije iz Beograda,” Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore (ASCG), CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56. *All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.
2. For example, Francis Fukuyama authored a series of works with this idea of an “end of history” in mind. See *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: Free Press, 1992); and *Have We Reached the End of History?*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1989).
3. The debate over Yugoslavia’s demise still centers on either a nationalist-driven approach or an explanation based on Tito’s Yugoslavia as having suffered from dysfunctional politics (i.e., Tito as a strongman). For some examples see Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman, *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994); Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington, “Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs: Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political Instability?” *International Security* 10:3 (Winter 1985–86); and James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992).
4. For examples, see Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), p. 343.
5. Tito cited in Dedijer, *Tito Speaks*, p. 353.
6. George Kennan in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 32.
7. Kennan (from 1947) in Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 33.
8. See various works such as Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich, (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1962), and Veljko Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, trans. David Floyd, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980).
9. Robert Pastor, “Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade,” National Security Council Memorandum, (7 August 1978). This document nicely summarizes the conflicts within the Non-aligned Movement, such as the struggle between moderates and radicals and how Yugoslav diplomats attempted to steer a middle-ground for the sake of stability.
10. For example, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), John C. Campbell, *Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics*, (New York: Harper Row, 1967), and Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
11. See “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56. Tito told Khrushchev that “we [Yugoslavs] already saw what the reason was. It was a question of our interests towards Corinthia (Austria) and in relations over Trieste ... it was a question of [war] reparations.” (Ali smo već videli da je bilo razloga. To je pitanje naših interesa prema Koruškoj u odnosu na Trst, gde je u Parizu – je neću o tome, to će drugovi, osle reći – pitanje reparacija).
12. See Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9:2 (Spring 2007), p. 60. Perović acknowledged that no document has emerged yet definitively pointing to Soviet intentions, yet, “the most useful source currently available” is a report sent by Stalin to the Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald on 14 July 1948,” which emphasizes the near-term goals for dealing with Tito:

- “I have the impression that you [Gottwald] are counting on the defeat of Tito and his group at the next congress of the KPJ. You suggest publishing compromising material against the Yugoslav leaders. . . . We in Moscow are not counting on the early defeat of Tito and have never counted on it. We have achieved the isolation of Yugoslavia. Hence, the gradual decline of Tito’s Marxist groups is to be expected. This will require patience and the ability to wait. You seem to be lacking in patience. . . . There can be no doubt that Marxism will triumph in due course.” The main problem with this source is of course that it is not internal correspondence and thus was more likely drafted to keep the Czechoslovak leadership on edge rather than justify the Soviet leadership’s policy of isolating Yugoslavia. Furthermore, evidence from meetings between Khrushchev and Tito in 1955, reveals that Gottwald was in fact being threatened by Stalin, who told Gottwald at the time that his support was expected and that he needed to “answer for Czechoslovakia!” See “Fragments” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.
13. These Spanish Civil War veterans, while failing to defeat General Franco, did earn valuable war experience and helped enormously with Tito’s Partisan and postwar efforts. For more, see Vjeran Pavlakovic, ““Our Spaniards””: Croatian Communists, Fascists, and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939,” unpublished dissertation, University of Washington, 2005.
14. There is some exciting new work coming out on the influence that the Spanish Civil War had throughout the world. While much activity has been devoted to the Cold War as an ideological nightmare wrought with zero-sum games, the battle between fascism, democracy, and communism should not be passed over. While it looked at a point that fascism might triumph, it ultimately failed and crumbled with Hitler’s Germany. Being pro- or anti-fascist meant a lot for deciding political careers, even in the United States. For more see, Mike Chapman, “Arguing Americanism: John Eoghan Kelly and the Spanish Civil War” unpublished dissertation, Boston College, 2006.
15. Ivo Banac claims (with good reason) that the declaration of a provisional government in the Bosnian town of Jajce on 29–30 November 1943 was against the wishes of Stalin (at least at that time). Banac sees a self-sufficient Tito during the war and emphasizes that point explicitly. See Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 11. In contrast, Perovic argued that while this might be the case more recent work verifies that Tito was in contact with the Soviets and they knew of Tito’s intentions. See Perovic, pp. 36–37.
16. The number of Communist Party survivors following the war was small, but worse still was any influence that pre-war members might have had. It came under attack thanks to a tremendous influx of hundreds of thousands of new members. Some who had survived would perish or face imprisonment after the Tito-Stalin split, as was the fate of long-time Serbian Communist and then army General Sreten Žujović.
17. See Edvard Kardelj, *Borba za Priznanje i Nezavisnost Nove Jugoslavije: 1944–1957*, in *Sećanje*, (Ljubljana i Radnička štampa, Beograd: Državna založba Slovenije, 1980), p. 11. “A jugoslovensko socijalistička revolucije je bila narodna, demokratska, samoupravna. Bez takve revolucije, Kardelj je to više puta isticao i naglašavao, ‘ne bi mogli nastati takvi oblici samoupravnih demokratskih odnosa kakvi su izgrađeni u posleratnom razvitku Jugoslavije.’”
18. See M.S. Handler, “Yugoslavia Tense over Balkan Rift,” *New York Times*, (16 September 1948), p. 7. Yugoslavia had officially sent notes of protest to Romania and Hungary because of what Handler quoted as “attempts to stir up a revolt against Premier Tito.”
19. See M.S. Handler, “Deserters of Tito Being Organized,” *New York Times*, (23 September 1948), p. 13. Handler noted that “Additional evidence of the lack of success of the Cominform’s drive is the substantiated fact that not a single member of the Yugoslav Politbureau, or Central Committee, is known to have deserted.” An exception to this was the desertion of a couple of army leaders, including Colonel General Arso Jovanović, who was shot near the Romanian frontier in an apparent attempt to flee the country. A situation report made during September 1948, took note of the success of Tito’s appeal to nationalism: “There appears no doubt that Marshal Tito gained considerable popular support among elements previously opposed to him when he was excoriated by the Cominform.” Cited in C.L. Sulzberger, “Anti-Tito Trend is Absent in Yugoslavia, Experts Say,” *New York Times*, (6 September 1948), p. 6.
20. Banac cited 7,877 border incidents; a reasonable figure. See Banac, *Cominformist*, p.130. There were many reports of instability at all frontiers, and after 1948, the Albanian and Greek borders with Yugoslavia were especially troublesome thanks to other revolutionary activity there.
21. For the influence at the time, see M.S. Handler, “U.S. Help at Once Held Vital to Tito,” *New York Times*, (29 December 1948), p. 10. Much later, General Ljubačić—the Yugoslav Secretary of Defense—petitioned the U.S. government for aid as news of Tito’s ailing health spread and his death drew nearer. While the most significant American aid ceased after the mid-1950s, such payments, gifts, or subsidies continued until the very eve of Yugoslavia’s demise. Ljubačić noted in 1980 that Yugoslavia was in a “complicated position” between both international and domestic troubles. He solicited a “special arrangement” with the U.S. government that would facilitate a system of credits that could be used to purchase weapons from the American military in case of crisis within or nearby to Yugoslavia. See “General Graves’ Meeting with Yugoslav Secretary of Defense Ljubacik [sic],” (11 February 1980), American Embassy, Belgrade.
22. Yugoslav Colonel General Dapčević stated to the Associated Press in an interview in 1951 that “Yugoslavia is ready now to defend herself against any aggressor,” and he suggested that they “would like to have some United States atomic bombs,” and that Yugoslavia “could build more air fields for strategic bombing of Russian targets if given United States material.”

- See “Yugoslavia Wants U.S. Aid To Include Atomic Bombs,” *New York Times*, (31 October 1951), p. 4.
23. *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute: Text of the Published Correspondence*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), p. 35.
24. *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, p. 36.
25. While decreasing over time, actions in both Greece and Albania continued into 1948. While a host of important issues were present, from commercial ties—including banking and import-export deals—to military advisors—primarily Yugoslav citizens from the neighboring territory who spoke either Greek or Albanian—persisted even after Soviet warnings to the contrary. For examples see, ASCG CK IX 1/III K.12 1–16 and K.13 17–35 for Albania and ASCG CK IX 33/III K.12 1–30 for Greece.
26. “Cominform communiqué, 28 June 1948,” in *Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, pp. 69–70.
27. Harry S. Truman in *Yugoslavia: Titoism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Washington D.C., Department of State Publications, 1952, p. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred over Truman’s support for Yugoslavia: “it is in the important interests of the West that Tito maintain his resistance,” but that one consideration that the United States needed to heed was “the reliability of the Tito Communist regime as an instrument of United States policy toward the USSR.” See General Omar Bradley in Sidney W. Souers, “Memorandum for the National Security Council,” National Security Council, (16 November 1949), p. 1.
28. See Pierre Maurer, *The Tito-Stalin Split in Historical Perspective*, (Bradford, England: Postgraduate School of Yugoslav Studies, University of Bradford), 1987, p. 15.
29. Tito in Ivo Lapenna, *State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p. 43.
30. See M.S. Handler, “Other Satellites Snap At Yugoslavia’s Heels,” *New York Times*, 3 October 1948), p. E4. “Tightening of control, in a sense, blind loyalty to the Soviet Union and submergence of national interests to Soviet interests is growing apace in states of the Soviet blocs. The movement is part of the general Soviet drive to mend Russia’s fences and establish greater unity of command. Advent of the Yugoslav question accelerated the urgency of this movement because of repercussions of Tito’s autonomous stand upon more independently-minded individuals and groups of Eastern Europe.”
31. Cited in “Soviet-Yugoslav Communiques on Policies and Party Aims,” *New York Times*, (21 June 1956), p. 10.
32. The Department of State issued paper NIE-29 “Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951” on 20 March 1951 and determined that “the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility.” The Intelligence Advisory Committee conferred another meeting 3 May 1951 and reviewed the situation published in NIE-29/1. They noted heavier Soviet troop movements coupled with “high Yugoslav officials” privately expressing “increased concern over the possibility of an early Satellite attack. Although the timing of these statements suggests that they may in part have been designed to support the recent formal Yugoslav requests for arms and equipment from the US, the fact that Yugoslavia is openly requesting such assistance may also be interpreted as further evidence of genuine fear of Satellite aggression.” See “Review of the conclusions of NIE-29 “Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951,” NIE-29/1, (4 May 1951), pp. 1–2.
33. Though, it must be added that the report noted the following, “The Director, Joint Intelligence Group,” has acknowledged, “The assassination or death of Tito would so weaken the regime that almost anything could happen. It is possible that his present assistants could promptly stabilize the situation without any fundamental changes in policy. But it is also equally possible that the CPY could be torn to pieces and emerge as a regime subservient to Russia.” See “Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,” NIE-29/2, p. 1.
34. See “Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,” NIE-29/2, pp. 1–3
35. See “Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,” NIE-29/2, pp. 1–3. My emphasis.
36. See “Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,” NIE-29/2, p. 6.
37. For some discussion of this process, see Roy Macridis, “Stalinism and the Meaning of Titoism,” *World Politics*, 4:2 (January 1952), p. 235. “Soviet leaders undertook a vast campaign of purging the Communist parties of the satellites to eliminate all dissident elements. In some cases, as in Poland, direct command of military personnel was entrusted to Russians.”
38. Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, “Memorandum for the President,” (30 June 1948), Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, p. 1.
39. Avdo Humo, in “‘Deformities’ in Yugoslav Army Security,” Tanjug (Belgrade) 24 September 1966, Open Society Archive, Hungary (HU OSA) 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Army, Army 1953–1966, container number 23.
40. General Ivan Gošnjak in “‘Deformities’ in Yugoslav Army Security,” Tanjug (Belgrade) 24 September 1966, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Army, Army 1953–1966,

