Interdependent Preferences: Biological versus economic rationality
When entities interact in an economic game setting, it is typically assumed that the entities make strategic choices based only on what they believe they alone will gain from the interaction. In other words, a rational actor cares only about absolute payoffs from a game. Yet, in terms of evolutionary fitness, only relative payoff, or fitness, matters in the struggle for survival. Economics has been slow to incorporate this idea into theories of rationality, though the subfield of evolutionary economics does explore the importance of interdependent preferences on economic decision making. The "relative gains" debate exists likewise in the field of international relations regarding the importance that relative standing has on national strategic decisions. In this research theme I explore how evolutionary biology, microeconomic behavior, and international relations share a fundamental dichotomy between absolute and relative payoff concerns and seek to determine the importance of relative payoffs in each arena. Understanding how decisions are affected by relative concerns may lead to better design of multinational treaties, a deeper understanding of human behavior, and insights into the evolution of cooperative behavior that is ubiquitous in the history of life.
RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS
2016 | Title: Interdependent Preferences and Prospects for Global Sustainability Author(s): S.T. Shutters Journal: International Journal of Sustainability Policy and Practice 12(3):25-39 | |
2013 | Title: Religion as a Superorganism Author(s): S.T. Shutters Conference: Conference on Emergent Approaches to Human Sociality and Religion Venue: Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 06-Oct-2013 |
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2013 | Title: Towards
a generalized
framework for studying
continuous 2-player games Author(s): S.T. Shutters Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology 321:40-43 |
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2013 | Title:
Tag-mediated altruism is contingent on how cheaters are defined Author(s): S.T. Shutters, D. Hales Journal: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 16(1):4 |
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2013 | Title:
Collective action and the detrimental side of punishment Author(s): S.T. Shutters Journal: Evolutionary Psychology 11(2):327-346 |
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2012 | Title:
Punishment leads to cooperative behavior in structured societies Author(s): S.T. Shutters Journal: Evolutionary Computation 20(2):301-319 |
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2011 | Title:
From cells to states: A unifying framework of social relativity Author(s): S.T. Shutters, M. Halás Conference: European Consortium for Political Research 2011 general conference Venue: University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland. 27-Aug-2011 |
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2009 | Title:
Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of cooperative
behavior Author(s): S.T. Shutters Doctoral Thesis: Arizona State University, School of Life Sciences Advisor: Ann P. Kinzig |
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2009 | Title:
Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair
allocations in a simulated ultimatum game Author(s): S.T. Shutters Journal: Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 15(2):64-77 |
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2009 | Title: Punishment,
Rational Expectations, and Relative Payoffs in a Networked Prisoners
Dilemma Author(s): S.T. Shutters Book: Social Computing and Behavioral Modeling, 201-208 Editor(s): H. Liu, J.J. Salerno, M.J. Young Publisher: Springer. New York, New York |