Interdependent Preferences: Biological  versus economic rationality

When entities interact in an economic game setting, it is typically assumed that the entities make strategic choices based only on what they believe they alone will gain from the interaction. In other words, a rational actor cares only about absolute payoffs from a game. Yet, in terms of evolutionary fitness, only relative payoff, or fitness, matters in the struggle for survival. Economics has been slow to incorporate this idea into theories of rationality, though the subfield of evolutionary economics does explore the importance of interdependent preferences on economic decision making. The "relative gains" debate exists likewise in the field of international relations regarding the importance that relative standing has on national strategic decisions. In this research theme I explore how evolutionary biology, microeconomic behavior, and international relations share a fundamental dichotomy between absolute and relative payoff concerns and seek to determine the importance of relative payoffs in each arena. Understanding how decisions are affected by relative concerns may lead to better design of multinational treaties, a deeper understanding of human behavior, and insights into the evolution of cooperative behavior that is ubiquitous in the history of life.

RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS

2016Title: Interdependent Preferences and Prospects for Global Sustainability
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Journal: International Journal of Sustainability Policy and Practice 12(3):25-39
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2013 Title: Religion as a Superorganism
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Conference: Conference on Emergent Approaches to Human Sociality and Religion
Venue: Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 06-Oct-2013
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2013 Title: Towards a generalized framework for studying continuous 2-player games
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology 321:40-43
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2013 Title: Tag-mediated altruism is contingent on how cheaters are defined
Author(s): S.T. Shutters, D. Hales
Journal: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 16(1):4
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2013 Title: Collective action and the detrimental side of punishment
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Journal: Evolutionary Psychology 11(2):327-346
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2012 Title: Punishment leads to cooperative behavior in structured societies
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Journal: Evolutionary Computation 20(2):301-319
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2011 Title: From cells to states: A unifying framework of social relativity
Author(s): S.T. Shutters, M. Halás
Conference: European Consortium for Political Research 2011 general conference
Venue: University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland. 27-Aug-2011
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2009 Title: Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of cooperative behavior
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Doctoral Thesis: Arizona State University, School of Life Sciences
Advisor: Ann P. Kinzig
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2009 Title: Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Journal: Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 15(2):64-77
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2009 Title: Punishment, Rational Expectations, and Relative Payoffs in a Networked Prisoners Dilemma
Author(s): S.T. Shutters
Book: Social Computing and Behavioral Modeling, 201-208
Editor(s): H. Liu, J.J. Salerno, M.J. Young
Publisher: Springer. New York, New York
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