- container number 23.
41. Ceda Kapor in “‘Deformities’ in Yugoslav Army Security,” *Tanjug* (Belgrade) 24 September 1966, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Army, Army 1953–1966, container number 23.
 42. Dizdarević in “‘Deformities’ in Yugoslav Army Security,” *Radio Zagreb*, excerpts, in HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Army, Army 1953–1966, container number 23.
 43. General Ivan Gošnjak in “‘Deformities’ in Yugoslav Army Security,” *Tanjug* (Belgrade), 24 September 1966, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Army, Army 1953–1966, container number 23.
 44. See “Marxist Education in Military Schools,” *Komunist*, (27 August, 1964), p. 4, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Army, Army 1953–1966, container number 23.
 45. The author contends that after a thorough review of Yugoslav documents—including Soviet-Yugoslav and American-Yugoslav conversations—Tito was not only a tough negotiator and shrewd politician, but also incredibly confident in himself and his position. Tito’s confidence though seems to have mattered greatly as he not only weathered the storm of Soviet critiques but also took the dangerous path towards reforming his state in the face of hostility.
 46. “Budući da je nesvrstanost efikasno, oružje malih i srednjih zemalja u borbi protiv bilo kojeg oblika dominacije i homogenije i za očuvanje nacionalne političke i ekonomske nezavisnosti, to očito ne odgovara ambicijama da se nesvstani pretvore u instrument politike lagera, a prije svega Sovjetskog Saveza.” From “Promašeni napadi na nesvrstanost,” *Vjesnik*, 21 September 1968, from HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Non-Alignment Foreign Policy 1 of 2, 1964–68, container number 286.
 47. Wolfgang Libal, DPA correspondent, “Tito to Activate the Uncommitted Counties,” 30 September 1968, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Non-Alignment Foreign Policy 1 of 2, 1964–68, container number 286. “Es vergeht kaum ein Tag, ohne dass die Jugoslawische presse die bedeutung dieser Politik eroertiert. Das ist nicht allein auf die durch die Sowjetische Okupation der CSSR entstandene Lage in Europa zurueckzufuehren, sondern auch auf die Moskauer Angriffe auf die Jugoslawische Politik der Buendnislosigkeit. Man schenkt diesen angriffen hier in Belgrad beinahe eine groessere beachtung als den Moskauer Polemiken gegen den Jugoslawische weg zum Sozialismus.”
 48. See “Belgrade: Nonalignment – Antithesis to Policy of Position from Strength,” *Radio Belgrade*, 11 June 1968, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Non-Alignment Foreign Policy 1 of 2, 1964–68, container number 286.
 49. See Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Intervention and the Making of Our Times*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 50. See Gavro Altman, “The Responsibility of Europe,” *Komunist*, 11 January 1968, p. 3, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Non-Alignment Foreign Policy 1 of 2, 1964–68, container number 286. Also see, J. Đoric, “Jesmo li Evropljan ili nesvrstani?” *Vjesnik*, 26 March 1967, HU OSA 300-10-2 Yugoslav Subject Files I, Non-Alignment Foreign Policy 1 of 2, 1964–68, container number 286.
 51. See “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56. “Jugoslavija ima svoje ambicije, da ona hoce da igra tako neku narocitu ulogu u socijalistickom svetu i da prema njoj treba drugacije postupati nego prema drugim socijalistickim zemljama. Naime, drugim rečima, ja mislim da teba tako postaviti odnose ne samo specijalne prema Jugoslaviji nego uopšte u socijalističkom svetu. Ja govorim u interesu daljeg razvijanja socijalizma i daljeg revolucionarnog razvoja i omogućavanja okupljanja svih progresivnih ljudi...”
 52. “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.
 53. See “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56. “Mi ne mislimo da su socijal-demokrati danas bolji nego što su bili pre 20 godina. Naprotiv, u mnogim stvarima oni su možda otišli još dalje od marksizma. Međutim, oni imaju za sobom radničke mase i u radničkom masama ima tendencija za jednom aktivnijom socijalističkom akcijom.”
 54. At the 1955 summit in Belgrade, Khrushchev said, “The question of Germany. The central question is Germany.” (Pitanje Nemačke. Centralno pitanje je Nemačka). Later in that same day, Tito said, “That means, the question of resolving the German question is closely bound with the question of European security at the same time.” (Znači, pitanje rešenja nemačkog pitanja usko je vezano sa pitanjem evropske bezbednosti, u isto vreme). See “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.
 55. Tito told Khrushchev, that the forming members of NATO told him that Yugoslavia cannot join because “You have a different system and because of that you cannot come into NATO,” (Vi imate drugi sistem i zato vas ne mozemo primiti u NATO). See “Fragmenti” ASCG, CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.
 56. “Soviet–Yugoslav Communiques on Policies and Party Aims,” *New York Times*, (21 June 1956), p. 10. Negotiations continued for more than a year and in the end the Soviets and Yugoslavs uttered several important phrases; one such includes, “Abiding by the view that the roads and conditions of Socialist development are different in different countries,” relations between progressive forces throughout the world should be based “on complete freedom of will and equality, on friendly criticism and on the comradely character of the exchange of views on disputes between our parties.”
 57. See “Fragmenti” ASCG, CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.

58. The JNA was cited time and again by Yugoslavs as being the only Yugoslav institution that was not self-managed. Many Yugoslav elites claimed that a military could not function under self-management due to inherent hierarchy issues prevalent in any army. Yet it is interesting to note that one of the justifications for the creation and strengthening of the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) was the self-management system based on self-directing principles. Namely, the TDF (operating on an equal level with the JNA) allowed Yugoslav citizens to participate in the defense of the country but in an organization that was inherently opposed to self-management. For examples of this consult Colonel-General Viktor Bubanj in *Teritorijalna odbrana* (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1970), p. 7; Miljenko Živković, *Teritorijalna obrana Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1985), p. 180.
59. Miljenko Živković, *Teritorijalna obrana Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1985), p. 61. “Samoupravljanje i samoupravni društveni odnosi utemeljuju jedinstvo klasnih, političkih i nacionalnih interesa svih naroda i narodnosti.”
60. Kardelj in Frits W. Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 194.
61. Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community*, p. 196.
62. *Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, (Beograd, 1963), pp. 3–4.
63. *Constitution*, (Beograd, 1963), pp. 13–14.
64. For more on the split of the Italian Communist Party and Tito’s role see M.S. Handler, “Titoism, Nemesis of Stalinism,” *New York Times*, (1 April 1951), p. 18. “The resignations of Valdo Magnani and Aldo Cucchi were not the cause of the split in the Italian Communist party, but were a logical outcome of an internal struggle within the party—a struggle which was set in motion by the Yugoslav revolt against Stalinist dictatorship.” Further in the article, the struggles facing the French Communist Party are attributed to the “Economic recovery” that has hit the party “a hard blow and cost many rank-and-file members,” p. 59.
65. Milovan Djilas cited in Ernst Halperin, *The Triumphant Heretic: Tito’s Struggle against Stalin*, (London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 118–19.



Ceremony commemorating the 26th anniversary of Josip Broz Tito’s death (Sarajevo). Wikipedia

III. IDENTITIES IN LITERARY REFLECTION

Octave Mirbeau's *La 628-E8*: A First Automobile Journey through Europe's Diversity.¹

Aleksandra Gruzinska, Arizona State University

"To whom dedicate the account of this voyage, if not to you, dear Monsieur Charron, who have devised, constructed, animated, with a wonderful life, the marvelous car in which I accomplish it, without fatigue or setbacks."²




C.G.V. - Fernand Charron

Fernand Charron (1866-1928) to whom Octave Mirbeau (1848-1917) dedicated the account of his voyage, "récit de ce voyage," which he also calls a "journal" (v, 1) was a French engineer and pioneer of the automobile at a time when the car was still seen as a sport. He

may have for all purposes

hand assembled one of the first cars for Mirbeau, a C.G.V. (Charron, Girardot et Voigt), 30 CV (horsepower).³ It was registered as 626-E8 which is also the title of the book published in 1907: a travelogue, a novel, a diary, and a collection of essays, of dreams and "wandering reveries" (x), or simply a collection of memories.⁴ Whatever genre one may choose, it will fit the book. Mirbeau himself admits not to know how to classify this bizarre volume. The *628-E8* is the first book ever written on the automobile.

Ownership of a car in 1907 positions our writer in a milieu of wealthy people, millionaires perhaps, though Mirbeau was not always this wealthy.⁶ His trip went smoothly according to him, without fatigue or snags.⁷ It provided many "impressions neuves" or new ways of perceiving things, a greater freedom in exploring new countries and regions that were less known at the time. Inhabited by very "diverse" populations and in spite of their "diverse" appetites, disagreements, and oppositions, these nations inevitably leaned, to use Mirbeau's words, toward the great human "unity." This does not mean, however,



Octave Mirbeau

that the countries and populations that Mirbeau visited liked what he said about them. In fact the *628-E8* provided food for heated disagreement and opposition, in particular on the

part of the Belgians.⁸

Mirbeau did not promise an objective account of his voyage. Unlike some human beings who are nothing but heart, mind, and lofty flights of the spirit, he, on the contrary, had a stomach, liver and nerves that led to indigestions, melancholy and rheumatisms. All were aggravated by sun and rain, pleasure or pain that exercised hostile influences on the subjects of interest to him. He did not take any notes during the trip, and claimed to have based his account on memories and dreams filled with contradictions.⁹ What he enjoyed was change, which the trip did provide.

In a long and admiring dedication honoring Fernand Charron, Mirbeau first recalls a trip that he took "six years ago" in one of the first cars built by the French engineer.¹⁰ Departing one early morning from Aurillac, in the center of France, Mirbeau found himself in the evening in the little town of Poligny located in the Jura. Although he had not yet left France, in just a few hours, he went, according to him, "from one race of men to another" (ix).¹¹

The little town of Poligny had a welcoming air of decency and good health, very rare in France in Mirbeau's opinion. He found Poligny friendly, *sympathique*, savored local specialties, a trout accompanied by a wine d'Arbois. He engaged in conversation with the local peasants who showed none of the unpleasant attitudes of divisive nationalism, mistrust and suspicion often attributed to French peasants. The *Poligny* peasants were very different

from the *Auvergnats*, for instance, whom Mirbeau described as harsh and cunning.¹² What were the peasants in *Poligny* interested in? They talked about weather, politics, economy, and, strangely enough, about education, a subject very dear to Mirbeau. They preferred secular or state education, also favored by Mirbeau, rather than religious instruction, described as “*farcié de légendes*” or “stuffed with legends” (viii). They were also interested in the quality of water, meat and air, things of interest today, globally, in spite of our regional differences.

Mirbeau was fifty-seven when the trip began “one morning in April 1905” (26). The itinerary of the 628-E8 took him through France, Belgium, Holland and mostly Germany. After spending the night in La Haye (7) Mirbeau and his party arrived in Amsterdam with its infamous, offensive and barbarian “*pavés*” or cobblestones, that made walking or driving uncomfortable and even dangerous. Mirbeau planned to stay at least a month and gave Brossette, his driver, time off.

The first thing to see in Amsterdam is the museums. This is Rembrandt and Vermeer country. Next, one visits the canals with their brownish and feverish dead waters, and the boats that reminded Mirbeau of the “*jonques chinoises*” or Chinese river boats. You can roam in the streets with their colorful rows of buildings, the gardens with their tulips, the Kalverstraat and nearby the catholic cloisters or *le béguinage* (11), and small boutiques. Finally we find Mirbeau meandering through unfamiliar areas of the harbor, which reminded him of India: slums, loud music that gets on your nerves, opium smells, and alcohol; a woman of color whispered passionate words in his ears. There were brasseries or bars, crowds, and bright lights. Suddenly everything began turning like a merry-go-round or vertigo. Mirbeau started the day very sprightly and planned to stay at least a month in Amsterdam, but at the end of a hectic day’s visit, he wanted nothing more than to leave immediately. What is more, to the speed of a rolling car, one must add the whirlwind visit of the city and Mirbeau finished the day like “a car with the ignition key still connected and still ‘rumbling angrily’, but unable to disconnect,” a familiar feeling experienced by many travelers. His chauffeur Brossette, who spent his free time fixing the car, asked nothing better than to leave. In his opinion, Amsterdam was no city for drivers. Trouville, Dieppe, Monte-Carlo, Ostende, on the other hand, had excellent garages by comparison with Amsterdam.

Mirbeau spent, nonetheless, a superb “month” in Holland. He recorded the politeness of the population, its enthusiastic welcome and generous hospitality. Sometimes the people manifested a troublesome curiosity. At Frise, for instance, some stones were thrown at the car (28), but people were mostly respectful. A peasant, seeing the 628-E8 speeding by on the road, let go of his horse and cart and started running towards the car, then stood motionless, full



Pierre Bonnard.

Pierre Bonnard

of admiration, holding his hat in his hand, in a sign of respect. It is a true painting fit for the Netherlands. The visit in the Netherlands was a fine occasion for Mirbeau to take a historical detour: He

recalls the ebullient young Louis XIV, his victory at Rocroi (1643), and his desire to conquer this region of Europe, the expeditions with banners, machines and food, and the women that came with him. The Sun King never quite managed to win over the proud Belgians (29).

Brussels is today the lively capital and site of European Union’s parliament. It is very different from the impressions that Mirbeau left a century ago. He saw Brussels as a city without any interest, “a rien,” in a country ruled by a wealthy king (Léopold II) who spent most of his time abroad.¹⁴ Brussels was mainly famous for a fountain known as the *Manneken Piss*. This famous tourist attraction is introduced in a conversation between a young girl, a French tourist, and her mother. As she asked for explanations that the *Baedecker*, the tourist guide of the time, failed to provide, her mother signaled her to lower her voice and whisper. This was no decent subject of conversation for nineteenth-century respectable women, and much less for girls. But both mother and daughter planned to see the *Manneken Piss*, eyes closed no doubt, venturing perhaps a discreet peak at the sculpture of the innocent and joyfully urinating boy.

If the visits to Amsterdam and Brussels, in countries

that enjoyed a more friendly relationship with France, were sometimes hectic, what might one expect when crossing the German border? Thirty-five years after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 the French defeat at Sedan by Napoleon III still tasted bitter, and some Frenchmen, according to Mirbeau, perceived the Germans as uncivilized hostile savages. Mirbeau, his travel companions and Brossette prepared for the worst, including rifles, instruments of torture and pointed military casks:

Oh! But Germany! Its arrogant (haughty, offensive) customs people, its terrible officers, its pitiless police? The trials would now begin. I regretted, oh! how much I regretted at this moment [says Mirbeau] not to have the chimerical soul of M. Déroulède so that with one gesture I could forever erase from the map this barbarian country. (*La 628-E8*, 30).¹⁵

Brossette reinforced this feeling by adding that “Les Allemands, Monsieur?... quel peuple de sauvages...! Ils ne comprennent pas le français...” (45): “The Germans, Sir?... what a savage people...! They don’t understand French...”

At the German border, the Mirbeau party became somewhat disoriented and confused and lost a great deal of time searching for the crossing. They expected, no doubt, nothing less than a military fortress guarding the entrance to Germany, similar to the one that French military architectural genius, Vauban, had built at Givet, on the Franco-Belgian border.¹⁶ Givet can boast of the most overwhelming military architecture that was inspired, no doubt, Mirbeau argues ironically, by the fear the French had of the Belgians: “What a strong terror the Belgians must have inspired in us [the French] to make Givet into such a formidable Fortress... Ah! Contemplating Givet, the Belgians must feel very proud to be Belgians...”¹⁷ And Mirbeau quickly added: “I can easily imagine that Givet must have been, for them [the Belgians], the best school where to fortify their national arrogance.”¹⁸



La 628-E8 entered Germany at Elten, from the Netherlands, on the Rhine River. In lieu of a similarly threatening military construction like the one at Givet, Mirbeau and his party finally located an unimpressive little building looking more like an empty private home. Eventually they came upon an old woman, deaf, wearing glasses, mending stockings, and a cat sleeping next to her. She had all the attire of a witch without the meanness normally

associated with witches. Mirbeau went into great trouble explaining to the old woman his business. She understood right away and took him to a cabaret located nearby where the dreaded *douanier* or terrifying customs officer was busy smoking a pipe and drinking beer. He showed great interest in the 628-E8, somewhat less enthusiasm for its French passengers, signed the customary documents and whisked them off in the direction of Dusseldorf, Germany, a country where the roads were so smooth as if they had just been waxed and polished.¹⁹

Mirbeau demystifies the image of Germany perceived by some Frenchmen as the country of savage hostile barbarians, the country of the enemy. He was a staunch pacifist, an anarchist in its purest sense that is a fighter who wished to make way for change peacefully. He saw the Franco-Prussian war as a mistake but, nonetheless, did his duty toward the country in 1870, one of France’s bitter defeats. Unlike Déroulède, mentioned earlier, he was no

revanchard obsessed by revenge.

While the 628-E8 has finally entered Germany, let us take another short detour to the year 1886. Some twenty years earlier, Mirbeau found himself in deep trouble with Mme Juliette Lamber Adam, the editor of *La Nouvelle Revue*, an important and influential journal. She admired Mirbeau and at first accepted in 1886 to serialize in her journal Mirbeau’s first novel *Le Calvaire*. When the time came to include Chapter Two, she hesitated to publish a troublesome passage.²⁰ The chapter lacked patriotism according to Mme Adam. She on the other hand, being a staunch patriot, worried that her conservative readers might react unfavorably to a chapter in *Le Calvaire* where, after shooting dead a Prussian during the 1870 war, like a soldier trained to kill is expected to do, Mirbeau’s hero, Jean Mintié, ran over to the dead Prussian, picked him



up and kissed him on the mouth, still covered with blood, in a gesture of brotherly compassion. Shortly after, *Le Calvaire* was published, in 1886, by Eugène Fasquelle with Chapter Two included.

Twenty years later, in *La 628-E8*, Mirbeau again pointed to the Germans as a nation different from France, yet inhabited by people who in many ways shared similar human flaws and concerns. He was not the first who attempted to modify the attitude of the French toward the Germans. Mme de Staël, another epic traveler who crisscrossed Europe from West to East and into Russia, a century earlier, pointed out in *On Germany (De l'Allemagne, 1810)* the then innovative Romantic ideas of the Germans. In spite of some criticism, *De l'Allemagne* contributed to promote the great French Romantic Movement; and, were she alive today, Germaine de Staël might agree with Mirbeau that the two nations should lean toward fostering greater openness and collaboration.

Our side trip on *Le Calvaire* and *De l'Allemagne* is only one of many similar detours that Mirbeau took during his voyage. As we return to his itinerary, one of the tourist gems little known and not yet explored by tourists in Mirbeau's time was the little town of Gorinchem in Holland:

The first joy that I was to know, in Holland, this time, was to spot this little town of Gorinchem which I will never again forget, a little town almost unknown to the tourists, and which from afar, from the other side of the water—the Rhine and the Meuse [rivers] flow here, combined together—[Gorinchem] appeared to me so spry and it delighted me even more as soon as we slowly walked, at length, in her narrow streets, crowded with strollers . . . I was enchanted, like a child is enchanted by a new toy. Truly, the town seemed a very new, very shiny toy—even though it was very old—its newness was its cleanliness/spotlessness.²¹

Mirbeau introduced in this passage a metaphor which he will complete later during the trip—the image of the two rivers, the Rhine and the Meuse as they combine and flow together towards the greater natural unity represented by the North Sea. The two Rivers blended, unconcerned so to speak, of being absorbed the one by the other or losing, as a consequence, their individuality or separateness. There is also the mixing of the old and the new in Gorinchem—

existing in harmonious familiarity, side by side.

Another little town in Holland that Mirbeau visited was Zaandam, very different from Gorinchem, very influenced by Japan:

Zaandam, with its canals, its vessels anchored in the quay, unloading heavy cargos of Norwegian wood, with its tight flotilla of small fishing boats, with their bows bulging like those of Chinese river boats, its water alleys, its pink huts, its sonorous workshops, its green houses, Zaandam, the most Japanese of all the settings of Holland.²²

Zaandam was a convenient side trip for Mirbeau to recall Claude Monet's discovery of Japanese prints in a grocer's shop. The owner, unaware of their uniqueness and value, used them to wrap cheese for his customers. And we know today what influence the discovery of Japanese prints had on Monet's art and his garden at Giverny. We also know that Monet's discovery probably did not happen the way Mirbeau narrated it.²³ His account of the event is, however, so much more dramatic and memorable.

But Mirbeau also found abroad conservative narrow interpretations, of monarchy for instance. "Le roi en est" or "the king is involved in it," with a touch of complicity perhaps, dominated Belgian thinking in Brussels, implying or simply suggesting that the king had a part in many deals or undertakings on one hand, and on the other that he strongly influenced and even dominated the nation's way of thinking.

Diversity aside, there were, and still are, problems that all countries share. Mirbeau found signs of harshness among capitalists who exploited workers and objected to their requests for better pay, better working conditions, and a more humane treatment. On the other hand, the Belgian capitalists accused the French of sending troublemakers among Belgian workers. Experiencing similar plights in northern industrial France, the French accused the Belgians of rousing miners against French capitalists. Borders existed between the countries, yet they seemed somewhat porous, like at Elten. The French travelled abroad, exploring Belgium and the Low Countries. The Belgians on the other hand felt obsessed by Paris. Each country had its great artists and welcomed tourists to their museums to witness their unique cultural heritage, like they still do today.

Some annoyances could not be avoided. The

Belgians spoke French with an accent which, to be truthful, was no accent. The language situation between the two adjoining countries reminds us today of the linguistic differences between the British and Americans, or the Quebecois and the French. Mirbeau found the “accent belge” sad and comical, like a flawed melody, “triste et comique, à la façon d’un air faux” (67). He noticed it mostly in the excellent quality of Belgian performing arts, almost as excellent as the *Opéra de Paris*, or the *Comédie Française*, except for the accent:

Not only the ingénue young actors, the great coquettes, the young leading actresses, the old [outgoing] actresses, the lovers, the noble fathers, the singers, the choristers, the prompters, the stage managers, the set designers, the gymnasts, the seal leaders [masters] and the horsewomen, all have this accent without an accent that makes you laugh and also makes you cry, but—amazing thing—the dancers also, the dancers above all, who, unable to put the accent in their mouth, introduce it in their legs, in their arms, in their poses, even in the light trembling of their tutus in flight.²⁴

Aside from Mirbeau’s use of irony, the passage includes a superabundance of expressions pertaining to the performing arts including classical drama, traditional characters, and performers in the circus, ballet and opera. Its linguistic acrobatics remains quite a challenge to translate.

After Givet, La Haye, Amsterdam, Brussels, Gorinchem and Zaandam, Mirbeau stopped at Waterloo, continued on to Anvers, to Emmerich, Berlin, and Dordrecht (not necessarily in this order) before he finally reached, after much geographical and mental meandering, Dusseldorf, the city of “Modern-Style.” Although Mirbeau himself was not very fond of it, he described this newest architectural trend like no other art critic had done before or has done after him (See *La 628-E8*, 327-328). He also discovered in Dusseldorf the pristine cleanliness of German bathrooms which he truly admired. He found,

The utmost delicate and refined and most complete bath and hygiene resources. By starting with a meticulous wash up in a room furnished with all the desired hydrotherapeutic equipment, I could not help thinking that, in this again, I was far

removed from our beautiful France where, almost everywhere, even in the biggest cities, the hotels jealously conserve the customs of the nation, the hereditary weakness by which one recognizes, better than by his wit, a true Frenchman from France: its filth.²⁵

“Modern Style” aside, Mirbeau saw Dusseldorf as a very beautiful city, very wealthy and sumptuous: the parks, balconies, gardens, green spaces, flowers and ponds made him soon forget the city’s Modern-Style. He saw stores loaded with fabrics, furs, jewelry, silver and food reminding him of altars ready for sacrificial rites to the gods. Dusseldorf was the city of wealthy entrepreneurs, some not unlike Isidore Lechat, a character in Mirbeau’s most successful play, *Les Affaires sont les affaires*.²⁶ The Rhine at Dusseldorf (like the Seine in Paris), was magnificent and impressive.

All travel inevitably leads home. Mirbeau’s trip was no exception. It ended in Strasbourg and Alsace. From a political point of view the region was German during Mirbeau’s visit. But according to the *aubergiste*, the innkeeper, it was neither German or French, the population identified itself with Alsace (411), in which France and Germany blended, like the Rhine and the Meuse rivers blended their waters near Gorinchem. Today, the same innkeeper might point out that the population identifies itself as Alsatians and Europeans.

In Strasbourg, the Mirbeau party ran out of gas. The pharmacist had none left; he had sold his last liter to an Englishman. As for the doctor, he was making calls and was not at home. A maid took them to the cellar where they found the fuel they needed and no one asked for money.

The 628-E8 crossed the Franco-German border at Grand-Fontaine.


In this way, meandering style, we arrived late one evening, at the frontier, at Grand-Fontaine I believe, a pretty village with its chalets nicely dotted in a green fold of the Vosges. It was half past eight... and we had the idea of staying overnight in Baccarat... Why dear God? The douannier started the formalities. In spite of the late hour, he made no difficulty in reimbursing us our deposit.

—I’ve got precisely, today, some French money, he said. I believe that you would like that better.

The office was very clean, very nice and tidy; the men looked polished in their green tunics. They wished us bon voyage.²⁷

The German officer proved to be just as kind and efficient as the *douannier* at Elten and sent the Mirbeau party off wishing everyone a happy and safe trip home.

The C.G.V. entered France at Raon-la-Plaine and its passengers felt immediately treated worse than dogs—“nous



fûmes accueillis comme des chiens” (412). In this dirty little French border town, “A foul-smelling hole, a squalid cesspit, a dunghill, such was our frontier;” some stones were thrown at the car.²⁸ The office was “an untidy room... a wooden floor sticky with dirt... There was no supervisor.”²⁹ Our travelers chose to return to Grand-Fontaine for the night because the French

douannier at Raon-La-Plaine could not be bothered at this late hour. The next day he took his time to search through their belongings. Mirbeau registered a complaint, but like passengers today, he mused whether such complaints reached anyone. He and his party had no more doubts that they were back home in France; it was a “sale pays” (“dirty/nasty country”) according to Brossette. Mirbeau hastily reassured readers that Brossette did not designate France as a whole. “Sale pays” in this instance only meant Raon-La-Plaine!

In order to get to know the Rhine region and its diverse people, tourists in the twenty-first century will find Mirbeau’s travels still instructive and informative, studded with curious anecdotes and political comments not included in the *Baedeker*, the tourist guide of the period which remained silent on the *Manneken Piss*. The above adventures represent only a cursory sampling of the many places and subjects discovered and discussed by Mirbeau within each country during a trip told in over four hundred pages many of which are devoted to Germany. The book was meant, no doubt, to invite the French to improve neighborly relations by venturing into Germany and exploring her modernity not unlike what Germaine de Staël did when she explored

the country a century ago and pointed out the innovative modernity of German Romantic literature. Mirbeau’s trip is well worth undertaking and rediscovering in our twenty-first century marred by wars and political tensions that, contrary to what Mirbeau said at the onset of his trip, separate rather than unite us.

Notes

1. Octave Mirbeau. *La 628-E8*. Vingtième mille. Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, Eugène Fasquelle éditeur, 1908. Published November 12, 1907. Privilege of copyright in the United States reserved under the Act approved March 3, 1905 by Octave Mirbeau, & Eugène Fasquelle, publisher. Mirbeau strongly believed in the rights of intellectual property and made prompt use of it. The first 225 volumes of this edition included illustrations by Pierre Bonnard: 25 were printed on imperial paper from Japan, and 200 on papier vélin d’Arches. Unless otherwise indicated, French citations and pagination refer to this edition. Translations from French are mine.
2. “A qui dédier le récit de ce voyage, sinon à vous cher Monsieur Charron, qui avez combiné, construit, animé, d’une vie merveilleuse, la merveilleuse automobile où je l’accomplis, sans fatigue et sans accrocs” (*La 628-E8*, v).
3. Mirbeau bought in April 1906 his first C.G.V. (Charron, Girardot et Voigt) thirty horsepower, the famous 628-E8. He paid the fabulous sum of twenty-five thousand francs. See Pierre Michel et Jean-François Nivet (766). The Internet site at <http://www.histomobile.com/histomob/internet/519/histo01.htm> features an illustration of a CGV. For ALDA, another car model by Fernand Charron see: <http://perso.numericable.fr/~encyclo/3001%20alda.html>. Two competitors of the CGV, the Panhard and the Brulard-Taponnier 12 horsepower, also make an appearance in *La 628-E8* (43).
4. Mirbeau calls his work a “récit de voyage” (*La 628-E8*, v.), and also a journal or diary. The word “récit” may be translated as “account” or “story.” “Account” seems preferred because it implies a status of witness on the part of the narrator to the various events and cultures that he describes.
5. *La 628-E8* was the central attraction of the Fourth International Colloquium in September 28-30, 2007 at the University Marc Bloch Strasbourg II: “Voyage à Travers l’Europe. Autour de *La 628-E8* d’Octave Mirbeau.”
6. Between 1900 and 1905 Mirbeau owned four different cars before he acquired in April 1906 his first C.G.V., the protagonist of *La 628-E8*. See Michel and Nivet (766). Mirbeau’s portrait reproduced here is accessible at: <http://michelmirbeau.blogspot.com/>.
7. Mirbeau seems to combine in his *récit/journal* several trips.

- The first one is described in the dedication. It began six years ago: “Il y a six ans... parti, un matin d’Aurillac, sur une des premières automobiles que vous ayez construites” (*La 628-E8*, vi). It seems to be separate from the trip narrated in *La 628-E8* proper which started several years later, one morning in April [16], 1905 (26). The trip was delayed till May 2. Contrary to Mirbeau’s claim, “Nous venions de passer un mois merveilleux, un mois enchanté, en Hollande (28),” “we have spent an enchanting month in Holland,” the trip only lasted three weeks according to Michel, Pierre et Jean-François Nivet (767). There also seems to be a conflict between the date when the 628-E8 was purchased (1906) and the year when the trip started (1905). This is a problem for scholars to solve. It should not affect the reader or his comprehension of events narrated in *La 628-E8*. The points of ellipsis [...] in Mirbeau’s citations are strategic techniques of his style and do not represent textual omissions.
8. See “La 628-E8: Le scandale des Belges et des ‘patriotes.’” In Pierre Michel et Jean François Nivet (807-809).
 9. “Selon que mes organes fonctionnent bien ou mal, il m’arrive de détester aujourd’hui, ce que j’aimais hier, et d’aimer le lendemain, ce que la veille, j’ai le plus violemment détesté (*La 628-E8*, 5-6). These sentiments are an echo of Mirbeau’s *Palinodies* published during the Dreyfus Affair. He had voiced a strong anti-Semitism in *Les Grimaces* before he had a change of heart and became a fierce Dreyfusard. For more information see “[Anti]-Semitism 1890s/1990s: Octave Mirbeau and E.M. Cioran.” Accessible at: <http://rmmla.wsu.edu/ereview/55.1/default.asp>
 10. “Il y a six ans... parti, un matin d’Aurillac, sur une des premières automobiles que vous ayez construites” (*La 628-E8*, vi).
 11. “Et tel était le miracle... En quelques heures, j’étais allé d’une race d’hommes à une autre race d’hommes, en passant par tous les intermédiaires de terrain, de culture, de moeurs, d’humanité qui les relient et les expliquent, et j’éprouvais cette sensation – tant il me semblait que j’avais vu de choses – d’avoir, en un jour, vécu des mois et des mois” (*La 628-E8*, ix).
 12. The inhabitants of Auvergne, a province in the central region of France, are called *Auvergnats*.
 13. “...tous mes nerfs vibrent et trépident... Je suis comme la machine qu’on a mise au point mort, sans éteindre, et qui gronde...” (*La 628-E8*, 12).
 14. The reference is to Leopold II (1835-1909), who became king of the Belgians in 1865.
 15. “Oui, mais l’Allemagne. Ses douaniers rogues, ses terribles officiers, son impitoyable police? Les épreuves allaient maintenant commencer. Je regrettais, ah! combien je regrettais, à ce moment, de n’avoir pas l’âme chimérique de M. Déroulède, pour, d’un geste, rayer à jamais de la carte du monde ce barbare pays!” (30).
 16. “Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de, maréchal de France, né à Saint-Léger-Vauban (Nivernais) (1633-1707). Commissaire général des fortifications (1676), il fortifia de nombreuses places des frontières françaises” *Petit Larousse 1983*.
 17. “Quelle forte terreur ont donc su nous inspirer les Belges, que Givet soit une telle forteresse... Ah! les Belges doivent être fiers d’être Belges, en regardant Givet...” (41).
 18. “J’imagine aisément que Givet soit, pour eux [les Belges], la meilleure école, où se fortifie leur arrogance nationale” (42).
 19. Dusseldorf, Mirbeau’s destination is mentioned early, on page 32. However, he never reached it until page 325. Mirbeau describes its modernity and wealth in admiring words (373-388).
 20. A controversial chapter on Honoré de Balzac and his Polish-born aristocratic wife, Mme Hańska, was cut from *La 628-E8* and it was never reprinted in the space that Mirbeau, an admirer of Balzac, had intended for it. In Pierre Michel’s recent edition it appears at the end of the volume. See also Aleksandra Gruzinska. “Octave Mirbeau’s Madame Hańska in ‘La Mort de Balzac.’” *Nineteenth Century French Studies* 15:3 (1987): 302-314. “La Mort de Balzac” was first published in: Octave Mirbeau. *La 628-E8*. Paris: Fasquelle [November 12], 1907. It was positioned right after and in contrast with “Les Femmes allemandes de Monsieur Paul Bourget” before being purged from the book. Mirbeau also acquired a rare edition of Balzac’s *Correspondence* in Cologne, Germany.
 21. “La première joie que je devais connaître, en Hollande, cette fois-ci, ce fut d’apercevoir cette petite ville de Gorinchem que je n’oublierai plus, petite ville presque inconnue des touristes, et qui de très loin, de l’autre côté de l’eau, —c’est le Rhin et la Meuse qui coulent là, confondus—me parut si pimpante et me ravit bien davantage dès que nous eûmes circulé, quelque temps, lentement, dans ses rues étroites, pleines de promeneurs... J’en étais enchanté, comme un enfant d’un joujou. Elle avait bien l’air d’un joujou luisant, tout neuf,—quoiqu’elle fût très vieille—sa nouveauté, c’était sa propreté...” (201)
 22. “Zaandam, avec son canal, ses navires à quai, débarquant des cargaisons de bois de Norvège, sa flottille serrée de barques, aux proues renflées comme des jonques, les ruelles d’eau, ses cahutes roses, ses ateliers sonores, ses maisons vertes, Zaandam, le plus japonais de tous les décors de la Hollande” (208).
 23. Mona Johnston provides a different version of Monet’s discovery and acquisition of Japanese prints. She quotes Theodore Robinson, an American Impressionist painter and friend of Monet: “M[onet] spoke of a Jap[anese] who has started a house—the first—in Japan for the sale of European art. He liked [very] much Monet’s work—bought the bully canvas of Germaine with her arms full of flowers.” In Theodore

- Robinson's Diary, July 3, 1892. Quoted in Sona Johnston, *In Monet's Light. Theodore Robinson at Giverny*. The Baltimore Museum of Art. London: Philip Wilson Publishers Ltd., 2004, 190. Johnston further explains that "This [the canvas featuring Germaine] is probably the work from 1888 entitled *Jeune Fille dans le jardin de Giverny* given by Monet to Tadamas Hayashi in exchange for a series of Japanese prints" (See note 12, p. 197).
24. "Non seulement les ingénus, les grandes coquettes, les jeunes premières, les vieilles denières, les amoureux, les pères nobles, les chanteuses, les choristes, les souffleurs, régisseurs, décorateurs, les gymnastes, les montreurs de phoques et les écuyères, ont cet accent sans accent qui fait rire et qui fait pleurer aussi, mais—chose fantastique—les danseuses également, les danseuses surtout qui, ne pouvant mettre l'accent dans leur bouche, l'introduisent dans leurs jambes, dans leurs bras, dans leurs poses, jusque dans le frémissement aérien des tutus envolés. (68)"
25. "...le plus délicat et le plus raffiné des plus complètes ressources de toilette et d'hygiène. En procédant à un minucieux lavage, dans un cabinet muni de tous les appareils désirables d'hydrothérapie, je ne pouvais m'empêcher de songer que, par là encore, j'étais bien loin de notre belle France où, presque partout, même dans les plus grandes villes, les hôtels conservent jalousement les habitudes de la race, la tare héréditaire où se reconnaît, mieux que par son esprit, un véritable Français de France: la malpropreté" (329). Sixty years later, Polish writer Witold Gombrowicz returning in 1964 to Europe after 24 years of exile in the Argentina of the 1940s and 1950s, noticed the pristine bathrooms in Berlin. Gombrowicz linked their cleanliness to ethical and moral concerns related to World War II. "Krany. Lazienki. Mycie higieniczne." [Faucets. Bathrooms. Hygienic washing]. *Dziennik* Vol. 3, page 148, and also *Paris-Berlin*.
26. Mirbeau's play, *Les Affaires sont les affaires* was published in 1903. It won several Molière awards during its more recent revival in Paris. Its main character is an unscrupulous, unfeeling and profit seeking businessman named Isidore Lechat. The "Molière" awards are equivalent to the Emmy awards in the USA.
31. "C'est ainsi, en flânant, que nous arrivâmes, un soir, tard, à la frontière, à Grand-Fontaine je crois, joli village égrené, en coquets chalets, dans un vert repli des Vosges. Il était huit heures et demie... Et nous avons l'idée folle d'aller coucher à Baccarat... Pourquoi, mon Dieu? Le douanier activa les formalités. Malgré l'heure tardive, il ne fit aucune difficulté pour nous rembourser notre dépôt. —J'ai justement, aujourd'hui, de l'argent français, nous dit-il. Je pense que vous aimerez mieux ça... Le bureau était très propre, bien rangé; les hommes très astiqués, dans leur vareuse verte. Ils nous souhaitèrent bon voyage" (*La 628-E8*, 412).
32. "Un trou puant, un cloaque immonde, un amoncellement de fumier, telle était notre frontière à nous..." (*La 628-E8*, 413).
33. "une pièce en désordre... un parquet gluant de saletés... Il n'y avait pas de chef..." (413)

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Strasbourg (France). Photo Courtesy Aleksandra Gruzinska

IV. ECONOMIC CHANGES AND IDENTITIES

Languages, Migrations, Economic Cultures: Europe's Diversity as a Common Wealth

Sylvain Gallais, Arizona State University

“Difference is not a threat... difference is natural... Europe created institutions which respected [its] diversity,”¹ said John Hume Nobel Peace prize. As Mark Leonard quotes, “Europe’s greatest gift is choice: Freedom to choose what country to live in, what food to eat, what university to study in, what job to work in, and where to sell your products.”² The Europe continent numbers 730 million people, 35 countries. The European Union numbers 495 million people (in 2007) in 27 member states (Fig. 1) who speak 23 different official languages. Other Europeans speak some 22 other languages. There are three main religions in Europe, hundreds of cheeses and wines, and as many local customs and cultures. Landscapes and climate are even more diversified (Fig. 2),

ranging from arctic polar climate to Mediterranean types, from oceanic to continental seasons.

Meeting different people, being acquainted with them, living in their own country makes one less favorable and receptive to rejection or even hatred of differences. Variety and diversity along with travel, migration and a larger range of consumption patterns make Europeans more aware of the riches their continent can offer.

Diversity does not seem to vanish under the more open choices and varieties of skills and occupations, business cultures and economic structures. The more different Europeans there are the more they can benefit from their diversity which is their commonwealth.

We will focus on some of the most significant




Figure 1. European countries.

diversities one finds when living in Europe: languages and immigrants, economic and business cultures.

Languages

A language is a culture. “Europe’s cultural identity is a diverse one and has its roots in the cultural legacy of three treasure houses of antiquity: Near East, Greece and Rome.”³ There are actually huge disparities in ways of life between countries or regions with various languages, various foods, clothes and beliefs.

More than 50 different languages or local dialects are spoken by Europeans. Moreover, they come from many different backgrounds (think of history, migrations and invasions). This means one can meet very different people in Europe.

Many Europeans speak more than one language. Some 56% (53% in 2000) of people residing in the EU 25 are able to hold a conversation in at least two languages, including their mother tongue. For example 99% of Luxembourgish, 97% of Slovaks and 95% of Latvians know at least one foreign language. Some 28% speak two foreign languages, as in Luxembourg (92%), the Netherlands (75%) and Slovenia (71%) and 11% master at least three foreign

languages.

English is the first spoken second language. English is spoken as first or second language by more than 50 % of Europeans. German comes second (32%) and French third (26%).

Migrations

Europe has always been a land of migration flows from the prehistoric times up to now. People were mostly following the Danube River or the Mediterranean coast, from East to West, ending up along the western rim of Europe (Finisteria, Finistère - end of the earth). During the first millennium various populations moved westward by numbers (fig. 3). Later on merchants established west-east routes more often than south-north. Today’s migrations show larger numbers than in these old times. What are the flows today and how do they influence the demographics of old Europe? And can we expect a growth of discriminatory behaviors as it is the case in times of increased movements of populations between different cultures?

During the 1990s, immigration to southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and to Austria, Ireland, and the UK increased considerably. In the beginning of the 21st




Figure 2: Climates of Europe.

century, more migrants are moving westward from central and eastern countries, as it was the case during the first millennium. These new flows are easily explained by the attractiveness of western European economies and welfare systems.⁵

Since the 1990s, the number of migrants to Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands decreased. Between 5 to 15% of the population of Western Europe are foreign-born, as compared with only 5% in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU-25 average was 8% in 2004 as compared with 12% in the USA.⁶

Population

In the EU countries, the recent growth has been essentially due to the contribution by migration, with the exceptions of Denmark, France, Malta, the Netherlands and Finland, where the positive natural change is still the main driver of the demographic growth. In the EU-25, more than 80% of the population growth was attributed to migration in 2005 (Table 1) while Eastern European countries like Romania or Bulgaria are losing their citizens. On another hand, in many countries immigration contributes largely to the natural change because an important part of the birth

rate can be attributed to migrants (over 80% in France), who are most of the time young, and are therefore contributing less to mortality and more to fertility than the indigenous population. France, like Ireland, is then displaying the highest rate of birth among the EU's countries. The non-nationals living in the European Union accounted for about 25 million, some 5.5 % of the total population. In absolute values, the largest numbers of foreigners reside in Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy.⁷

Where do they come from?

The number of non-nationals in the EU-15, estimated around 8%, has doubled between 1995 and 2005.

(1) Migrants from outside Europe or EU-27.

In all EU Member States, except Belgium (they come from Italy, 8.3% of the Belgian population), Cyprus, Ireland and Luxembourg, the great majority of foreigners are coming from non-EU-27 countries. The largest non-national groups are located in Germany (Turks, 9% of the population), Denmark (Turks, 5%) and the Netherlands (Turks, 4.3%), in Greece (Albanians, 8%), in the UK (India), in Portugal and Spain (2 to 7%, from Cape Verde,




Figure 3. Migrations during the first millennium.

Table 1. Crude annual rates of population change by region or country.
(per 1000 population) (in brackets number of countries)

	Natural change			Net migration			Total change		
	2000	2004	2005	2000	2004	2005	2000	2004	2005
European Union (25)	0.8	1.0	0.8	1.5	3.8	3.6	2.3	5.4	4.4
Eurozone* (12)	1.1	1.3	0.9	3.0	4.6	4.3	4.1	6.8	5.3
Acceding ** Countries (2)	-2.1	-2.8	-2.8	-7.7	-0.3	-0.2	-9.8	-3.2	-3.1
Candidate Countries (3)	13.8	11.8	11.5	0.5	20.2	0.1	14.4	11.9	11.6
EEA (28)	0.8	1.1	0.9	1.5	3.8	3.6	2.3	5.5	4.5
EFTA (4)	2.8	2.5	2.4	3.0	4.4	4.5	5.8	6.8	6.8

* Now 13 in 2007; ** Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007.

Source: *Statistics in focus: Population and social conditions, Eurostat #16, October 2006.*

Brazil, Angola, Ecuador, Morocco) and Estonia and Latvia (Russian, 22%).⁸

European countries are applying different policies to their immigration issues. In the European Union, a common legal framework for dealing with immigration began to develop in 1975, which was established as the Third Pillar in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). The national governments retained an important power as compared with the EU Commission. However the Treaty of Nice (2000) gives the EU's Council (heads of national governments) the power to vote to qualified majority on issues like non-EU national, asylum or frontier controls. Cooperation all over the EU is achieved by Europol and Eurojust nowadays.

(2) Migrants between EU countries.

The flows of migrants between European countries have been sharply increasing during the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century, from the East to the West, as it had been the case during the first millennium, following almost the same routes or so.

As a matter of fact, Western Europe is getting more attractive to Central and Eastern Europeans than ever since frontiers have been lowered and the EU has grown toward the East. But free movement is not allowed overnight.

All new members of the EU are on a "2+3+2" year arrangement as for labor movement between member states. Workers from the 12 EU new comers (Central and Eastern European countries), just like non EU workers, are more or less discriminated at the borders of the older member states until the end of the 7 year arrangement. Non-official filters

are established nowadays when some Western economies (Germany, Denmark) are in dire need of skilled workers⁹ whereas migrants to Ireland are mainly unskilled.

On the other hand, circulation is completely free inside the Schengen area (30 countries signed the Schengen Agreement¹⁰ of which 13 countries¹¹ have implemented the Agreement in 1997; 15 in 2007; and 23 in 2008¹²).

Is there any discrimination?

The most frequent discrimination against non-nationals is about religion more than citizenship. Thirteen European countries still do not recognize Islam as a religion, the fast growing second-largest religion in some 16 of the 37 European countries. More than 23 million declared Muslims are European residents, accounting for 5 percent of the total population.

Discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnicity is more developed in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and is less frequent in Greece, Ireland or Finland than in other EU countries.¹³ Economic discrimination tends to curb down, the EU's law is strongly enforced against the practice of discrimination and awareness campaigns have been launched in most member states.¹⁴

By and large, less discrimination can be observed in the working place. Migrants adapt usually to the business culture of the firm where they work.

3. Economic and Business Cultures

It is frequent to state, and it clears the landscape to say, that there are three dominant economic and business cultures in Europe¹⁵, epitomized by the three

largest economies: Britain, France, and Germany. Despite a seamless single market and hundreds of directives from the EU Commission, they still display their same genuine characteristics, although to a lesser extent.

The British and Irish economies have always been more market-oriented and market-driven than other European economies. The economies of Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden can be labeled “managed” economies, whereas French and Italian economies have been clear examples of interventionist and state capitalist economies, more ideology-driven.

The German economy shows a cooperative labor-business relationship; firms are well known as producing and exporting high quality products, and workers are highly skilled and paid.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital between EU members is asserted as a fundamental principle by the Maastricht Treaty. Businesses of all size are allowed to settle in any EU country. But the single market is not yet completely achieved. The last and most significant remnant of the previous Europe is the absence of a unique European financial market. The London stock exchange is still far bigger than any other European stock exchange, and it is also the biggest in the world in bonds trading. It benefited more than its continental counterparts from their common “big-bangs” in the mid 1980s.

For about twenty years, the liberalized French firms learned how not to be anymore under the protection of the government, under the intensification of globalization and the EU Commission competitive pressure. For example, like German businesses, they progressively turned to equity financing instead of depending on the banks and the state.

All businesses in Europe had to adjust the EU’s overall deregulation that tolled the death-knell of monopolies and entry barriers in many industries. Germany has deregulated more often way ahead of what the EU was asking, and the UK did it even earlier than any other member state, during the Thatcher era. For this reason, the UK encountered fewer problems than other European countries. Germany, after a difficult transition around 2000, is again the leading European economy. France accepted a minimum deregulation of her services, far less than required by EU directives. French politicians never really gave up their preference for centralization with some control over the economy (let alone firms and people).

Consequently, there is no such thing as a unique

model of business culture in Europe. British firms and CEOs are still closely linked to the financial market, which rewards or punishes firms’ management as reflected in the value of the stocks. British households and private investors own 80% of the British shares, as compared with an average of 40% in France and Germany. The degree of competition between British firms is pretty high and fair.

German Small and Medium Sized (SMS) businesses are more integrated in the whole society, linked to regional banks. Their CEOs have to take into account a wide range of concerns aside from the financial market. As an example, German employees sit on the supervisory boards, and working conditions are designed at the firm’s level by the workers’ councils.

French business culture is quite the opposite. Instead of sitting around a table, unions send their troops into the streets. Firms have still interconnected but very autonomous CEOs. Most of them established their networks while attending the “Grande Écoles.” Like EOS in Germany, French business managers share elite state education.

The European diversity of business cultures will not transform into a unique kind, even in the foreseeable future. The World Competitiveness Yearbook in 2000 ranked Germany 5th in the world for the quality of its products (France was 15th and UK was 28th). The service sector is more important in France and in the UK (73% of the labor force, as in the US) than in Germany (63%). France ranks 6th, Germany 8th and UK 21st for firms with global productivity. And while Germany trains 34% of each workers’ cohort, France trains 28% and the UK only 11% of it. But the UK shows lower unemployment with about 4% (8% in France, 9% in Germany).

In conclusion, with very flexible specialization, high wages, high skilled and cooperative workers (along with a higher degree of protection), Germany is a model that can hardly be copied by other European neighbors. The high-end manufacturing (for example the automobile industry) collapsed in the UK because it had lower wages, a lower level of training, and a low-skilled labor force. French business stands right in the middle, more skilled and trained workers than in the UK but less than in Germany.

European diversity will not subside in a unique EU framework of regulations and policies. Cultures have a long history and their personal traits and characteristics are probably even exacerbated by the progression of a common and unique playground.

As Mark Leonard, director of Foreign Policy at the London Center for European Reform, writes, “The European Union is about enhancing rather than destroying national identities.”¹⁶ “The European vision”, he contends, “has never aimed to establish a single model of human progress: it is about allowing diverse and competing cultures to live together in peace.” Doing this, “Europe’s contribution to civilization entitles it to be more than a mere economic power.”¹⁷

Affairs, NY, 2005, pp. 15 and 17.

17. Rodney Leach. *Europe. A concise encyclopedia*, Profile Books, London, 2000, p. ix.


Notes

1. John Hume’s acceptance speech Oslo 1998, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/nobeljh.htm> (my emphasis).
2. Mark Leonard. *Why Europe will run the 21st Century*, Public Affairs publishers, NY 2005, p. 92.
3. Walter van Gerven. *The European Union, a polity of states and peoples*, Stanford University Press, 2005, p 46.
4. *Europeans and Languages*, Eurobarometer, September 2005.
5. Cf. John McCormick. *Understanding the European Union*, Palgrave MacMillan, N.Y. 2005, p. 140.
6. Rainer Münz, “Migrants, Labour Markets and Integration in Europe,” *Commission Mondiale sur les Migrations Internationales*, # 16, October 2004.
7. In 2004.
8. In 2004, “Non-national population in the EU,” *Statistics in Focus*, Eurostat, June 2006.
9. It becomes obvious in 2007.
10. First signed in 1990.
11. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, UK, Cyprus, Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Romania.
12. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic joined in December 2007.
13. “Discrimination in Europe”, *Eurobarometer*, 57.0, May 2003.
14. Not all member states have implemented the Race and Employment Directive of 2000.
15. See Schmidt. Vivien A. *The Futures of European Capitalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
16. Mark Leonard. *Why Europe will run the 21st century*, Public



London (England). Photo Courtesy Sylvain Gallais

V. Book Review



**Thomas, Hugh. *Beaumarchais in Seville. An Intermezzo.*
New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006.**

177 pp. 21 b/w photos.

ISBN 0-300-12103-2.

Cloth: \$25.00.

Aleksandra Gruzinska, Arizona State University

Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais (1732-1799), was the son of a reputed French watchmaker. He later followed in his father's footsteps by becoming a watchmaker himself. Society is indebted to this young man who at the age of twenty-one invented a new escapement for watches that revolutionized the way we keep time with precision. He is remembered less for this scientific invention, than for his trilogy of plays: *Le Barbier de Séville* in 1775 (*The Barber of Seville*), *Le Mariage de Figaro* in 1778 (*The Marriage of Figaro*) and *La Mère coupable* in 1792 (*The Guilty Mother*). The first two remain imbedded in our memory because of their lively and loquacious rogue and main character, Figaro. Music giants Mozart and Rossini were inspired by Beaumarchais's plays and composed operas that today still enjoy great popularity.

The title of *Beaumarchais in Seville* is somewhat misleading since Beaumarchais never set foot in Seville (Spain). He only used Seville as a setting for his two famous plays. Hugh Thomas, the author of *beaumarchais in Seville*, assumes not only the role of a historian but also that of a playwright. He shapes his work like an *intermezzo*, in the genre of a short stage or operatic performance. He documents historically and culturally Beaumarchais's

one year stay in Madrid, an *intermezzo* in itself situated midway in Beaumarchais's life. It is a lively fast moving *entr'acte* in ten scenes traditionally designated in a book as chapters. The *Dramatis Personae* (xi-xiv), however, are not fictional stage characters but real-life eighteenth-century personalities from France and Spain. They come from the highest political and social echelons, including King Louis XV of France for instance and Charles III, King of Spain. They are all brought to life in an elegant fast-moving style illustrated with twenty-one black and white photographs.

The voyage to Spain started in April 1764 and ended in March 1765. Beaumarchais undertook the trip for personal reasons, mainly to avenge the honor of his sister, Lisette, to whom Clavijo, a well-positioned gentleman in Spanish society, promised marriage but never married her (Chap. II, IV and V). Thus the family's honor was at stake. During the trip Beaumarchais also planned to take care of some business enterprises devised by a powerful financier, Joseph Pâris-Duverney. He provided generous funds to assure his *protégé's* success in three schemes risky enough to provide rich subject matter for dramas and operas. He is the same Pâris-Duverney who possibly inspired Madame de Pompadour that she convince King

Louis XV to build the Ecole Militaire, which now faces the Eiffel tower in Paris. Duverney dreamt of becoming the commissary of the Spanish armed forces, a position that might have meant vast profits (Chap. VI, 82). He envisioned colonizing unpopulated areas in the Sierra Morena (Chap VI, 87), and obtaining a license to trade slaves to the Spanish empire (Chap. VI, 80). Slavery was indeed a very lucrative business at the time, and profits primed in business over moral and ethical concerns. Statements like those uttered by Voltaire, “After all, the Africans sell their own people, we only buy them, so we must be superior” (Chap. VI, 91) may have sounded witty and convincing to the many admirers of Voltaire. Others argued that “the conditions of life of Africans were so appalling in their own countries that the Europeans did them a service by offering them opportunities in the New World” (Chap. VI, 92). These opinions represented a way of thinking that somehow made slavery look morally possible, less appalling and damning. It is almost a relief to learn that the eloquent dramatist Beaumarchais failed in all four missions: Lisette never married and remained a spinster. As for Duverney’s three schemes, richly documented, they came to naught because of the mistrust the Spanish had of the French.

Beaumarchais’s trip, nonetheless, was not a failure but a success. In an era when travel was risky and dangerous, he experienced Spain first hand as an eye-witness. He met colorful characters, made friends, attended plays and *tertulias* or social gatherings comparable to the French eighteenth-century *salons*, and spent Duverney’s money while he immersed himself in a different culture. Lord Thomas is not only a savvy historian who explores original documents and especially letters, be they from Spain, France or Russia, he also provides solid cultural information and details about life in Madrid (Chap. VIII); about gambling and theater life (Chap. IX), and the staging of less known dramatic plays like *sainetes* and *tonadillas* (Chap. IX, 132) by playwrights who were popular during Beaumarchais’s stay in Madrid. Beaumarchais may have seen performed on stage the *sainetes* of Ramón de la Cruz for instance. While their influence may have contributed later to assure the success of Beaumarchais’s dramatic creations as Sir Hugh Thomas suggests in his book, Beaumarchais certainly had in France another model in the great Molière, some of whose plays were inspired by Spanish writers.

Lord Thomas enlarges the historical approach by exploring culture, a process we more often associate with

literary scholars who explore works of art within the society that inspired them. Culture allows for some speculation. Whether Beaumarchais in effect did see performed the plays by Ramon de la Cruz remains uncertain, but the vivid details of plots and the places where the plays were performed, as detailed by Lord Thomas, allow the reader to experience them as if he were right on the premises. Beaumarchais may also have witnessed exotic events such as *corridos* or bull fights as Sir Thomas suggests. He introduces the reader to less common Spanish cultural terms such as *chorizos* and *folia*, *calenda*, *majos* and *majas*, *seguidillas gitanas*, *claquettes*; words that refer to dances, plays and performers, Spanish culture and Spanish life (Chap. VIII-IX). As a rule, their elucidations belong more to the cultural, dramatic and literary domain than to History with a capital H.

What makes this book a truly delightful reading experience is not only the subject matter, the historic and cultural approach, the exotic colorful characters, but the elegant, light and fast-moving style. It will delight different groups of readers, those who want to be entertained by a good book, and those who value well-documented information that inspires and stimulates our curiosity and desire to learn and increase our repertoire of knowledge. The book is truly an *intermezzo*, free from all pretentious scholarly linguistic baggage. It affords the reader the freedom and pleasure of concentrating on the text and context. It contributes a new dimension to two chapters on Spain included in “the late Maurice Lever’s admirable life of Beaumarchais” (163) which served to inspire *Beaumarchais in Seville*.

VI. Fourth Annual RMESC Conference Program



Friday, October 19, 2009

Saturday, October 20, 2009

Friday, October 19, 2007			
Morning Sessions			
Business Administration BA 353			
8:15-8:30 Conference Wide Assembly I			
Greetings and Welcome			
Joe Cutter , Director of School of International Letters & Cultures Deborah N. Losse , Dean of the Division of Humanities, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences			
8:30-9:00			
Sander E. van der Leeuw , Chair School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University			
BA 353		BA 365	
9:00-10:30	Session A–Slavdom’s Language/Literature & Identity – 20 minute sessions	Panel/Session B–French Cultural Myths & National Identity. 20-minute sessions	9:00 - 10:30
9:00-9:20	Fielder, Grace . University of Arizona. [Russian] Discourse Markers in the Balkans.	Frederick, Patricia E. Northern Arizona University. National Identity and French Cultural Myth in Film.	9:00-9:20
9:20-9:40	Farbishel, Tatiana . Arizona State University. National Folklore: Reflection of Russian National Identity.	Hess, Erika . Northern Arizona University. Re-reading French Medieval Literature: Parallels with French Contemporary Identity.	9:20-9:40
9:40-10:00	Šipka, Danko . Arizona State University. New Words and Old Identities: Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Lexical Changes of the 1990s.	Mouaya, Joseph . Flagstaff Arts & Leadership Academy. Mythic France: An African Perspective.	9:40-10:00
10:00-10:20	Wright, William W. Looking to and from the West in Tom Stoppard’s The Coast of Utopia	Bauge, Nicole . Northern Arizona University. Study Abroad. Myth vs. Reality	10:00-10:20
Chair and Moderator: Lee Croft , ASU		Moderator: Patricia E. Frederick , NAU	
Pause - 10:30-10:45 - Break			
10:45-12:15	Session C–Who are the Germans?	Session D–Definitions of Identity	10:45-12:15
10:45-11:15	Keller-Lally, Ann . University of Northern Colorado. German Reunification in Film: Dismantling the Psychological Wall.	Feinstein, Wiley I. Loyola University, Chicago. Strong Jewish Identity in Contemporary Italy.	10:45-11:15

11:15-11:45	Rundell, Richard. New Mexico State University, Las Cruces. Learning Lessons. Germans as Good Neighbors: Liedermacher Songs and Promoting Tolerance.	Leahy, Elise. C. Southern Utah University. Shame and National Identity in Works by Magyd Cherfi.	11:15-11:45
11:45-12:15	Steckel, Gerd. University of Idaho. “Leitkultur” or “Islam Conference” Questions on Immigration into Germany.	Stoenescu, Stefan. Independent Scholar. Sibiu’s Long-Standing Cultural Diversity as Topic of Lyrical Sequence by Contemporary Romanian Poet Dumitru Chioaru.	11:45-12:15
Moderator: Volker Benkert , ASU		Moderator: Mark Von Hagen , ASU	
12:15-1:15 Friday Box Lunch MU 219 Navajo & MU 221 Apache			
Friday, October 19, 2007			
Afternoon Sessions			
BA 353		BA 365	
1:15-2:45	Panel/Session E—Asia Anglicized, Europe Asianized: The Case of Contemporary Britain	Session F—Conflicts in Identity	1:15-2:45
1:15-1:45	Castle, Gregory. Arizona State University. “Mehr Licht”: Bildung and Enlightenment in Hanif Kureishi’s The Buddha of Suburbia	Bebber, Brett. University of Arizona. The Panopticon Manifest: The Early History of Closed-Circuit Television and English Football Violence.	1:15-1:45
1:45-2:15	Codell, Julie. Arizona State University. Re-writing Diversity across Generations: South Asian Film and the South Asian Diaspora in Britain		1:45-2:15
2:15-2:45	Solis, Ted, Solis. Arizona State University. “We’re British:” Deracinated Gamelan in Britain.		2:15-2:45
Moderator: Julie Codell , ASU		Moderator: Victoria Thompson , ASU	
Pause - 2:45-3:00 - Break			
3:15-3:45	Session G—Identity in Emigration	Session H—Clash of Identities: Catholicism	3:15-3:45
3:00-3:30	Elstob, Kevin. California State University, Sacramento. A Decade after Hate: Representations of Immigrant Culture in French Cinema.	Ayers, Rachel. University of Arizona. Defending the Rebellion: Cardinal Goma y Tomas, the Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War.	3:00-3:30
3:30-4:00	Reuther, Jessica. University of Arizona. Neither Whores nor Doormats: Immigrants, Identity, and Social Activism in France.	Foster, David. Arizona State University. Madalena Schwartz: A Jewish-Brazilian Photographer	3:30-4:00

4:00-4:30	Weckström, Lotta. University of Jyvaskyla, Finland. Going to school in Diaspora.		4:00-4:30
Moderator: Giuseppe Candela , ASU		Moderator: Wiley Feinstein , Loyola University	
4:30 – 7:00 PM Dinner on your own—7:00-9:00 PM Film screening Social Sciences SS229			

Saturday, October 20 , 2007
Morning Sessions

BA 353		BA 365	
9:00 - 10:30	Session I—Development and Growth Problems.	Session J—Critical Perspectives on European Modernity	9:00 - 10:30
9:00-9:30	Croft, Lee. Arizona State University. Declining Automotive Diversity in the 20th Century: The Fate of Nine European Marques.	Brown, William. Mesa State College (Colorado). Metahistory, Crisis, and “The Lived Myth” in Thomas Mann’s “Disorder and Early Sorrow.”	9:00-9:30
9:30-10:00	Dall’erba, Sandy. University of Arizona. Impact of Structural Funds on Regional Growth: How to Reconsider a 7 Year-Old Black Box.	Freeman, Michael R. Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado. Retaining Critical Authority: Mark Tobey and European Modernism	9:30-10:00
10:00-10:30	Jacoby, Wade. Brigham Young University. The EU and Central Europe	Orlich, Ileana. Arizona State University. Magic Realism as Narrative Discourse in Recent Romanian Fiction.	10:00-10:30
Moderator: Sylvain Gallais , ASU		Moderator: Ileana Orlich , ASU	

Pause - 10:30-10:45 - Break

10:45-12:15	Session K—Power and Justice	Session L—Cultural Diversity	10:45-12:15
10:45-11:05	Clarke, Kris. California State University. Fresno. Ethnicized Bodies and the Nordic Welfare State: Notions of Cultural Competence in Finnish Social Work	Elorrieta, Jabier. Arizona State University. The Basque Conflict and the Apparent Clash of Ethnic vs Civic Nationalism.	10:45-11:15
11:05-11:25	Niebuhr, Robert. Boston College. Department of History. A Struggle for the Hearts and Minds: Ideology and Yugoslavia’s Third Way to Paradise.	Reese, Marilya V. Northern Arizona University. Dealing with the Baggage: Zehra Cirak’s & Juergen Walter’s Integrationskoffer	11:15-11:45
11:25-12:45	Stedham, Yvonne. University of Nevada Reno. Business Ethics – A Justice Perspective: A comparative Study of German and Italian Business Students	Wilson, Lindsay. Northern Arizona University. Diversity in Science: Gender, Nationality, and Method. Marie Bonaparte (1882-1962) and the Parisian Society of Psychoanalysis	11:45-12:45
Moderator: Sylvain Gallais , ASU		Moderator: Peter Horwath , ASU	

12:15-1:15 Lunch on your own

Saturday, October 20, 2007
Afternoon Sessions

BA 353		BA 365	
1:15-2:45	Session M—Economic Changes and Identities. - 20 minute presentations	Session N—Identities in Literary Reflection -20 minute sessions	1:15-2:45
1:15-1:35	Bryson, Phillip J. ; Brigham Young University. European Union Regional Economic Development Policies: Their Past and Prospects.	Enders, Victoria Loree. Northern Arizona University. Gender and Nationalism in early 20th Century Catalonia.	1:15-1:35
1:35-1:55	Gallais, Sylvain. Arizona State University. European Diversity as a Common Wealth	Watson, William Van. University of Arizona. Calvino, Monty Python and the Archaic Patriarchy of the Holy Grail.	1:35-1:55
1:55-2:15	Kresl, Peter. Bucknell University. The Economic Consequences for EU Cities of an Aging Population.	Gruzinska, Aleksandra. Arizona State University. Octave Mirbeau’s La 628-E8 as an Expression of Europe’s Diversity.	1:55-2:15
2:15-2:35	Kurzer, Paulette. University of Arizona. Strength in Diversity? How the European Commission Takes On New Policy Fields in an Enlarged EU.		2:15-2:35
Moderator: Peter Kresl , ASU		Moderator: Aleksandra Gruzinska , ASU	
Pause - 2:45-3:00 - Break			
3:00-4:00	BA 353		3:15-4:00
3:00-4:00	<p style="text-align: center;">Conference-Wide Assembly —“The future of RMESC” Presiding: Giuseppe Candela, Chair Lee Croft, Co-Chair; David Foster, Co-chair</p> <p>Plans for a Consortium; University[ies] support Finances, Bank Account, PayPal option Exploring Future Grants Publication of <i>Connections</i> Vol. 4 (2008) Deadline for submitting final version of paper Anonymous Peer reviews Planning for the 5th Annual RMESC Conference New Business Conference Evaluation/Appreciation/Comments</p> <p style="text-align: center;">A safe return home</p>		